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FOREWORD 
Throughout most of human history public opinion did not have an impact on society, in 
some ways it did not exist. At least not in the way it is understood today. There were no 
surveys, no Gallup polls. There were no public spheres or media platforms for discussion 
and distribution of mass preferences. There were no policy-makers working to keep their 
jobs via public support. Leadership was imposed instead of elected. Individuals existed in 
familial and social groups that were hierarchical. By design these families and societies 
had leaders who made decisions for the group. These were often the most physically 
dominant, traditionally appointed, or oldest members. In family-units this was often one 
person, while in social groups of many families (e.g. tribes, kinship networks, small 
societies) decisions often were made by small groups of elders or dominant individuals. 
The public were out-of-the-loop and obliged to accept the decisions made for them. Often 
there were social norms or scripts that determined how the public should think and act 
and these were not open to deliberation or debate.  
As the size of societies increased, the concept of stewardship and nobility arose as 
ruling without direct familial linkages. Nobles would rule over societies and excise taxes 
and claim other rights to ownership of the labor, physical being, and material possessions 
of their subjects. The public were bound to the rule of an imposed hierarchy. Although 
the size and concentration of societies into cities arguably allowed the public to 
communicate and formulate public opinions, there was no voting or forum for expression 
of these opinions. Only in extreme cases if the public were fed up enough with their rulers 
they might revolt and overthrow them. This happened in the First Spanish Republic, the 
French Revolution and the 1917 Russian Revolutions for example. 
There are no measures of public opinion from historical revolutions in Europe and 
Asia. If a monarch was overthrown, public dissatisfaction is inferred. Furthermore, even 
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if there was public opinion, there were no organizational practices or laws that conferred 
any political power to the public. This changed with the rise of democratic ideas and mass 
social movements. Or so it seems. Today, democracy by definition and by legal 
precedents, affords the opportunity to exercise political power and decision-making to 
every citizen of a given society, so long as they are enfranchised (e.g. women and some 
ethnic groups were not in the beginning of modern democratic systems), and have not lost 
their political rights (e.g. through illegal activities).  
Today public opinion is constantly measured and discussed in democracies. But 
where do these opinions come from. Does rational thinking lead to unique individual 
opinions, or are there patterns across social class, ideology, and institutions? Do these 
public opinions actually shape policy, or are they shaped in order to fit with policy? 
These are the two main questions addressed in this dissertation. The approach is 
macro-comparative and the data are diverse and sampled from many regions and 
countries. Therefore, I hypothesize about many different ways that public opinion forms 
and how it interacts with social policy. The dissertation is presented as a coherent book, 
although the work was initially formed into three studies intent on publication as papers 
in academic journals. Largely the empirical work remains identical with that in the 
papers, but the theory has been expanded and streamlined to have a "red thread" 
connecting it, as my German colleagues would say. At the completion of this dissertation, 
one of the three papers is published, one is under review for the first time, and one has 
been reviewed and rejected several times. I am reminded by one of my supervisors that I 
am not allowed to complain about multiple rejections until I reach the lucky number of 
thirteen, which one of his mentors Art Stinchcombe achieved before finally getting a 
paper published. The dissertation is very much a work in progress. It draws on sociology, 
political science and social psychology, and is intended for an interdisciplinary audience 
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interested in public opinion, social policy, democracy and welfare states. As much as 
possible I attempt to combine sound theory with rigorous empirics. I believe that 
statistical analyses should be transparent, consistent with my personal ethical beliefs 
about science. Therefore, I provide enough information to replicate all the work 
conducted herein in the form of technical appendices presented at the end of the book. 
The work for this dissertation sprang out of my Master's studies at the University 
of Nevada, Reno and was largely completed during my three year PhD Fellowship at the 
Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences, a collaboration between the 
University of Bremen and Jacobs University in Bremen, Germany. I am grateful to the 
German Excellence Initiative of the DFG (German Research Foundation / Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft) and Steffen Mau, Alexander Gattig, Sibyl Kleiner, Olli Kangas, 
Olaf Groh-Samberg, Jonathan Kelley, Mariah Evans, Philipp Lersch, Maureen Eger, and 
Ralf Götze for their comments, and finally to Katja Hanke and Maike Schulz for serving 
on my defense committee. And special thanks to Judith Offerhaus not only for comments, 
but also undying support through the thick 'n thin of dissertation study, love and being in 
my life in general. 
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1 CHAPTER ONE  PUBLIC OPINION AND SOCIAL POLICY IN DEMOCRACIES 
Today the world is divided into nation-states that tend to operate under some degree of 
democratic government. Even the communist system of China has a process of voting, 
despite the fact that there is only one party and the system is mostly undemocratic. All 
societies today are more or less democratic with only a handful of exceptions. Figure 1 
presents some countries and their levels of democracy from none in totalitarian Saudi 
Arabia to the most democratic systems in the world, for example in Sweden and the 
United States. 
Figure 1. Democracy in Selected Countries, 2006 
 
 
Note: Data adapted from Freedom House (Teorell et al. 2010:45). 
Level of democracy in Figure 1 is measured on a scale from 0 to 10 based on the amount 
civic and political freedom individuals have in a country. Political freedom grants the 
ability to take part in political processes such as policy making. Civic freedom allows 
individuals to pursue their interests without discrimination or political oppression. The 
word democracy from Latin denotes public-rule, and the idea of democracy is to allow 
individual citizens to participate in ruling or power-sharing. A democratic society ideally 
affords all members the chance to weigh-in on the practices and policies of their society. 
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2 Chapter One  Public Opinion and Social Policy in Democracies 
 
If effective, this process should help individuals determine what interests they have in 
common and to shape society to favor these interests (Ringen 2006). At the level of 
nation-states, direct democracy where each member is involved in the decision making 
process is not logistically feasible. Instead, the people elect officials to represent their 
interests, i.e. representative democracy. With the approval of the public as expressed in 
voting and public opinion, elected officials take on the responsibility of policy making. 
Thus, at some basic level democracy carries with it the idea that public opinion has an 
influence on policy (Key 1961).  
Public opinion is an unusual concept. The words describe a singular or cohesive 
entity, but the public in even the most homogeneous societies is very diverse in terms of 
class, ethnicity and especially opinions. So what is public opinion? Surveys are one way 
to capture it. But 'it' in a large public such as the citizens of a country is often fractured in 
their opinion(s). For example, recent public opinion on the legality of abortion is divided 
between some bitterly opposed, some strongly in favor, and a majority favoring abortion 
only for exceptional cases (J. Scott 1998). These three facets of abortion opinion(s) 
constitute public opinion on abortion, as a total entity, when in reality it is not one thing. 
Surveys employing representative sampling are the only way to measure public opinion 
of an entire population. Although speaking about the public opinion of a whole group is 
like speaking about a field of grass where each blade is unique. 
Measuring opinion with surveys is arguably the best if not only way, but this 
method is not without limitations. The questions cannot capture all aspects of all issues 
and policies. Furthermore, the timing of surveys may render public opinion more or less 
meaningful. Change in democracies requires institutional processes such as deliberative 
policy-making, ballot-initiatives and scheduled meetings of legislative bodies which only 
happen at certain times. Also, different members of a public have asymmetrical 
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information leading to different opinions. Often public members are aware of social 
policies, such as pensions or health care, but not fully informed about how these policies 
work; in fact most policy-makers themselves do not possess thorough knowledge of all 
social policies and instead form expert committees. This is due to the complex natures of 
modern social policies (Pierson 1996) and large-scale bureaucratic institutions (Weber 
1921). Therefore, public opinion as measured in a survey is just a picture of a constantly 
changing and amorphous thing. 
One lesson from over a century of survey research is that public opinion is 
somewhat predictable and is shaped by a variety of social and political factors. As public 
opinion should be an important part of the political process in democracies, I seek to 
uncover more about how public opinion forms. I do not engage in a lengthy debate over 
the exact nature of democracy. This is an ongoing discussion dating back to ancient 
Greece and carried to modern times with the writings of Jefferson and Rousseau for 
example, and continues to be at the center of fervent debates (Dahl, I. Shapiro, and 
Cheibub 2003). I take the basic idea of democracy that the people within a democratic 
society have access to and influence on the policy-making decisions in that society and 
this brings politics to align with their common interests. Public opinion is, as such, as 
measure of common interests and effective democracies should transform these interests 
into social policy.  
As shown in Figure 1, and based on the full Freedom House data which is not 
shown, the advanced nations of the world all score a 10, or a perfect score in 
democraticness. Therefore, I expect that these countries should have nearly perfect 
transmission of public opinion into social policy. Despite this expectation, researchers 
struggle to demonstrate that public opinion is a cause of policy (Burstein 2003, 2006; C. 
Brooks and Manza 2007; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). A reason for this might be the fact 
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that social policy shapes public opinion (Rothstein 1998; Pierson 2000). As an empiricist 
I attempt to bring evidence to bear on the formation of public opinion and this perplexing 
relationship of public opinion and social policy. But social policy is a large net that might 
capture many policies and public opinion is a contested term. Therefore, I start this 
process by clarifying my usage of the concepts public opinion and social policy in the 
first two sections, and then I finish the chapter with a discussion of my cumulated 
dissertation research and an outline of this book.  
1.1 Public Opinion 
A quote from Floyd Allport illustrates the ambiguity of the term public opinion. 
Whether we personify the notion of the public or not, we are likely to commit a 
fallacy when we use a collective term as the subject of a verb denoting action. For 
the statement which the verb implies will often be true only of a part of the 
aggregate concerned (1937:8). 
As Allport's comment suggests, public opinion is not a single thing, nor does it possess 
qualities of action or independence. Public opinion is a theoretical concept. It is an 
aggregate measure of individual attitudes in a society. It is a phrase used by journalists, 
politicians, scholars, and in everyday language to refer to a group.  
The usage of the phrase public opinion is as a singular noun. This thing, i.e. force, 
political tool, mass preference, etc., has travelled in its meanings from the preferences 
discussed amongst the ruling elite in ancient Greece, to its connection with utility and 
rationality starting in the Enlightenment, to a manufactured product in the public sphere 
dominated by the power elite, to a near synonym of democracy based on full adult 
population enfranchisement in the past century (Splichal 1999). I use a definition of 
public opinion here as nothing more than special political attitudes. Attitudes are mental 
dispositions with a degree of favor or disfavor toward an object or entity, i.e. person, 
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place, issue, law, or weather pattern for example; and political attitudes are those that 
concern government, power relations, policy, and societal organization. It is important to 
point out that attitudes often predict individual actions (McBroom and Reed 1992), and 
public opinion predicts social and political outcomes (Converse 1987). Understanding 
action and outcomes has been a central task of social, political and economic theorists for 
as long as they have been around (cf. Coleman 1986). Measuring opinion is important for 
understanding social and political behavior; it helps determine the mood of a given 
society at a particular time (Zaller 1992). Public opinion should predict collective action 
and it should shape social policy. But public opinion is not just any set of political 
attitudes. To qualify as public opinion these attitudes must have special characteristics. 
Public opinion is not just any aggregate measure of individual attitudes within a 
group, it only encompasses special attitudes. Paraphrasing from Allport (1937:13), public 
opinion should meet some rough criteria to qualify it as a special kind of attitudes. In 
order to have formed public opinion on a particular topic or event, individuals must be 
capable of expression of their attitudes on this topic and articulation of others' attitudes. 
This requires universal or widespread awareness of the topic. Many individuals will have 
attitudes about this topic as opposed to general apathy. The topic must be something in 
transition or have the potential to be changed, such as an objective or goal for society. 
Attitudes are often polarized or diverse in favor or opposition of objectives related to this 
topic. Finally, individuals are aware that many others have attitudes about this topic and 
shape their attitudes and behaviors in response to this public awareness. Take the 
examples of nuclear power and the sale of raw milk. While individuals may form 
coherent opinions on whether each of these should be legal, raw milk is not a polarizing 
topic with widespread awareness. Furthermore, outside of special interest groups there is 
little initiative to change the legality of milk sales, whereas some countries made recent 
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decisions to end the usage of nuclear power in the near future after major news events and 
many public discussions and protests (Dempsey 2011). Those who wish to study public 
opinion must be aware of what topics fit these criteria. 
Which opinions fit these special criteria are shaped by political elites and the 
media because each individual cannot experience most major or public events, unless 
they occur in the individual's immediate surroundings. Thus, individuals are dependent on 
second-hand information for opinion formation. This information is collected, discussed 
and disseminated by policy elites, e.g. politicians, policy-makers, academics and policy 
related journalists. Although the public gets this information second-hand, this is a 
constant truth about how members of the public get their information. I focus only in this 
book on what happens after information is received, regardless of the source(s) from 
where it comes which is studied elsewhere (Zaller 1992).  
Walter Lipmann helps contextualize this experience by referencing Plato's 
shadows of reality. Like the prisoners in Plato's cave whose heads are fixed to look only 
away from the entrance to the cave and who thus see only the shadows cast by those 
passing by outside. The prisoners discuss what is taking place outside the cave as though 
they experienced it. Individuals everywhere experience shadows cast by what is 
happening out of their field of vision, these shadows are found in second-hand 
information such as the media. Lipmann brings up the example of an island in 1914 
inhabited by English, French and German inhabitants where news from off the island is 
irregularly delivered. These individuals learned of the outbreak of war six weeks after the 
event and, "for six strange weeks they had acted as if they were friends, when in fact they 
were enemies" (Lipmann 1949:vii-5). These island inhabitants had a public opinion; it 
was one coherent thing that directed their continued peaceful cooperation for six weeks, 
even though they were technically at war. If there was a survey of these island inhabitants 
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it would surely show that they believed that there was peace and thus constituted a social 
force for holding together their way of life.  
Surveys are one of the most important tools for measuring or glimpsing the 
shadow-reality with which members of social groups conduct their affairs. Unless the 
group is extremely small, it is not possible to discuss opinion with every member and this 
brings about the need for sampling from the population. Furthermore, the questions asked 
on the survey cannot cover all possible topics to be the object of opinion. Thus, scientists 
design surveys to identify what issues should be public opinion. They cannot know ahead 
of time what topics will be widely opined, but use theory and pilot research to develop 
questions to ask of the public. Thus, public opinion as it is measured will never be the 
thing that it is theorized to be, it becomes some approximation of what is intended. The 
closer that survey questions get to asking about the most relevant and widely held social 
and political preferences of a given population, the more accurate the theoretical models 
and the deeper the understanding of how human society functions and changes. After 
identifying what topics should be a part of public opinion social scientists then measure 
attitudes toward these topics using surveys. The type of survey determines public opinion. 
Public opinion is like a wave-particle. It may be measured at distinct locations at fixed 
points in time, but it remains perpetually in motion. There is uncertainty over one person's 
opinion at any specific moment, but there is strong statistical probability that many 
people will have levels of opinions during a given timeframe.  
Taking a step further, the public whose opinion should be known, must be 
definable as a singular group. Thus, in the case of Germany, the public is all Germans. 
This can be further broken down into voting-age Germans, non-citizen residents, or in 
any number of other ways. Therefore the surveys utilized by scientists must target 
specific groups. Again in the case of raw milk, surveys might only target dairy farmers 
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and the small group of consumers interested in this product as a way of constructing 
public opinion toward raw milk. To capture a group opinion requires knowledge about 
the quantity and whereabouts of the group members. If the group is sufficiently large, as 
with a country, it requires sampling from the population.  
As my dissertation focuses on public opinion in a cross-national comparison, it is 
best to use the pluralized term public opinions. In the first place, each nation-state may be 
conceived as having a public residing within its borders. The events that impact the 
country and the ensuing policy responses are not isolated from the global community, but 
they are restricted heavily to national politics and media coverage. Thus, each nation-state 
has its own public opinion, and when comparing nations there arises the need for the term 
public opinions. Furthermore, within each country the formation of public opinion around 
important issues is divisive. Thus different coherent opinions form in different coherent 
publics, for example migrants and natives, rich and poor, or men and women. 
1.2 Social Policy 
Social policy is a category of government policies that target the welfare (i.e. well-being) 
of individuals in society. I use this term as synonymous with welfare policy, although I 
recognize that the term welfare is negatively connoted in some settings, in the US 
especially. Social policy includes public, as opposed to private, provisions of welfare and 
redistribution. For example pensions, health care, unemployment, housing and even food. 
Social policy is a broad term with many potential sub-categories, and policies related to 
families, marriage, migration and more may also be considered social policies so long as 
they are relevant for the basic needs or well-being of individuals. Basic needs may be 
loosely defined, but most traditionally these encompass forms of material security and 
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health. One particularly contentious issue is redistribution to the poor. Many individuals 
see the poor as personally responsible for their positions in life, and have no interest in 
using tax money to redistribute resources to them. Others see the poor as victims of the 
structure of society and in need of (and deserving) assistance (Van Oorschot 2000). 
Social policy requires some kinds of redistribution from those who have to those who 
have not, or have less, because social policy is funded through tax monies, and thus it is 
expected that those who earn and spend more will contribute more through taxes. 
Meanwhile those who earn and spend less will contribute less in taxes. So even if all 
members received equal material benefits from social policy, it would be redistributive 
due to taxation. 
Social policy is a sub-category of policy that is part of the larger public policy 
category which includes any governmental policy that impacts individuals' lives whether 
welfare related or not. For example, the legality of abortion which only impacts the 
welfare of those involved with an unplanned or unwanted pregnancy, or, the legality of 
alcohol consumption in public which arguably has no direct impact on general public 
welfare. By welfare I follow a literal definition as "the state of doing well especially in 
respect to good fortune, happiness, well-being, or prosperity" (M-W 2012). Thus, social 
policy targeting welfare provides for individuals who experience lapses in well-being or 
prosperity. Lapses may be random, as with illness or sudden job loss, or may be 
concomitant with life course phase, for example young workers, students or old aged 
persons who have less ability to provide for their material securities. Social policy also 
targets group lapses in welfare, for example women whose incomes are tied to male-
breadwinners in more traditional households, ethnic minorities who face discrimination in 
attempts to provide for their own well-being, or individuals who do not have enough 
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education or capital to secure welfare in a competitive market. Whether for individuals or 
groups who struggle to obtain welfare, social policy is a means of redistribution to them. 
Social policies appeared in almost all societies throughout human history. Ancient 
Greeks developed systems for offering provisions to citizens in case of sickness, 
unemployment and or compensation for being a veteran of war for example (Ierley 1984). 
Similar practices were a feature of Roman society, the early settlements in North 
America, and across Europe, even during the tumultuous medieval times (Parker 1998). 
However, modern nation-states are qualitatively different from previous welfare systems. 
Since the beginning of the 20th Century, the most advanced countries of the world 
developed nationally centralized bureaucracies designed to publically coordinate welfare 
provision. This came with the process of nation-state building. This was a departure from 
previous provision systems which came from families, churches and local organizations, 
or monarchs or other forms of the power elite. Especially after the 1940s, the most 
advanced nation-states had expansive social policy provisions and the term welfare state 
emerged as a way to describe these new country-level policy systems. To speak of social 
policy today is to speak of welfare states. 
A welfare state is a national bureaucratic framework that provides social policy at 
a level that guarantees a minimum welfare for all citizen members of the country, and 
often all legal residents. Historically the term welfare state was utilized in Great Britain 
as a new direction in social policy departing from the Poor Lawa where the state would 
end poverty and eliminate the problems of unemployment. In other words the state would 
take a heavy hand in centralizing and altering the distributional power of market forces 
(Briggs 1961). The nation-states were guarantors of civil and political rights and became 
welfare states when the provided social rights to well-being (e.g. welfare as a right) 
(Marshall 1992). The latter is evidenced in the rise of welfare states in the United 
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Kingdom, Germany and eventually Scandinavia and all of continental Europe. This 
normative framework of social rights embodied in the state is what gives welfare states a 
classification that is distinct from other nation-states that lack comprehensive social 
policy provisions.  
Welfare states manifest in a variety of forms throughout the world (Arts and 
Gelissen 2002), each containing divergent notions of social rights (Mau 2003). Who gets 
what and how much are questions asked in all welfare states, but met with answers that 
range from the US' extreme liberal market position, where provisions are minimal and 
means tested; to the United Kingdom's liberal pension and unemployment schemes, but 
generous universal health care; through German and continental European systems of 
universal welfare with important contributory and status distinctions; to the social 
democratic Scandinavian countries who generally provide for all regardless of 
contributions or means.  
The complicated historical rise of welfare states from Bismarck's Germany and 
Beveridge's England is not the focus of this dissertation. I pick up after the 
institutionalization of welfare states across the advanced western nation-states which in 
addition to welfare states, also rose to become some of the most democratic political 
systems in the world (Freedom House 2012). Thus, after the Golden Age of welfare 
expansion and through the neoliberal reforms that roughly characterize the late 70s and 
1980s, the modern western welfare state of the past 30 years emerged (Esping-Andersen 
1996). The modern welfare state is a highly stable democratic state with deeply 
entrenched policies. However, these policies diverge markedly in their characteristics 
(Arts and Gelissen 2002).  
Since the 1940s, most advanced western nations have increased spending on 
social policies as a percent of their overall wealth, suggesting an increasing commitment 
12 Chapter One  Public Opinion and Social Policy in Democracies 
 
to welfare. There are some clear exceptions, for example Sweden has seen a sudden 
decrease in spending since the mid-2000s dropping from its former prominence as the 
largest spender (OECD 2012). Also, specific social policies have changed, for example 
the Hartz IV reforms in Germany, the changes in TANF in the US, or the 'privatization' 
within public provision of the National Health Service in the United Kingdom. As social 
policies diverge across welfare states, so do public opinions. Democratic theory predicts 
that public opinion should shape the divergent welfare policies to grow and change over 
time. 
1.3 Cumulous of Three Studies 
This book presents the results of over three years of research in the area of public opinion 
and social policy. Three studies are the empirical basis for this book. The first is 
published in a peer-reviewed journal (Breznau 2009, 2010a) and it uses International 
Survey of Economic Attitudes (ISEA) data and structural equation modeling (SEM) to 
show that individuals are not merely self-interested in their opinions (cross-sections from 
1991-1996; N=13,294; country N=5). Instead, ideology and institutions shape these 
preferences. Those from formerly Communist social and political regimes, and those who 
have personal ideological orientations that are more egalitarian, are more supportive of 
price controls, subsidies and public provision of welfare. 
The second study is under review for publication (Breznau and Eger 2012). It uses 
European Social Survey (ESS) data and multilevel regression modeling to support the 
claim that in-group bias leads native born individuals in western European countries to be 
less supportive of social welfare policies when they live in areas with more foreign-born 
(cross-sections 2007-2009; N=22,049; regional N=112; country N=14). This paper is co-
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authored with Maureen A. Eger, and it required construction of a regional database of 
European countries at the NUTS 1, 2 and occasionally 3 levels, which includes measures 
of ethnic diversity, and socioeconomic and demographic conditions (collected from 
countries' census data). The models in the paper adjust for individual, regional and 
country-level variables in the complicated opinion formation process. To date Eger and I 
know of no other systematic review of Western Europe that finds strong support of the in-
group bias hypothesis. 
The third study is also in the review process (Breznau 2010b, 2011). It uses 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data aggregated to the country-level along 
with OECD data and an instrumental variables, non-recursive SEMs approach to provide 
initial evidence that there is no general feedback loop between opinion and social policy 
(i.e. welfare spending) (time period 1985-2006; country N=18; country-time N=61). 
Instead policy mostly shapes opinion at the macro-level. The apparent cross-national 
correlation of opinion and policy is determined by social and political institutional norms 
which are shown to have significant and similarly sized effects on both opinion and 
spending and in the same direction. Thus institutional alignment instead of reciprocal 
causality is supported as the mechanism between opinion and social policy.  
The purpose of this book is to combine the findings of the aforementioned papers 
into a coherent story about public opinion and social policy in advanced democratic 
countries. Chapter Two, "Determinants of Public Opinion" discusses some theories of 
what causes public opinion. It derives hypotheses about the roles of structure and 
demographics (2.1), ideology (2.2), in-group bias (2.3), and institutions (2.4). This 
chapter makes distinctions between the micro-level of individuals, the macro-level of 
countries, and the meso-level of sub-national regions. Chapter Three, "Measures of Public 
Opinion and Determinants" discusses my variable measurements and how others have 
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measured demographics, ideology, institutions and in-group bias, and derives some best 
measurement practices within the realm of available cross-national data on public opinion 
and its determinants. It concludes with a summary of hypothesized effects and the 
measurements of the variables to test for the effects, presented in Table 4. 
Chapter Four, "Testing Determinants of Public Opinion" presents the empirical 
results from the first two studies that are the basis for this cumulative dissertation. The 
first in section (4.1) focuses on the individual level, it tests three hypotheses related to the 
impact of self-interest, egalitarian ideology and former Communist institutions on support 
for three types of social policy. The second section (4.2) presents the results from the 
second study looking at in-group bias in Western Europe, focusing on the individual and 
regional levels (i.e. micro and meso) and the effects of ethnic diversity. 
Chapter Five, "Causality of Public Opinion and Social Policy" discusses the 
relationship of public opinion and social policy. It reviews relevant theory and empirical 
findings about a reciprocal relationship between the two, i.e. feedback loop (5.1), and 
about plausible institutional factors that might create the appearance of feedback due to 
simultaneous impacts on opinion and policy, i.e. institutional alignment (5.2). These two 
hypotheses give competing explanations for the cross-national correlation of public 
opinion and social policy. Then Chapter Six, "Testing for Feedback and Alignment" 
presents the empirical results from the third study undergirding this dissertation which 
focuses on the macro-level relationship of opinion and policy cross-nationally.  
Chapter Seven, "Perspectives on Public Opinion and Social Policy" summarizes 
the findings of the research presented in this book. The chapter breaks down into three 
sections that review empirics and limitations; first study (7.1.1), second study (7.1.2), and 
third study (7.1.3), and five sections reviewing theoretical implications; self-interest 
(7.2.1), ideology (7.2.2), in-group bias (7.2.3), institutions (7.2.4), and a theory of 
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opinion-policy (7.2.5). The chapter concludes that self-interest and ideology are both 
driving forces of opinion formation, although ideology may be even more important. 
Also, that both social and political institutional norms found in Communism, 
individualism and corporatism shape public opinions. Finally, it concludes that although 
public opinion probably has an impact on social policy, this does not appear to be a 
general impact across democratic societies. Instead, institutions align opinion and policy 
into a cross-national pattern. The stability of social spending indicates that path 
dependency of policy impacts the otherwise erratic nature of public opinion. The 
conclusion (7.3) presents some normative digressions on democracy, public opinion and 
social policy. 
  
16 Chapter One  Public Opinion and Social Policy in Democracies 
 
  
17 
 
 
2 CHAPTER TWO DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC OPINION 
Public opinions are somewhat random and somewhat predictable. The parts of opinions 
that may be predicted are the focus of the theory in this section. This section looks at 
what causes public opinion formation. Self-interest is one cause. Opinions favor policies 
that bring material benefits. Also, opinions are ideologically motivated, and individuals' 
normative beliefs about the world shape their preferences. Ideologies are passed on from 
parents, schooling and peers, but also from the context of socialization. Individuals 
identify themselves as members of groups and define their opinions based on these 
subjective memberships, or group consciousnesses. They often prefer to share with or 
protect resources of their perceived in-groups. Also, the institutions of a society shape 
public opinion by providing norms for actions and behaviors. In the following sections I 
review some of the literature on self-interest, ideology, in-group bias and institutions in 
the formation of public opinion.  
I focus on three levels of opinion formation: The individual level which is also the 
micro-level, the regional level within countries which is a meso-level, and the country or 
nation-state which is my highest order level known as the macro-level. In order to 
understand public opinion of a group or country, it is important to look at the 
determinants at all three of these levels because there are strong theoretical reasons that 
all matter for shaping opinions and actions in society (Coleman 1986). While discussing 
theory and deriving hypotheses in this chapter I will use language of levels to locate 
where each effect should take place. In addition to the determinants of public opinion that 
I discuss in this chapter, I suggest that social policy itself shapes opinion. I place this 
discussion in Chapter 5 because it fits with the idea of reciprocal effects between public 
opinion and social policy. But first: what determines public opinion? 
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2.1 Self-Interest 
Individuals have different levels of socioeconomic status (SES). Their status locations 
within their respective societies determine their opportunities, social and material 
resources, and their opinions. Educational level, occupational status, and income (i.e. 
access to material wealth), are three primary ways of understanding SES. Education is no 
guarantee that an individual will be rich or have a high status job, and similarly an 
individual being rich is no guarantee that she is highly educated; but often these go 
together. The structural context of individuals in their early life course phases determine 
what opinions they develop. Measuring this structural location through SES, and 
understanding how SES then determines how individuals think and behave throughout 
their lives, is one of the great tasks of the social sciences throughout history (Wallerstein 
1999). Individuals at different ages face different opportunities and constraints 
independent of their SES, for example older persons are more likely to need health care, 
and thus behave and opine accordingly, all else equal. SES and demographics form the 
basic individual-level characteristics for understanding opinion formation. 
At the heart of many theories of human attitudes and behaviors is the mechanism 
of self-interest. A product of classical philosophy and economics is the notion that 
gaining access to materials motivates individuals (Ricardo 1821; Marx 1887; Papadakis 
1993; Friedman 2002). Materials include basic necessities such as food and shelter, and 
on a social level translate into ownership and control of capital. Self-interest leads 
individuals to form or join groups with common self-interests, and these groups often 
espouse common opinions, such as rich people trying to minimize redistribution of their 
tax monies. I consider self-interest in a narrow and strict sense here by focusing on 
interests based on material gain. Materials can be in the form of goods such as income or 
services such as medical treatment. Self-interest in a general sense extends beyond the 
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goods and services realm because individuals form interests based on ideological beliefs 
(as I will show in section 2.2), because their interests are coerced by a 'liberal public 
sphere' (Habermas 1962), or because their interests are momentarily shifted based on 
affects such as fear (Edwards 1990). These extra-material determinants of interests fall 
outside of my scope, although it is important to recognize that they are of critical 
importance to public opinion formation (Zaller 1992; J. Lewis 2001). The simplified story 
here is that material self-interest is a micro-level determinant of individual attitudes, 
which collectively may be viewed as public opinions.  
There is strong reason to believe in material self-interest in shaping public 
opinion. Those who are lower in SES have more to gain from centrally provided welfare 
and redistribution and as such are consistently shown to be more supportive of various 
social policies (Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Svallfors 1997; Andreβ and Heien 2001; 
Jæger 2006b). More specifically, individuals aim to advantage themselves in relation to 
others' incomes and their own unemployment experiences (Meltzer and Richard 1981; 
Gelissen 2000); they demand public insurance given a volatile private market for health 
care (Barr 2000); and workers with specialized skills tend to support job protection 
policies because the demand for their skills is more erratic (Iversen and Soskice 2001). 
Overall, the hypothesis of self-interest is that individuals will hold opinions in support of 
social policies that will benefit them materially. Status varies substantially within 
societies. For example, looking at the income distribution in the US the top decile 
averaged $93k in 2005 while the bottom decile averaged $6k, and in Sweden these 
figures were $45k and $9k respectively (OECD 2008). Lower status individuals will 
espouse higher support of social policy that redistributes material resources to them. 
Conversely, higher income, education and occupational status individuals should have 
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lower support of social policy. Thus, public opinions should be dispersed along status 
lines, as with income but also other measures of SES. 
Demographics also play a role. Women face social and material disadvantages 
compared with men. Women are also disproportionately responsible for childcare and 
family-work. Therefore, women are expected to have an interest in stronger social 
policies to mediate material disadvantage and to bolster familial care (i.e. the service that 
they are disproportionately tasked with providing). Also, age plays a role. Persons who 
are retired or closer to retirement may be more interested in social policy that gets them 
better pensions and health care. Those who are unemployed, i.e. labor market status, 
should be more supportive of unemployment if not other social policies that will take care 
of them during their times of material risk. The same is true of persons with ill-health or 
who expect to need medical care. 
Individual self-interest is not only determined by individual SES and 
demographics, but also the context in which an individual lives. The level of development 
of a region or country for example will shape individual attitudes. Development is a kind 
of regional- or country-level SES. Economic development is a general concept linked to 
many specific qualitative features of regions or countries. Some regions and countries 
have more wealth, better infrastructure, less corruption and etc. and these factors shape 
individual opinions. Regions within highly developed countries vary substantially in their 
levels of development. In the US, state-level GDP in 2000 was $54k per capita in 
Connecticut and $43k in California, while being only $26k and $32k in Missouri and 
Kentucky respectively (BEA 2012), also states diverge in education levels with high 
school completion rates in 2000 of 78% in Mississippi and Texas up to 90% in Colorado 
and New Hampshire for example (Evans et al. 2009). Similarly in Germany, a large gap 
between the wealthier and poorer Länder (federal states) exists with a per capita GDP of 
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43k€ in Hamburg, 33k€ in Bremen and only 17k€ in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in 2000 
for example (Eurostat 2012). GDP and educational attainment may be understood as 
variables of development that lead to dispersion of public opinion throughout the world.  
Based on similar theoretical components of self-interest I expect that regions with 
more development will be less supportive of social policy. This is due to the fact that 
these regions are filled with individuals who are better off than elsewhere in a given 
country. These individuals may not want their regional productivity to be redistributed to 
other regions, i.e. a regional class-based interest, or they may simply be more likely to see 
themselves as self-sufficient thanks to their materially secure region and adopt a view 
similar to those others in their region. Although countries differ in their actual levels of 
regional redistribution, all countries engage in redistribution through the tax structure. 
When the national government takes taxes and then spends on the needy, wealth is 
redistributed from wealthier individuals and regions. Wealthier regions may have more 
persons who are pressing to keep taxes low and thus actively engaged in maintaining low 
levels of spending on things like social policy. Independent of their own individual SES, 
individuals should benefit from the collective wealth and development of a region and 
thus be less likely to perceive a need for social policy. Another argument is that an 
individual may see her highly developed region as more successful than elsewhere and 
take on a protectionist stance, or an in-group bias toward her region, I will discuss this 
group phenomenon more in section 2.3. Finally, regional development may capture levels 
of individual SES that are unobserved by measuring education, occupational status and 
income, for example wealth passed on through families. 
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2.2 Ideology 
Individual ideology plays a role in shaping public opinion. Ideology is something 
different from an attitude. Ideology comes from familial and early socialization 
influences and is something deeply held and relatively stable over time. Ideology includes 
normative notions about ideal ways the world should be. Ideology, conviction, value, 
norm, opinion and attitude have some overlapping usages and I hope to briefly clarify this 
language here before specifying the theoretical relationship of ideology to public opinion. 
Ideology, according to Merriam-Webster (M-W 2012), is "visionary theorizing". I argue 
that ideology is something that shapes an individual's goals, e.g. a vision of how things 
should be. I use the concept of ideology as synonymous with conviction, as in a "strong 
persuasion of belief" or "state of being convinced" (ibid.). However, ideology is 
preferable to conviction because the primary definition of conviction relates to a 
procedure to identify criminal guilt, or in everyday usage may be confused with religious 
faith, both of which are not related to the topics at hand (ibid.).  
Ideology is something less flexible over time than an attitude which is a "mental 
position with regard to a particular fact or state" (ibid.). The fluidity of mental 
dispositions, facts and states of being over time, leads to attitudes which may change at 
any moment as shown in social psychological research (general review in Eagly and 
Chaiken 1993). A value (i.e. der Wert in German) is similar to an ideology in the sense 
that an individual holds a value and it should be somewhat stable over time. However, 
"value" is rarely used in a singular form in English (or German) and instead comes in a 
plural form. "Values" (die Werte) distinguishes this concept from "value", which is an 
English word that refers to the worth of something in monetary or equivalent economic 
exchangeability. Values instead are a set of ethical convictions, notions of what is right or 
wrong, that are often prefaced by another term to designate what set the values are from; 
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for example human values, ethical values, or family values. Although values refer to 
ideologies, the necessity for a preface word makes this term impractical. 
A norm and an ideology are very similar, but not quite synonymous. A norm is "a 
principle of right action binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, 
control, or regulate proper and acceptable behavior" (M-W 2012). A norm is something 
external to an individual and exists in the social construction of reality within a group 
(Berger and Luckmann 1967). Most or all members of the group are aware of the norm; 
however, not all agree with the norm. Thus, an ideology is an individual's stance or 
position with respect to a social norm, or normative principle. Norm is to society what 
ideology is to an individual. For example, being against gender inequality would be an 
individual ideology, despite the fact that it is one of the most widely held norms in 
democratic societies (WVS 2008, authors own calculations). An individual has taken on 
an ideology via socialization and cognitive processes. Although the individual may 
fluctuate in the extent that she agrees a norm, the norm does not change in its content 
except over large segments of time or via revolutions.  
There are many kinds of individual ideologies in a given population that might 
shape social policy. One of the most common usages of ideology is in reference to 
political ideologies that are more left or more right leaning, i.e. more liberal or more 
conservative to borrow from the US context. There is a plethora of research suggesting 
that political ideologies (i.e. left v. right, liberal v. conservative) shape public opinion on 
various issues (R. Y. Shapiro and Young 1989; Rudolph and J. Evans 2005). However, as 
I am looking specifically at welfare and redistribution related policies, I focus away from 
political ideology because a left-leaning ideology goes with a left-party preference, and 
across all European and English-speaking nation-states left-parties are advocates of 
welfare and redistribution in their political agendas (J. D. Huber 1989). Thus, political 
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ideology and public opinion toward social policy have conceptual issues, where left 
ideology and redistributive policy may be one and the same in the minds of survey 
respondents. 
In order to investigate the ideology and public opinion linkage I focus instead on 
egalitarian ideology, i.e. the idea of equality or having a more equitable distribution of 
resources in society. One function of social policy is to create a more equal distribution of 
some of a society's resources. Therefore, the belief that society should be more equal 
should influence preferences for more redistribution and for welfare services that shift 
resources from those who have to those who have not. At the other end of egalitarianism 
is anti-egalitarianism, or the belief that society should be unequal. This is a kind of 
individualism, i.e. the belief that individuals should acquire their own resources and not 
be required by the collective to share those resources. Although egalitarian ideology is 
often found amongst subjectively left leaning individuals, it is unique from left-right 
ideologies and from public opinion toward social policy because it is not a direct measure 
of policies or policy-making processes. Egalitarian ideology is instead an abstract 
understanding held within an individual that society should have a more equal 
distribution of resources. 
At the theoretical level I rely on Weber's usage of instrumental rationality 
(Zweckrationalität) and value rationality (Wertrationalität) to provide a framework for 
the translation of ideology into opinion (Weber 1921:24-26). The idea of value rationality 
suggests that some actions at the micro-level are based on ideological convictions. These 
convictions are deeply held and will motivate actions regardless of what outcomes 
individuals expect from these actions. Thus individuals with more economic 
egalitarianism should engage in actions that promote a more equal society. The idea of 
instrumental rationality, i.e. means-ends rationality, is that an individual with specific 
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goals will choose rationally consistent actions of achieving those goals. If individuals 
have economic egalitarian goals for society, then they should choose greater government 
provided redistribution. Thus, value rationality and instrumental rationality should work 
together. Greater economically egalitarian ideologies should translate into goals of more 
material equality (regardless of whether individuals believe that this is possible), and 
these goals should lead individuals to support policies of redistribution of material 
resources, because the government has the power and the tax revenue to reduce 
inequality. Thus social policy is a means for achieving the goal. Figure 2 proposes a 
simple model of this hypothetical process.  
Figure 2. Hypothetical Causal Model of Ideology to Policy Preferences 
 
 
The process from ideology to goal to policy preference along the bottom of the 
figure provides the abstract idea. The middle row gives the broad categories of value, 
ends and means; i.e. Weber's theoretical framework. The model hinges on 'values'. As 
previously distinguished, I use ideology instead of value, although these terms are 
synonymous in their meanings in my usage. The top row of the figure demonstrates 
concrete examples with relevance for economic egalitarian ideology leading to a 
preference for a society with a more equal distribution of material resources which in turn 
Goal Policy PreferenceIdeology
Value Ends Means
Value Rationality Instrumental Rationality
Material Equality Support Redistributive 
Social Policies
Economic 
Egalitarianism
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leads to preferences for increases in social policy. I make no claims over the rational or 
irrational nature of instrumentally or value motivated opinions. As Weber points out 
(Weber 1921:26), even if a value leads to irrational behavior (such as giving away money 
to the poor instead of using it to eat), the instrumental actions that come as a result of the 
value are consistent with the value and thus have a degree of rationality to them. I do not 
engage rational-choice debates, as this would require a second and maybe third 
dissertation. I merely suggest that whether egalitarianism is conceived as an ideology (i.e. 
Weber's value) or a goal or both, it is a normative ideology and should lead economic 
egalitarian ideology to increase opinions in favor of social policy. 
Although I use Weber's theory to predict that ideology shapes opinion, there are 
other theories that support this hypothetical process. The psychological concept of 
cognitive consistency for example suggests that individuals will align their attitudes with 
each other and with their actions; otherwise they experience the negative state of 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957; Bem and McConnell 1970). This means again that 
an individual with egalitarian ideology, understood as a kind of intrinsic attitude or belief, 
should behave and act consistently. Again, psychological research distinguishes between 
implicit attitudes, those that occur heuristically and without rational cognition, and 
explicit attitudes, those that are the product of thought and reflection. This distinction 
integrates with Weber's theory. Implicit public opinion may be "automatic" based on 
ideologies (value rationality) and explicit public opinion may be "deliberate" or 
calculated based on ideological goals (instrumental rationality) (Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen 2006:692). 
Individuals are exposed to a slew of information during their lives. They receive 
persuasive messages that might shape their opinions. In this dissertation I look at many 
factors that shape opinion, but do not explicitly look at information as it is passed from 
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the media or political elites to individuals. The media in general may be understood as 
ideologically persuasive (J. Lewis 2001). Various news outlets such as newspapers and 
television broadcasting organizations utilize ideological biases to distribute information. 
They take results from public opinion polls and frame them 'ideologically' so as to 
support a particular position or agenda. In this way the media shapes public opinion by 
impacting what the public thinks that the public thinks, and by using ideology to shape 
what individual members of the public think. Those in charge of media sources seem to 
be well aware of the impact of ideology on opinion and the fact that individuals carry 
"predispositions" toward certain opinions and these will be activated by information 
exposure (Zaller 1992:23). Although these processes are presumably important for public 
opinion, I take them as given, as fixed features of nation-states (and sometimes regions) 
and I argue that individual ideology reflects the influence of the media over each 
individual's life course. Thus focusing on ideology here indirectly captures media and 
many other socialization effects (which are studied in detail elsewhere, see also Converse 
1964). 
Ideologies therefore do not operate independent of self-interest or media content 
which may reflect socialization and particular interests and institutions. They develop 
throughout the life course out of a variety of forces. Scholars note that self-interest may 
shape ideologies and those further up the SES ladder have more commitment to 
individualism as opposed to egalitarianism (see discussion in Hasenfeld and Rafferty 
1989). Others show that socialization determines ideologies and those raised under liberal 
markets with democratic principles will have strong commitments to economic 
individualism with simultaneous commitments to basic levels of egalitarianism; whereas 
those socialized under Communism will favor ideal levels of egalitarianism as 
subordination to Communist doctrine (Arts and Gijsberts 1998). Thus, individuals have 
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ideologies that are deeply held from socialization and early life experience, but also that 
change due to structural and demographic characteristics.  
Here is where the line between micro-level ideology and macro-level norm 
becomes blurry. The social norms of a society are present in the media, institutions and 
socialization of individuals. Also, meso-level norms in local media, regional institutions 
and group consciousnesses shape the socialization of individual ideologies. Thus 
individuals may ally themselves with any number or variations of different norms present 
in societies and groups. Thus, the impact that societal norms (at country- and regional-
levels) have on individual ideologies is unclear, and may depend on how strong 
individual characteristics foster alliance with the higher order norms. For example, being 
white, wealthy and protestant may dispose an American to be strongly opposed to 
redistribution and strongly in favor of individual acquisition of welfare, but it is hard to 
tell whether whiteness, wealth or Protestant ideas cause this.  
Wegener and Liebig (1995) discuss the phenomenon of primary and secondary 
ideologies. They use this ideological dichotomy to explain why individuals may hold 
contradictory ideological positions, e.g. simultaneously favoring meritocratic acquisition 
and state intervention in distribution of welfare and redistribution. This is due on the one 
hand to the primary ideology of a nation-state with respect to just distribution of 
resources, for example the US has a meritocratic primary ideology. On the other it is due 
to the secondary ideology of a sub-group with respect to social justice. For example, blue 
collar workers often have a redistributive secondary ideology. Thus an American blue-
collar worker would hold meritocratic views while simultaneously favoring redistributive 
justice, on average. I make a distinction here. When discussing ideology, I only look at 
individuals and their individual ideologies. These may be a result of primary and 
secondary ideologies, and a product of socialization and interests. In the next section 2.4 I 
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discuss institutional norms. Primary ideologies, as used by Wegener and Liebig are what I 
will call social or political norms at the country-level, and secondary ideologies are those 
norms found at lower group levels. Therefore, the Wegener and Liebig distinction must 
be re-interpreted for the purposes of my theoretical perspective by replacing their usage 
of ideology with my usage of norm. 
As suggested in the work of Wegener and Liebig, and others, the range of 
distributive ideologies throughout a given population might blur the relationship of SES, 
institutions and ideology with social policy opinions. I propose to deal with this issue by 
using a theoretical causal model with ideology placed in between SES and institutions on 
one side and public opinions on the other. But I admit that ideology, institutions and SES 
are reciprocally related, mutually reinforcing, and that causality is never certain and only 
theoretical. In the end I hope to control for some of the factors that lead to diverging 
individual ideologies.  
My theoretical framework follows the lead of research done in a US sample from 
Detroit, where Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989) find that those with stronger normative 
beliefs in social rights (to well-being and prosperity) had significantly greater support of 
specific contributory and means-tested social policies net of other variables in the US. It 
also follows the work of Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) in showing that egalitarian 
ideology increases support of government provision of unemployment and health care 
across Europe.  
2.3 In-Group Bias 
In between individual- and country-level determinants, meso-level factors shape 
behaviors and opinions. Membership in groups is a fundamental component of social 
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organization and the way individuals navigate their social worlds. Although there are 
many types of groups that distinguish themselves from one another, such as blue or white 
collar worker, male and female, or young and old, I consider here a group boundary that 
is especially relevant to social policy. That is the group boundary of ethno-nationalism, 
what I conceive of as natives versus foreigners.  
Festinger (1954) argues that social categorization into a perceived group is an 
automatic human response to the environment. Individuals see themselves as part of an 
in-group that comprises of individuals who are similar on some salient dimension or 
dimensions. The in-group is defined by these dimensions which are different from other 
groups, identified as out-groups. In-group bias is a tendency of an individual to prefer 
members of the in-group for social interaction and resource sharing (Tajfel et al. 1971; 
Turner 1975; Brewer 1979; Mullen, Brown, and C. Smith 1992). Experiments show that 
people strongly prefer members of their own group, even when group is randomly 
assigned and has no consequence for the subject (Tajfel et al. 1971; Brewer 1979).   
The reason that in-group bias should be a determinant of public opinion is due to 
immigration. Western European countries for example are more ethnically diverse now 
than they have been at any point in their respective histories (Castles and Miller 2003). Of 
the roughly 70 million immigrants residing on the European continent, by the end of 
2008, approximately 75% immigrated to Western Europe which is home to the greatest 
levels of social policy in the world (United Nations 2010). In-group bias should be strong 
where foreign-born persons are found in large numbers, enough to constitute a sustained 
presence of an out-group, or out-groups. 
With the exception of a few comparative analyses, the majority of scholarship on 
the relationship between diversity and public opinion comes from the US case. Gilens 
(1995) finds that racial stereotypes about black work ethics negatively affect white 
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attitudes towards social policy. Gilens finds the effect of racial stereotypes is greater than 
that of individualism and economic self-interest. Other evidence comes from Luttmer 
(2001), who finds that the race of welfare recipients matters for welfare attitudes towards 
unemployment insurance. The US literature is unique in the sense that it finds a 
relationship between race and public opinion toward basic means-tested social policies. 
Blacks in the US however are not immigrants. Also, in Europe social policy has broader 
coverage beyond unemployment or minimum income; in fact the bulk of spending comes 
from pensions and health care (OECD 2012). Thus, findings from the American case are 
not directly transferable to the European case where persons who are ethnically different 
from the majority often are immigrants, and health care and pensions are distributed more 
generously. 
Nonetheless, scholars have hypothesized that similar group dynamics processes 
may be at work in Europe as in the US, but thus far have mostly failed to confirm this. 
Relying on European Social Survey (ESS) data from 17 countries in 2008, Mau and 
Burkhardt (2009) find only a small effect of immigration on support for redistribution. 
Hjerm and Schnable (2012) also rely on ESS data from 18 countries in 2004 and find no 
effect of immigration on support for redistribution or acceptance of taxation. In 
comparative analyses of welfare attitudes in 45 countries, Freeze (2011) relies on a 
number of data sources, including ESS, and finds no clear linkage between ethnic 
heterogeneity and support for redistribution. Brady and Finnigan (2011) also find little 
evidence that immigration undermines support for the welfare state. Crepaz (2008) finds 
no relationship between immigration-generated ethnic diversity and social policy 
attitudes, but data issues also undermine the validity of his results. Crepaz relies on 
“percent foreign” instead of “percent foreign-born.” Both measures are available from 
OECD, but they do not measure the same thing, and “percent foreign” captures different 
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populations in each country. Furthermore, for most countries involved, “percent foreign” 
is approximately 20-50% smaller than “percent foreign-born.” This means that Crepaz 
significantly underestimated the size of the first-generation immigrant population.   
Some recent research shows that immigration does indeed affect public opinion. 
Eger (2010b) finds that immigration-generated ethnic diversity reduces support for social 
policy in Sweden. Larsen’s (2011) comparison of welfare opinions in the US, Sweden, 
Denmark, and Great Britain provides further evidence. His results show that although 
Americans’ general distaste for redistribution is truly “exceptional,” stereotypes about 
immigrants from non-Western countries affect Europeans’ attitudes about social welfare 
at least as much as stereotypes about African-American work ethic affects American 
attitudes. Although his analysis does not include objective regional- or country-level 
measures of diversity, respondents who report hostility towards living in a neighborhood 
where at least 50% of the residents are from an ethnic out-group are less supportive of 
redistribution.   
The only current research that demonstrates robust statistical relationships 
between objective measures of ethnic diversity and public opinion toward social policy 
come from the US and Sweden.  Following the work and ideas of Maureen A. Eger, I 
suggest that this relative lack of support for in-group bias effects is due to the privileging 
of the nation-state in comparative political research. All of the aforementioned work on 
Europe compares countries to each other. A large body of research on group dynamics 
suggests that diversity in smaller, local contexts should lead to in-group bias (Festinger 
1954; G. W. Allport 1954; Tajfel 1970; Horowitz 1985; Barth 1969). Furthermore, many 
countries are extremely diverse in their regional characteristics, and these differences are 
lost when measuring diversity at the country-level. Research confirms this. The analyses 
that employ measures of ethnic heterogeneity at the meso-level in the US and Sweden 
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demonstrate that diversity reduces public support of social policy (Luttmer 2001; C. Fox 
2004; Eger 2010b).   
A critical caveat of this hypothesis, based on the work of Eger (2010a), is that in-
group bias is not the same as out-group hostility. It is not anti-immigrant attitudes that 
create group based public opinion in opposition to social policy. It is a general bias to 
prefer the in-group instead of any out-group regardless of the characteristics that define 
the group boundaries. For example, Protestants could have in-group bias against 
otherwise phenotypically similar Catholics, or teenagers against adults of the same 
ethnicity. I do not suggest that racism or prejudice against immigrants or against 
individuals who are ethnically different does not shape public opinion. These are 
hypotheses tested elsewhere, and especially supported in the US. Instead, I focus on in-
group bias because it is theoretically a factor for all humans and can bridge the diversity 
experience of a range of countries. Understanding in-group bias may help to build grand 
theories of public opinion formation, as opposed to racially or ethnically specific theories. 
There are many alternative arguments for why diversity should shape public 
opinion. These include socio-biological fictive kinships or ethnic nepotism (Trivers 1971; 
Van den Berghe 1981); psychological impacts of empathy on altruism (Batson et al. 
1981); neuroscience of negative responses to ethnic out-groups (Gutsell and Inzlicht 
2010); evolutionary reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971); and social psychological trust in 
homogeneous group characteristics (Brewer 1979; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000) to name 
a few examples. I focus on the impact of real or perceived group boundaries, which is 
what all these studies have in common. A greater proportion of out-group members 
should activate stronger in-group allegiance and lead to reduced support of social policy, 
i.e. reduced support of sharing resources with out-group(s). 
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2.4 Institutions and Norms 
Like ideology at the individual level, norms at the societal level shape public opinions. 
Social interaction leads to the construction of norms, and repeated social interaction leads 
to institutionalization of these norms (Jepperson 1991). Norms arise out of common 
interests such as the need to communicate, take care of sick persons, and make decisions 
or policies that impact a society. Individuals rely on previously constructed norms to 
guide present actions. So instead of inventing a new language, new health care practices, 
or new system of government every time a need arises in society, individuals rely on 
institutional norms. The process of institutional norm transmission occurs in all societies, 
e.g. via language, cultural practices, families and socialization (Berger and Luckmann 
1967). However, since the rise of bureaucratic organization amongst humans, norm 
transmission also occurs in formalized political institutions (e.g. assemblies and 
governments) (Weber 1921); non-governmental organizations (e.g. social movements and 
unions) (Cornfield 1986); and profit-seeking organizations (e.g. businesses and firms) 
(Dessein and Santos 2006).  
A lexical definition of an institution is a "significant practice, relationship or 
organization in a society or culture", and an "established organization or 
corporation...especially of a public character" (M-W 2012). As this definition suggests, an 
institution is something in practice. Institution implies repeated action or "chronically 
repeated activity sequences" (Jepperson 1991:145). Institutions require social interaction 
for their preservation, and the institution itself is a kind of map or framework to guide 
social interactions. An institution gives a "stable design" to activity sequences (ibid.). The 
institution cannot exist without stable norms and societies cannot exist without 
institutions. Norms evolve about the way the world is, the way the world should be, and 
how to behave accordingly (Geertz 1973). Through norm enforcement amongst members, 
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institutions exert forces external to each single individual (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 
Although behaviors and attitudes on the part of individuals often shape institutional 
norms and outcomes, the norms and formal rules of an institution shape actions and 
attitudes of individuals. Institutions serve as connecting points and motivating forces for 
individuals to develop opinions and behave in ways that reproduce and maintain 
societies1 (Weber 1921; Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
Institutions tend to be stable, but their characteristics are not permanent, and 
undergo perpetual change. However, institutions arise as a means of creating order in the 
disorder of reality. Each conscious individual has a unique subjective reality, and 
objective reality can only be inferred through social interaction in which actors find 
shared experience of, and agreement over objective reality necessary for survival. Thus, 
institutions must be consistent and durable in order to offer the stability that individuals 
require. As Berger and Luckman point out: 
[T]he reality of everyday life maintains itself by being embodied in routines, which is the 
essence of institutionalization. Beyond this, however, the reality of everyday life is 
ongoingly reaffirmed in the individual's interaction with others. Just as reality is 
originally internalized by a social process, so it is maintained in consciousness by social 
processes. These latter processes are not drastically different from those of the earlier 
internalization. They also reflect the basic fact that subjective reality must stand in a 
relationship with an objective reality that is socially defined.  (1966:149).  
Without wandering too far into a philosophy of knowledge, I seek to point out that 
institutionalization of objective reality is necessary for social existence. Otherwise society 
unravels into chaos, for example when individuals attempt to trade goods that have no 
agreed upon value or characteristics; murder their bosses when they seek a promotion; or 
abandon their children electing to simply make new ones, etc. Institutions by nature tend 
                                                 
1 I do not engage in the discussion of whether institutions act, or whether they are merely the sum of 
individual actions, e.g. debates on methodological individualism, rational choice-theory and actor-centered 
approaches. In social science, institutional effects and transmission of institutions across space and time are 
observable and exert independent influence on individuals. For me this is sufficient reason to consider them 
as a force external to individuals, regardless of whether this force is a product of synergy or simply 
summing of individuals' in their impact on other individuals. 
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toward stability and replication, which is one of their functions if not hallmarks. This 
requires norms for enforcement of the institution, and these norms shape public opinions 
(and behaviors) to align with the contents of the norms. 
Hall and Taylor offer a summary of the institutionalist theoretical perspective by 
pointing out that,  
...institutions provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action. The 
individual is seen as an entity deeply embedded in a world of institutions, composed of 
symbols, scripts and routines, which provide the filters for interpretation, of both the 
situation and oneself, out of which a course of action is constructed. Not only do 
institutions provide strategically-useful information, they also affect the very identities, 
self-images and preferences of the actors (1996:939). 
Seen in collective trends, these actor preferences constitute public opinions. The public 
may face consequences for not having attitudes or behaviors that align with institutional 
norms, for example being unable to interact socially, shunned from society, or in more 
extreme cases criminally punished (see Mau 2003:27-31). Thus, it is the primary 
hypothesis of this section that institutions, through their normative contents, shape public 
opinion. 
Although there is a barrage of institutions in the world whose boundaries overlap 
in many cases, I focus on three areas of institutions and institutionalization of norms; 
these are social, political and historical institutions. With the exception of economic 
institutions, which I otherwise categorize here under the heading "social", this trichotomy 
is a common framework for analyzing institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996; Goodin 1996; 
W. R. Scott 2001). Each of these institutions helps to explain the transmission of norms in 
a given country.  
First, social institutions. These are the ways that social order is maintained in 
families, kinship networks, towns and countries. They are anchored primarily through 
social interaction and do not necessitate formal structures such as buildings or written 
rules to uphold them, although many have such features such as churches for the 
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institution of religion or dictionaries for the institution of language. The usage of social 
institutions here is synonymous with many features of culture. Normative notions of the 
ideal way of distributing welfare in a society are part of the fabric of social institutions. 
These norms are generated through repeated activities in human societies when faced 
with collective welfare issues, such as how to care for the sick and older members of 
society when they are unable to do so themselves. In early societies this was analogous to 
participating in a family or small kinship unit whose members provide welfare for each 
other. In later societies, the organization is more complicated, but social norms about 
deservingness, charity, welfare, social justice, and ideal distribution of resources 
permeate the social landscape of families, regions and countries and are all interrelated 
with the social norms of a society. 
Next, political institutions. These are the institutions whose norms are arbiters for 
the distribution of power in societies. They require formal structures to maintain their 
frameworks, because power is often contested by individuals and groups. Political 
institutions are found in governing practices, especially strong in recent times at the level 
of nation-states. These include constitutional structures, legal practices and bureaucratic 
buildings, forms and processes. The norms of political institutions relate to power sharing 
and competition, defense, and collective risk pooling for example. Organizing welfare 
centrally, by pooling tax resources and then distributing them to those in need, helps 
provide for those who are sick or without gainful employment. Those who have the most 
power may prevent the redistribution of (their) tax resources to those in need. The process 
of negotiating or 'fighting' over welfare is a repeated activity sequence and forges 
political norms about who gets what and who deserves what. 
The third type is historical institutions. These are not singular institutions such as 
a church, school or government, but instead they are systems of institutions. Historical 
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institutional classification is a way of understanding regimes or entities with ethnic, 
political or geographical boundaries that exist over long periods of time through many 
cohorts, for example the Chinese, Roman and British empires. In the case of the Chinese, 
the 'empire' still exists today although it has taken on a shape of nation-state in recent 
times, and despite the fact that it had its ruling systems sacked or overthrown on many 
occasions over the course of 2,000 years. The Roman Empire collapsed entirely, while 
the British one lost a great deal of size but remains in the United Kingdom as a small 
cluster of states, with a few outlying territories. The historical institutions of the British 
for example, do not exist solely in one place, do not have a uniform legal structure over 
time, and are subject to changing norms. However, there are some commonalities or 
similarities throughout British history, the most obvious being the English language. The 
historical perspective highlights the presence of social norms over great lengths of time.  
Figure 3 offers an overview of social, political and historical institutions. In this 
figure some empirical examples are given to show what each type of institution might be 
observed as, and what types of repeated activities take place within the institution. 
Figure 3. Types of Institutions and Examples of Norm Construction 
 
 
Institution:
Social
Historical
Political
Language, family 
structures, 
neighborhoods, 
schools
Bureaucracies, interest 
organizations, rules, 
conditions of political 
processes
Nations/nation-states, 
ethnicities, geopolitical 
groupings, regimes, 
empires
Observable as:
In the family, at the 
market, in school, 
across a neighbor’s 
fence
Elections, policy-
making, bargaining
Social, economic and 
political interaction 
cumulated across 
many cohorts
Repeated Activities: Norms:
Individualism, 
egalitarianism, gender 
equality, universalism
Corporatism, federalism, 
party identification, legal 
and political precedents 
A package of norms 
over time
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In the right hand column are some examples of norms that exist in social and political 
institutions. The important caveat is that historical institutions are better understood as a 
package of norms instead of having specific norms.  
I focus on the norms that are embedded in institutions and institutional practices. I 
select three norms that capture an aspect of each of these institutions that should help to 
theoretically link them to public opinion and, as I discuss further in Chapter 5, social 
policy. I select the social norm of individualism, the normative orientation of political 
institutions toward corporatism, and the difference between English-speaking and 
European historical institutions. I discuss these in detail in the next three sections and 
review some theory and empirical work suggesting how each should impact public 
opinion related to welfare and redistribution. The primary mechanism at play here is that 
social norms, or what Wegener and Liebig (1995) call primary ideologies, shape 
individual ideologies, behaviors and opinions. Specifically, norms provide higher order 
content for individuals to use to interpret the social world. They use norms to determine 
how others will act and think, and this in turn determines how they act and think. 
2.4.1 Individualism 
Picking up on the discussion about individual egalitarian ideology, I elect to focus on the 
country-level social norm of individualism. Individualism prioritizes personal time and 
freedom, and appropriate rewards for individual hard work (Hofstede 1984:148-58). Less 
individualism is associated with collective time usage and collective solutions to 
problems on the other hand. Societies with stronger social norms of individualism favor 
equality of opportunity. In the context of employment for example, societies with higher 
individualism favor independent adaptations to and styles of work and thus unequal pay 
based on individual performance. This contrasts with lower levels of individualism in a 
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society which favor order and submission to collective work style and hierarchical pay 
schemes that are more equal across jobs, in other words equality of outcome. In the 
context of social policy, higher levels of individualism should lead to policies that leave 
individuals in charge of their own acquisition of welfare. Lower levels in contrast should 
favor collective provision of welfare, regardless of individual efforts. Thus, greater 
individualism should lead to public opinion less in support of social policy. 
Strong individualism as a social norm does not guarantee that all persons in a 
society are ideologically individualists. Individualism is a 'primary ideology' to use the 
framework of Wegener and Liebig (1995) and all persons in an individualistic society 
(such as the US) will be aware that in the context of work, welfare, family and many 
other social interactions, that there is an expectation of individualism and this will shape 
their actions and thoughts. There is an understanding that equality of opportunity and 
resulting unequal outcomes based on individual freedom and expression is 'normal' for an 
individualistic social context. However, many individuals will hold individual ideologies, 
and these may impact their public opinions to be at odds with the dominant social norms, 
for any number of reasons such as competing group norms (i.e. 'secondary ideologies' or 
in-group bias) or self-interest (i.e. SES). Overall the norm of individualism should shape 
the public to be less supportive of collective welfare and redistribution. 
Individualism as a social norm (i.e. primary ideology of a country), 
institutionalized in employment, religions, schools and etc. is opposite in many ways to 
egalitarian ideology as discussed in section 2.2. However, individualism favors individual 
freedom, work and gain, and egalitarianism is not necessarily opposed to these things; 
however, egalitarians seek to redistribute individual gains so that society has a more equal 
distribution of resources and incomes. I do not want to confuse the reader so I will elect 
to stay away from the term egalitarianism in the context of social institutions because I 
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have already used it in reference to individual ideology. Thus, I will point to collectivism 
as the preferred term to capture a social norm opposite to individualism. But I caution that 
it is possible to have social norms that favor both collectivism and individualism, for 
example in Germany there is a strong sense of collective social control, following the 
rules and keeping society in order, while at the same time there is great differences in 
individual outcomes based on individual abilities and work2. In fact Germany is the most 
individualistic of the otherwise collectivistic societies of Europe (Hofstede 1984). So 
there is an axis of individualism-collectivism, but there are many types of individualisms 
and collectivisms.  
The research that is relevant for individualism at the level of social institution and 
its impact on public opinion requires a broad understanding of individualism. Studies 
struggle to capture this term explicitly. What individualism is and what constitutes an 
individualistic society is the subject of many debates (Oyserman, Coon, and 
Kemmelmeier 2002). The individualism Hofstede measured was related most primarily to 
the way individuals behaved in an organizational work context, and how the patterning of 
this across countries was evidence of those societies' divergent social norms. I summarize 
only a snippet of the empirical literature here and try to draw attention to the fact that 
there are more or less individualistic norms in every country, that these norms are strong 
and pervasive, and that they shape public opinion.  
Research on the US often referred to as the "national values" approach, supports 
the idea that individualistic norms shape public opinion to oppose social policy (C. 
Brooks and Manza 2007). This is based on the extensive research of Lipset (1963, 1992) 
                                                 
2 The author is aware of the concept of tight and loose cultures (Carpenter 2000; Triandis 2004), as 
something that captures such a division as in the German case, which would be considered a somewhat 
individualistic country but with a tight culture (similar to Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance measure). 
Although, the axis of tight and loose as a way of distinguishing countries is a fruitful avenue of future 
research, it is largely in the field of cross-cultural psychology and falls beyond the focus and scope of the 
present study. 
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on American norms of equality of opportunity and individual achievement of outcomes. 
Tests of hypotheses derived from this approach often focus on individual-level data. The 
effect of the social norm is inferred from measuring individual ideologies as a proxy for 
how much individuals subscribe to the social norms. This is somewhat dangerous 
ecologically; however, large-scale representative surveys should allow for distinctions to 
be drawn across countries while controlling for individual-level characteristics, just as 
Hofstede did in his work on individualism. Findings show that level of identification with 
American individualism leads to reduced individual support of social policy (Fine 1992); 
something also found in specific policy areas such as guaranteed jobs and government 
provided health insurance (Feldman 1983), welfare spending and food stamps (Feldman 
1988), and spending on the most needy (Jacoby 2006). Linos and West (2003) show that 
ideology about the role of self-determination in getting ahead in life (i.e. individualism) 
leads to reduced public opinion toward welfare policy in Norway, Australia and the US.  
Some scholars have been able to show societal level effects of individualism (or 
individualism-like factors) on public opinion. Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) find that 
egalitarian norms at the country-level increase support of social policy in 24 countries, 
mostly in Western and Eastern Europe. Research on four Nordic countries reveals that a 
range of values including universalism (a partial inverse of individualism focused on 
equality of outcomes) explain some of the class based differences in public opinion 
toward social inequality (C. Brooks and Svallfors 2010: Table 5). A similar finding exists 
in analogous research showing that universalism leads to public support for immigration 
across 21 advanced democracies (Schwartz 2007). These few studies offer direct, as 
opposed to inferred, evidence on the linkage. 
Research on deservingness criteria also supports my individualism hypothesis. 
Deservingness criteria are widely held views that form the basis for how members of a 
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public determine why people are poor, i.e. they are norms. These criteria are often on an 
axis from laziness and lack of effort, to structure and bad luck as explanatory factors. 
Individualists are expected to see the poor as responsible for their state of being, i.e. they 
failed to achieve after being granted equal opportunities. Whereas collectivists are 
expected to see the poor as a product of cumulative disadvantage, and structural or 
societal disadvantages that they have no control over. Thus, individualism may be 
inferred based on a society's normative deservingness criteria. Research on deservingness 
consistently shows patterns of higher blame of the poor for their position (i.e. 
individualists) as linked to less support of redistributive policies (Van Oorschot 2000; 
Larsen 2008). A study by Petersen et al. (2011) in Denmark suggests that egalitarianism 
and deservingness work in concert to shape public opinion, i.e. that they co-vary in 
predicting public opinion. This is similar in the broad reaching study of Mehrtens (2004) 
of many advanced welfare states which demonstrates that blame the poor (people should 
provide for themselves) and anti-redistribution (a presumable result of individualism) are 
cross-nationally correlated.  
Based on my institutional framework and the hypothesis that social norms shape 
public opinions, and based on the inferences from individual-level findings and especially 
the evidence of country-level effects; I predict that countries that have stronger 
individualism as a social norm will have public opinions less supportive of social policy. 
2.4.2 Corporatism 
Political institutions exist at many levels and are upheld through formal institutional 
settings such as local assemblies, regional or state governments and unified national 
governments. They promote norms and practices with respect to politics and power 
structures such as the symbols and behaviors of various political parties, the tactics used 
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by parties in their campaigns, and the rules of policy-making. Nowhere are political 
institutions more powerfully upheld and intrusive into almost all spheres of individual 
affairs than with the central bureaucracies of nation-states, at least in the developed world 
where centralized states are the dominant form of political organization. These 
centralized social policy systems are the reasons advanced democracies are also known as 
welfare states, where regional autonomy is minimal when it comes to welfare and 
redistribution. 
Nation-states uphold institutionalized norms of how power is shared, and how 
policy is made. These institutions should shape public opinion toward social policy. 
Although there are many political norms, I focus here on the degree that markets, 
interests and social interaction are coordinated by the state, known as corporatism. When 
the state takes a leading role in society and markets by maintaining and regulating 
interests within its formal institutional framework it is more corporatist and when the 
state is separate from society and economic affairs leaving interests to compete and fend 
for themselves it is more pluralist. Corporatism should promote collective power and 
interest sharing and should promote welfare and redistribution as centrally provided 
features for all interest groups in a given society (as opposed to individual provisions). In 
a pluralist system the state allows interest groups to compete and exert individual 
influence on policy making outside of the state (Lijphart and Crepaz 1991:238; Footnote 
13 includes a literature review). The norms upheld in a more corporatist political 
framework are thus more collectivistic in character. Therefore, a more corporatist 
institutional framework should lead to increased public support of social policy. 
Social and political norms overlap in general through common languages and 
through individuals filling roles as both social and political actors (March and Olsen 
1984). There is not a clearly defined line between social and political institutions within a 
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nation-state, as seen in the line between individualism and corporatism is not so clearly 
definable. The nation-state provides a formal structure to uphold social and political 
norms, and pushes these norms in homes, in public and within its own policy-making 
structures (Skocpol and Amenta 1986). States promote consistent norms which then 
attract individual practices and attitudes, thereby inducing conformity, and even 
commitment (Jepperson 1991). National institutions have a force that pushes toward 
social reproduction of what was before into what is to come allowing mostly for only 
slow changes, a process known as path dependency, which is interrupted only at times of 
revolution (W. R. Scott 2001; Ebbinghaus 2005). 
Social policy builds cohesion and belief in the institutional norms amongst state 
citizens (Pierre and Rothstein 2010), and cultivates a public willing to accept and support 
its political institutions based on their belief that their government is just and moral in its 
practices (Rothstein 1998). Therefore, with the support and cohesion of the people and 
stable normative social and political structures, a nation-state provides welfare and 
redistribution both as a norm and a practice (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). More 
corporatist political institutions give greater bargaining power to those who are at risk or 
have greater need for welfare and redistribution (such as the lowest occupational statuses 
and the elderly) by including those who represent their interests in the state policy-
making processes. Pluralistic systems on the other hand leave interests in welfare to 
compete for themselves against other interests. The resulting norms are more competitive 
and rugged in the case of the pluralistic institutions, and more collective and power-
sharing in the case of corporatist. Thus, individuals in more corporatist nation-states 
should have more allegiance to the state and more trust in the state as welfare provider, 
whereas those in less corporatist nation-states are not allied to the welfare capacities of 
the state and are accustomed to individual competition for resources.  
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More corporatist political institutions overlap with collectivistic social institutions 
(i.e. less individualistic societies). Again, there is a connection between the social and 
political. Societies with strongly corporatist, centralized institutional arrangements where 
welfare is controlled and provided by the state with a large redistributive net for most or 
all citizens are built on distributive norms of equality of outcome. The pluralistic political 
institutions are found instead in societies with market-oriented institutions where the state 
offers some minimum protections and leaves the rest up to individual acquisition, i.e. 
equality of opportunity only (Mau 2003).  Furthermore, corporatist and pluralist political 
institutions may be understood in a simplified dichotomy of coordinated versus liberal 
market economies. In the former the government regulates heavily in economic affairs, 
and in the latter not (Hall and Soskice 2001).  
The research on corporatist institutional norms and public opinion is scarce. I thus 
I draw on the research about the different worlds of welfare to anchor my corporatism 
hypothesis (Esping-Andersen 1990; Arts and Gelissen 2001, 2002). Those who focus on 
social welfare policy have repeatedly noticed that levels of welfare and redistribution 
diverge across countries. The divisions follow particular patterns that may be linked to 
the corporatist or collectivistic character of nation-states, and also pattern across historical 
institutions. Therefore, I discuss this analogous literature in detail at the end of the next 
section on historical institutions as my existing evidence supporting my institutional 
hypotheses.  
2.4.3 Historical Institutions 
Institutions are overlapping and path dependent, and different institutional configurations 
maintain stability over time. These configurations have some commonalities of 
institutions today, but most importantly they have trajectories that connect them socially, 
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politically and culturally through the experience of history. Although the diffusion and 
transfer of policy has been a powerful causal mechanism in shaping social policy across 
the advanced capitalist democracies (Obinger, Schmitt, and Starke 2012) I expect that 
diffusion and transfer are strongest within two different groupings of advanced nations. 
The first are the English-speaking societies compared with the European societies, and 
the second are the formerly Communist societies versus the Western/'capitalistic' 
societies. 
The socialization and political action of individuals cumulated over time and 
driven, in part, by material interests, generates institutional norms about redistribution, in 
both social and political institutions (discussions in Coughlin 1980 and Esping-Andersen 
1990). On the one hand, history, culture, and socialization carry a set of norms that are 
institutionalized across a given population, but not necessarily organized in political 
institutions. On the other hand, bureaucracy, state-building, and law enforcement lead 
nation-states to carve out institutional social norms within a population, so that the social 
institutions are shaped by the political ones. Many of these norms may be carried over 
from the time before nation-states, from the social institutions of a given group of people 
who engaged in state building, e.g. the remnants of monarchies or totalitarian regimes. 
Regardless of the origins of institutions, social interaction that generates and responds to 
norms about redistribution and equality within institutional frameworks carries 
institutions along a path that is somewhat pre-determined. The impact of social and 
political institutions is to bring these pre-determined norms to bear on individual thoughts 
and actions and thus, these institutions shape public opinion (see Jacobs 1992). 
English-speaking and European Countries 
The English-speaking societies spread through British colonialism all espouse 
more individualistic social institutions with a focus on equality of opportunity, not 
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outcome (Olsen 1997; Mau 2003, 2004; Ringen 2006). This is not a coincidence; there 
are many features of these societies that remain similar after many decades of 
independence from British rule (Castles and Mitchell 1993). The European societies as 
well share a history that is rooted in Christianity, the Latin language, the Carolingian 
Empire and repeated power struggles over resources, ideologies and land (Crouzet 2001). 
The strong individualism, pluralism and other norms of the English-speaking countries 
should lead to less support of social policy, while the more collectivistic, corporatist and 
otherwise normatively similar European countries should have more support. 
Individualism is something that was especially strong in England from the early 
transition away from serfdom and as a cause and result of the industrial revolution 
(Macfarlane 1978). This individualism grew and spread through British Empire building. 
The English language and many social norms were exported to Ireland, Australia, New 
Zealand, the US and Canada (with the exception of Quebec). These English-speaking 
countries have legacies of individualistic social institutions and these should shape public 
opinion to be less supportive of redistribution and social policy. These countries were not 
comprised entirely of Anglo-Saxon individuals by ethnicity or origin, as countries such as 
Australia and the US are home to a plethora of ancestrally Germanic, Jewish, Italian and 
many other ethnicities, not to mention the indigenous people and enslaved workers there. 
Yet the earliest power structures in the political institutions of these countries were 
handed down via colonialism and especially rested in the hands of the Anglos. Therefore 
the transmission and reification of norms was strongly 'English' in nature, driven by the 
wealth and political capital of the white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, who were the earliest 
in power in the US and Australia and remain a large part of the power structures of these 
societies.  
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Weber's work The Spirit of Capitalism (Weber 1905) points out that Protestant 
normative frameworks generated a capitalism that diverged from the Catholic 
counterparts of southern Europe. Weber also suggests that the spirit of capitalism was 
particularly strong in New England in the US based on the writings of Benjamin Franklin. 
As the US came from English origins and power structures, I suggest that Weber's work 
also demonstrates indirectly how social institutions of capitalist development were 
exported to the US from England and were diffused in the interconnected social structures 
of the English-speaking countries. Weber does not deal with individualism as such, but it 
is clear that religious social structures and the norms of social and economic exchange 
were peculiar to Western Europe and North America, a phenomenon observed in the 
work of others who identified the rise of laissez faire capitalism (A. Smith 1776) and a 
unique English individualism (Moore 1966).  
The English-speaking countries formed from British colonialism are also the 
pluralist and liberal market countries. The European countries on the other hand are the 
corporatist, coordinated market economies and less individualistic. This overlapping 
characterization of countries is no coincidence. Instead I argue that there is something 
that uniquely characterizes social and political institutions of continental and Northern 
Europe as compared to the English-speaking countries and possibly Japan under heavy 
English-influence after the devastating war. These constitute two distinct families of 
nations (Castles 1993). I add to Castles' phrasing by labeling these as two families of 
institutions. Whereas most characterizations focus on one area such as welfare policy, 
political economy, or individualistic norms, the families of institutions idea builds on 
historical communality and trajectories. Families of institutions exist in long-haul 
groupings of countries dating to the 19th century if not before.  
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There is a clear distinction between the historical institutions of Europe and the 
English-speaking in government spending on social welfare (Wilensky 1975; Castles and 
Mitchell 1993), economic inequality or 'decommodification' (Esping-Andersen 1990); 
women's labor force participation and adaptation to new social risks (Bonoli 2007); 
majoritarianism (Obinger and Wagschal 2001); taxation (Castles and Obinger 2007); 
social justice norms (Mau 2004); church and state influences (Castles 1993; Evelyne 
Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Lijphart 1999); and individualism (Hofstede 1984). 
The causal mechanisms cannot be captured in the aforementioned analyses, yet the 
English-speaking contrasted with the European families are present in all of these 
outcomes, and thus I make an assumption that common norms within each family of 
countries shape public opinion to be more supportive in Europe and less supportive in the 
English-speaking countries.  
Most importantly for my institutional hypothesis is that public opinion also 
follows these families of institutions. There is initial evidence of this. Support for social 
policy is strongest where social justice norms favor universal welfare and weaker where 
norms favor residual welfare (Coughlin 1979; Esping-Andersen 1990; Svallfors 1997; 
Arts and Gelissen 2001; Andreβ and Heien 2001). As pointed out in the previous section, 
individual opinions tend to be in opposition to social policy if it is an institutional norm to 
blame the poor for their position, whereas norms pointing to collective fault will instead 
lead to support of welfare (Van Oorschot 2000; van Oorschot 2010). Social policy has 
what Albrekt Larsen (2006, 2008) labels an “institutional logic” (see also Pierson 2000 
and Jordan 2010). Of course, each individual in a given society will not have an opinion 
perfectly reflective of the "logic" of the institutional norms; instead corporatist or 
collectivistic social and political institutional norms will shape the tendency toward 
supportive opinions across all individuals in society. This means that there will be lots of 
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variation in between individuals in a given society based on demographics and SES if not 
other factors shaping public opinion (Kangas 1997; Barley and Tolbert 1997; Mau 2004).  
I make a caveat in my claims that English-speaking historical institutions are not a 
single mechanism. I do not mean to suggest that being an English-speaking country 
causes public opinion to be less in favor of social policy. But that all English-speaking 
countries from the wake of British colonialism have some common social and political 
norms, that they are two kinds of institutional black-boxes of shared norms. Although it 
goes beyond this dissertation to specify exactly what these institutions are, I suggest that 
individualism is a key feature. This individualism sets apart the English countries from 
the more egalitarian or collectivistic European ones who set out the task of collective 
welfare state production in the first place where citizenship and social policy were closely 
linked.  
Formerly Communist Countries 
The Communist extreme has been deleted by recent history but it was an example 
of a total state, a fully centralized institution that coordinated nearly every aspect of 
society. In fact the only interests that are represented in the Communist state are the 
upholding of Communism and therefore it is a totalitarian as opposed to corporatist 
democratic institution. Nonetheless, Communism should have provided strong political 
institutions to dictate, regulate, and socialize individuals into belief in centralized 
provision of welfare and redistribution (and everything else). It had an explicit focus on 
the collective. Communism is also an example of a 'natural' experiment for testing the 
impact of institutions on public opinion, because Communism did not come into being 
organically in countries such as Poland or Bulgaria and was instead imposed by Russian 
tanks. Thus, institutional theory leads me to predict that after the fall of Communism, the 
dominance of its institutional framework for so many years should leave a lasting impact 
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on public opinion due to its normative legacy. The publics in formerly Communist 
countries should be more supportive of social policy.  
The argument that the public in formerly Communist countries are more 
supportive of welfare and redistribution is supported in the case of reunified Germany 
(Roller 1994) and between Eastern and Western European countries (Lipsmeyer and 
Nordstrom 2003). There is strong evidence after the fall of Communism that individuals 
were subject to competing norms; on the one hand those handed down from Communism 
and on the other those developing in the new free and liberalized markets (Arts and 
Gijsberts 1998). This ties into the conflicting norms (i.e. primary and secondary 
ideologies) identified by Wegener and Liebig (1995). Although the prediction is that 
eventually the norms of Communism will be socialized away, in the period of the 1990s 
shortly after Communism, public opinion should still be normatively shaped by this 
historical institution to be more supportive of social policy. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE            MEASURES OF PUBLIC OPINION AND DETERMINANTS 
As outlined in Chapter One, public opinion exists in measurements. In this dissertation I 
utilize three different surveys that measure public opinion cross-nationally. Each of these 
surveys has unique questions about social policy. I choose these questions primarily 
based on their coverage of various common and contested social policies and of course 
their availability. I attempt to capture a range of public opinions that pertain to welfare 
and redistribution. The different surveys have different measurements of public opinion 
toward social policy and I discuss measurements and question wordings of my various 
public opinions in-depth in the respective analytical portions of Chapters 4 and 6. Here I 
provide an overview of the opinions covered in the three surveys in Table 1. In Chapter 4, 
public opinion is a dependent variable. In Chapter 6, I construct a test of reciprocal 
causation between public opinion and social policy which makes each a dependent and 
independent variable simultaneously.  
The most pervasive and expensive social policies provided across advanced 
democracies are related to old-age care (i.e. pensions) and health care. These policies 
have redistributive functions shifting resources from those who are younger and healthier 
into pensions and health care services for those who are not. There are also directly 
redistributive policies that provide redistribution of income from the top to the bottom 
and for those who are unemployed. Another two areas of social policy that are not always 
grouped into welfare state research are price controls and subsidies for basic needs. These 
utilize public resources to lower the costs of things such as food, health care and housing. 
Despite the free market capitalism of the advanced democracies, many things are price 
controlled and subsidized, for example pharmaceuticals, rent and electricity. 
I seek to cover a broad range of public opinion toward social policy so I attempt to 
include as many measures as possible. Furthermore, I seek to generate multiple-item 
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scales to measure general social policy opinions. Multiple-item scales measuring latent 
variables are always preferable to single items so long as they are reliable, because they 
reduce random measurement error.  
Table 1. Measurements of Public Opinion in Three Cross-National Surveys 
 
As shown in Table 1, The ISEA and ISSP have multiple items that capture latent public 
opinion toward social policy. I use only single measures in the ESS because these three 
questions do not form a satisfactory latent indicator as I discuss in Chapter 4.2, (also see 
Table 38 and Section 10.2.2 in Technical Appendix Three for more info). 
I measure social policy as spending on welfare and redistribution as a percentage 
of GDP taken from the OECD's Social Expenditures Database (2010) (“SOCX”). 
Although this aggregate measure has been criticized for sometimes failing to represent 
variation in welfare spending by domain (e.g. health care, pensions and unemployment), 
it nonetheless may be understood as one way for capturing a nation’s overall commitment 
to social policy (C. Brooks and Manza 2006b; Kenworthy 2009). More importantly, 
increased spending overall is directly correlated with less poverty and reduced income 
inequality (Castles and Obinger 2007), and these are the two features of social policy 
(welfare and redistribution) that I specifically set out to measure in this dissertation.  
European Social 
Survey
Social Services Health Redistribution Social Policy Jobs
Education   (single-item) Income redistribution
Day-care Health care
Old-age care Old-age care
Price Controls Electricity Health Care Unemployment protection
Food   (single-item)
Housing
Health
Subsidies Electricity Old Age Care
Food   (single-item)
Housing
Health
International Survey of       
Economic Attitudes
International Social                
Survey Program
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Having outlined the theoretical determinants of public opinion toward social 
policy, I construct a framework for measuring these determinants; in other words the 
independent variables (IVs). The remaining chapter discusses my measurements for these 
IVs based on what is preferable and available, and the work of others. The measurements 
I choose are restricted in their scope because they must be asked in a way that gives them 
cross-national comparability or are available in comparative statistical databases. For 
example, I would like to have a yearly measure of the strength of individualistic norms in 
all of the OECD countries spanning 30 years, but this simply does not exist. I attempt to 
use the best possible measurements within these constraints. Furthermore, I look for 
measures with the most detailed information on individuals, regions and countries. For 
example measures that are continuous as opposed to dichotomous are usually preferable. 
3.1 Socioeconomics and Demographics 
One of the most basic and fundamental observations that social scientists attempt to make 
in the world is determination of where individuals are located on the 'social ladder', i.e. 
how an individual relates to the larger social group(s) she is located in. This structural 
relationship is determined by the status of an individual. Status (i.e. class) is multifarious 
and cannot be captured with only one measurement such as income, occupation or race. It 
is determined by social and demographic characteristics such as education, biological sex, 
relationship status, and age. This section offers some concrete measurements to help 
relate individuals, and regions and countries to their statuses. 
3.1.1 Individual-level: SES and Demographics 
Socioeconomic status (SES) is regularly measured with at least one of the 'big three'; 
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education, income and occupational status. There are other ways to determine an 
individual's status such as wealth (material possessions) and social networks (for example 
social capital) but these are not often measured in cross-national surveys.  
Education is a commonly measured individual attribute. It is often conceived of in 
years or in highest degree attained. Educational systems differ across advanced 
democracies making direct comparison somewhat challenging. Thus, highest degree 
completed, for example primary, secondary, or tertiary education is one way to 
standardize the measure. The problem with this practice is that it vastly reduces accuracy 
of measurement because it leads to an ordinal scale with 3 or 4 categories. Year of 
education solves this problem to some degree. A person who completed secondary and 
completed four years of tertiary education (but did not finish the tertiary degree) has a lot 
more time spent in formal education than a person who just finished secondary education 
and then left. Years of education is therefore preferable to highest degree completed 
because it is a more continuous measurement with years running from 0 to something 
around 24 and has categories that represent linear steps in time. Measurement in years 
may also be faulted for accuracy in the cases where an individual takes many more years 
than the average to complete a degree, but it is better than the other options. 
Income is a relatively straightforward measure. Although income often suffers 
from lower measurement reliability, due to the fact that many people refuse to answer 
income questions and extremely high income individuals are a rare and difficult to sample 
population, income is regularly asked on surveys, usually as a weekly, monthly or yearly 
amount. I follow the lead of the surveys that I select for my analysis in measuring income 
and only utilize income when it has been standardized to an economic parity purchasing 
power (PPP) unit, such as international dollars or Euros. It is possible to improve upon 
this measurement of income by taking income in PPP and calculating it as a ratio to the 
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average blue-collar worker in a respondent's country (Kelley and Evans 1995). This helps 
to account for the fact that some countries are more prosperous than others. Data that 
allow for this exist in my first study in Chapter 4.1. With a small number of countries it is 
not practical to measure levels of development at the country-level, but by calculating this 
ratio, the individuals are standardized to their country's lowest common denominator of 
income. Furthermore, I take income always as family (i.e. household) income, so that 
individuals are placed within the structural location of their family regardless of their 
individual contribution to its overall income. 
Occupational status is a highly contested measure. There are a plethora of 
schemes to calculate the relative value and social status that a society places on a given 
occupation. Similar research attempts to measure occupational prestige. Occupational 
status and prestige are both intended to measure class. Both concepts relate to the ranking 
of occupations in a hierarchy or into distinct groups. Prestige is focused on subjective 
perceptions of the worthiness of a given occupation while status relates to the 
opportunities afforded to an individual and the individual's offspring as a result of being 
in an occupation, but both have no widely agreed upon measurement schemes. Status is 
often measured based on income, whether the individual is a business owner or manager, 
the level of education necessary to attain the job, and even how much power the job 
affords an individual (see Leiulfsrud, Bison, and Jensberg 2005). Most of these rankings 
are non-linear for example the International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO) and the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero classifications (EGP) break occupations 
into categories such as unskilled worker, self-employed farmer, and service class. While 
it is self-evident that unskilled workers are lower status than the service class3, it is 
                                                 
3 As in managers and administrators, not to be confused with the 'service industry' in the United States 
which refers to restaurant or hospitality work 
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unclear how much higher a service class member is in status than an unskilled or self-
employed farm worker. This means that the measurements must be taken as a pile of 
dummy variables in an analytical framework, one for each category of the selected 
measurement scheme (EGP has 11 for example).  
Although there are strong arguments for why occupational status is a non-linear 
measurement (E. O. Wright 1985), class is theoretically something that exists on a 
continuum from the lowest proletarian to the highest bourgeoisie (Marx 1887).  Thus, I 
elect to take a continuous measure from the work of Kelley (1990) who compiled a single 
continuous variable to delineate the relative status of occupations on a scale from 0 to 
100. Although it may be interesting for other research to look at non-linear relationships 
of occupational status to public opinion, my study is only partly focused on this IV and 
having a single continuous measure provides the most parsimonious analytical models. In 
the end, as Kelley points out, the continuous measure is also preferable to a typology 
because, "...you would find that the bottom of Goldthorpe's 'service' class merges 
smoothly into the top of his routine white-collar class, and so forth down the hierarchy" 
(1990:327). Thus, a continuous status scale reflective of the theoretical reality of class 
becomes truncated by lumping categories into typologies. Table 2 gives an overview of 
Kelley's Worldwide Status Scoring, which is based on the tradition of earlier continuous 
measures used by Blau and colleagues (e.g. the Socio-Economic Index) and is focused on 
the education and income associated with a job, but also the transmission of inherited 
privilege to offspring and cross-national comparability (Kelley 1990:344). 
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Table 2. Worldwide Status Scoring for 
Selected Occupations 
 
Another SES variable I measure is those who are at risk. I create a dummy 
measurement which equals 1 when individuals have been sick, unemployed, or retired as 
their main activity in the past 7 days, and 0 otherwise. Although these three states are 
qualitatively different, they are all potentially states that increase the likelihood of 
needing welfare provisions and this might lead self-interest to increase opinions in favor 
of social policy (as discussed in Chapter 2.1). 
I do not explicitly hypothesize about the impact of demographic variables. Thus I 
do not spend a great deal of time on their measurements. Female is an easy way to 
capture biological sex as a dummy variable, with females coded as a 1 and males 0. Age 
is conventional in years. Church attendance is taken as the natural log of days per year, 
with zero given a -0.5. This is done because days per year would give a similar sized gap 
in measurement between someone who attends church never or 1 day per year compared 
to someone who attends 51 compared to 52 days per year. Logically, I expect that 
someone attending never and someone attending 1 day per year is probably quite different 
in their religiosity than someone who attends 51 compared with 52 days. Thus, the log 
emphasizes the differences between those at the low values of days per year. Suburban 
refers to individuals living in suburban neighborhoods, and it is dichotomized so that 
Higher Professionals 100
Administrators and Managers 75
Technical Employees 70
Higher Clerical Employees 60
Higher Sales Emloyees 51
Routine Clerical Workers 38
Skilled Manual Workers 37
Semi-Skilled Workers 24
Unskilled Manual Workers 14
Farm Laborers 0
Source: Kelley (1990)
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suburban equals 1 while urban and rural equal 0. This is a data driven measurement 
decision, as I have observed that suburbanites tend to be less supportive of redistribution 
than both of the other groups (see Technical Appendix Two, section 10.2.1). Finally, I 
measure married as a dummy where those who are currently married or in a cohabitating 
partnership are coded 1 and all others 0. 
I measure attitudes toward government effectiveness as a control variable in my 
first study. I do not hypothesize about this variable other than to worry that these attitudes 
might bias support of social policy, as those who do not think their governments are 
effective are not likely to support any government activities including social policy 
provision (more in section 4.1). 
3.1.2 Meso and Macro: Countries and Regions 
I use two measures of economic development at the meso-level (i.e. regional-level). 
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita taken at PPP, and the percentage of the 
population with a tertiary degree.  I also control for the political climate of a region by 
measuring the percentage of the population that voted for a traditional left party (i.e., 
social democratic, labor, and socialist) and the percentage of the population voting for a 
neo-national party in the last national election.  A neo-national party is a party that is 
explicitly anti-immigrant. Although political values are something held by individuals, 
the usage of a subjective left-right scale introduces measurement error because subjective 
values do not necessarily align with voting behaviors, and because this measure contains 
a great deal of non-response, and as discussed previously it may be endogenous with my 
DV.  
At the country level I measure female labor force participation (FLP) as the 
percentage of women in the labor force as opposed to in household work or otherwise out 
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of the labor force out of all working age women as it is presented in the OECD's 
statistical database (OECD 2010a). Although this variable measures what kind of labor 
market a country has, it is also utilized as an instrumental variable which I discuss further 
in Chapter 6. I measure the demographic structure of a country by calculating aged as the 
percentage of persons 65 and older and married as the percentage of persons married or 
cohabitating 'as married' out of the total population. I measure the government revenue 
generated from taxes and the amount of military spending for each country-year as a 
percentage of GDP (OECD 2010b; SIPRI 2012). Married, taxes and military spending are 
also instrumental variables discussed later, but they provide information about the 
demographics, spending power and strength of a nation-state. 
3.2 Ideology 
I seek to measure egalitarian ideology, but I narrow the scope of egalitarianism to focus 
on economic egalitarianism. Therefore I aim to capture individual ideological positions 
about the ideal distribution of material resources in society. Thus I measure how much 
difference individuals desire between rich and poor and if redistribution is something 
society should have. As this is a deeply held belief in individuals, multiple items are 
essential for sorting out the ideology from attitudes that might be cued in survey 
questions. I focus on ideology in my first study, see Chapter 4.1 and the exact question 
wording and scale construction are available there, but the main aspects of the questions 
refer to ideal income differences between rich and poor, the importance of redistribution, 
and targets and goals for the respondents' particular social contexts (i.e. country) with 
respect to egalitarian outcomes. By utilizing five questions that have both face- and 
content-validity (see Table 33 in Technical Appendix One), I tap into the latent and 
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underlying ideology of economic egalitarianism. 
As previously mentioned, left-right ideology is often used for capturing 
'ideological' impacts on public opinion, but I do not focus on this due to endogeneity 
issues and the fact that it also introduces an increase in missing data patterns. However, in 
my second study I offer a sensitivity analysis which controls for subjective left-right 
placement (see Technical Appendix Two). 
3.3 In-Group Bias 
I measure in-group bias indirectly via the percentage of foreign-born individuals in each 
region of Western Europe, the center of massive migrations in the past few decades. I 
measure this for Western Europe because the ESS is the only individual-level survey data 
that includes regional representative sampling (112 regions in 14 countries) that aligns 
with regionally available data in almost all countries. Percent foreign-born is a necessary 
measure for immigration generated diversity because it is a standard measure that is 
comparable across Europe. The percentage of the population that is born-abroad captures 
the proportion of the population that is a first-generation immigrant, regardless of country 
of origin, naturalization status, length of stay, or any other way that the immigrant 
population could be sub-divided. It is important to note that this is the only measure of 
immigration that is available at the regional-level across these 14 countries. Regardless of 
data limitations, for a quantitative, cross-regionally and cross-nationally comparative 
analysis, this is the only appropriate way of measuring the impact of recent immigration 
on public opinion. 
My in-group bias predictions following the arguments of Eger (2010b) 
hypothesize that the proportion of the population born-abroad should impact public 
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opinion when we control for attitudes about immigrants and immigration. In other words 
that in-group bias operates independently of anti-immigrant sentiment, i.e. these are two 
different individual attitudes. Thus, I include an individual-level variable that captures 
anti-immigrant as a latent measurement (alpha=0.86) constructed from the mean of three 
variables that capture respondents answers to the following questions: 1) “Is immigration 
bad or good for the country’s economy?” 2) “Is the country’s cultural life undermined or 
enriched by immigrants?” and 3) “Do immigrants make the country a worse or better 
place to live?” Higher values indicate that individuals are more anti-immigrant (see 
Technical Appendix Two, p. 233). 
3.4 Institutions 
I use four measures of institutions to help isolate institutional norms in societies. In the 
first study I dichotomize a small sample of countries into formerly Communist (=1), and 
otherwise free market (=0). In the second study I do not look at institutions. In the third 
study, I measure social institutions, political institutions and a rough grouping of 
historical institutions across a large number of the advanced democracies of the world. I 
specifically measure social institutions using an axis of individualism. In the 1960s and 
70s, Hofstede pioneered a way to investigate various social norms across most of the 
advanced nations of the world by surveying working individuals. His work with an 
International Business Machines survey of its workers provided multiple dimensions of 
cultural consequences for organizational practices (Hofstede 2001). He developed a way 
of cross-nationally comparing cultures along specific dimensions. The data was 
comparable based on survey design and translation and the fact that the surveyed workers 
were performing similar tasks albeit in different countries. His individualism places 
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normative importance on active individual achievement of goals as opposed to reliance 
on collective coordination and incentives for goal achievement. Critical research in 
cultural psychology finds that there are various types of individualism and collectivism 
and each is a measure on its own, and societies might have a high or low degree of both 
(Oyserman 2006). Hofstede's measure captures individualistic values in particular, 
however, greater individualistic values should crowd out a collectivistic approach to 
problem solving, therefore I utilize this measure as a proxy of part, but not all possible 
kinds, of collectivism. Higher scores at the country-level indicate higher levels of 
individualism.  
I measure political institutions on an axis of corporatism. This measure is taken 
from the work of Lijphart and Crepaz (1991) who constructed a standardized scale based 
on 12 expert measures of corporatism in advanced democratic societies. It is thus a scale 
of scales, i.e. an averaging of expert definitions. The broad idea of corporatism is more 
regulation of society by the state. In particular, the expert scales often include the degree 
to which the state itself organizes and coordinates interests (e.g. workers, profit seekers, 
lobbies, and so forth). If these interests are left to coordinating themselves outside of state 
institutions, then this is known as pluralism and is the opposite of corporatism. Lijphart 
and Crepaz do not measure corporatism for Portugal and Spain, therefore I engage in 
imputation for these two countries, see Technical Appendix Three, Table 45. The imputed 
values put Spain above average and Portugal at about average in corporatism. Although, 
these two countries are known in Europe as less-organized economies in the traditional 
sense, there is evidence that since the 1980s, globalization and alternative forms of 
coordination are imposing change giving these two countries surprisingly strong neo-
corporatist institutions. Their imputed scores reflect this, placing them far above the US 
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and other pluralist systems yet below the most corporatist systems of Northern Europe; 
therefore I see the imputed measures shown in Table 3 as adequate (Royo 2002). 
Finally, I measure English-speaking countries (=1) based on available spending 
and opinion data, to include Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Great 
Britain, and the US, and European (=0) as Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland for use in my third study 
in Chapter 6. Japan is a questionable case amongst the English-speaking nations but I 
leave it there for consistency and a close post-war linkage with English-speaking 
reconstruction, plus the overwhelmingly positive adoption of Japanese business to 
English-speaking institutional norms, and the fact that others tend to place it in that group 
(Ralston et al. 1997; Dore, Lazonick, and O’Sullivan 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001; C. 
Brooks and Manza 2007). Based on the discussion in Chapter 2.4.3, I do not make this 
family of institutions measurement linked to any specific causal mechanism, but instead 
throw a very broad net to collect countries into two groups which have some historical 
institutional commonalities. I restrict my sample to include only advanced democratic 
countries in the ISSP. Table 3 presents the scoring of individualism, corporatism and 
English-speaking institutions for all of these countries. 
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Table 3. Institutional Measures by Advanced Democracy 
 
aPortugal and Spain corporatism scores imputed, see Technical Appendix Three, Table 45 
On a final note, many studies measure norms at the individual level. In fact this is 
often the only way to get at an institutional norm (i.e. as with aggregating attitudes to get 
public opinion). Thus, I do not take a strong stance on the difference between ideology 
and norm. Institutional norms are basically chronically repeated ideologies. Individuals 
may subscribe more or less to these ideologies. Individual ideology taken at its mean 
reflects institutional ideology in many cases. However, norms are sometimes heuristic, or 
difficult to capture in a survey. In fact Hofstede's measure required dozens of questions 
and it was only through cross-national comparison of the responses did institutional 
patterns emerge. Thus, using Hofstede's cultural measure and the corporatist measure of 
Social Political Family of 
Institutions
Individualism Corporatism English-speaking
Australia 90 -1.025 1
Austria 55 1.600 0
Canada 80 -1.335 1
Denmark 74 0.518 0
Finland 63 0.427 0
France 71 -0.725 0
Germany 67 0.480 0
Ireland 70 -0.528 1
Italy 76 -0.851 0
Japan 46 0.053 1
Netherlands 80 1.006 0
New Zealand 79 -1.106 1
Norway 69 1.531 0
Portugal 27 -0.030a 0
Spain 52 0.477a 0
Sweden 71 1.396 0
Switzerland 68 0.505 0
United Kingdom 89 -1.341 1
United States 91 -1.025 1
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Lijphart and Crepaz helps to identify institutional level norms (i.e. ideologies) that are not 
simply the averaging of individual responses to the surveys that I analyze. 
3.5 Summary of Hypotheses and Measures 
Before proceeding to the testing of opinion determinants I summarize the theoretical 
expectations derived from Chapter 2 on what determines public opinion, what 
mechanisms are at play, and measurement sources for each hypothesized IV in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Hypothesized Determinants of Public Opinion toward Social Policy 
 
Determinant Level Mechanism Measure
Effect on Public 
Opinion
Self-Interest, 
Individual
Micro Higher SES have 
less to gain more to 
lose
Income, education 
and occupational 
status
Decrease support 
of social policy
Self-Interest, 
Context
Meso More development, 
more to lose
GDP, average 
educational 
attainment
Decrease
Ideology Micro Value and 
instrumental 
rationality
Economic 
egalitarianism
Increase
Social 
Institutions
Macro Individualism norm Hofstede Decrease
Political 
Institutions
Macro Communist           
totalitarian 
collectivism
Former Communist 
countries v. not
Increase
Political 
Institutions
Macro Corporatism, 
coordination of 
markets, society and 
politics by the nation-
state
Lijphart and 
Crepaz
Increase
Family of 
Institutions
Macro None specified, 
proxy for families of 
institutional norms
English-speaking 
(v. European)
Decrease
Ethnic 
Diversity
Meso In-group bias, 
natives v. immigrants
Percent foreign-
born
Decrease
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4 CHAPTER FOUR TESTING DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC OPINION 
In this chapter I empirically test the hypothetical determinants of public opinion toward 
social policy derived in Chapter 2. It is divided into sections representing my work in two 
studies. The first is presented in section 4.1 and taken directly from its published version 
under the title "Economic Equality and Social Welfare: Policy Preferences in Five 
Nations" (Breznau 2010a). The second study presented in section 4.2 is a product of 
collaborative work with Maureen A. Eger presented as a conference paper (Breznau and 
Eger 2012), and I give it a working title "Immigration, Social Policy and Public Opinion 
in Western Europe". This second study is currently under review for publication. As the 
article will feature Eger as first author, I have taken care to engage in analyses that extend 
beyond what is found in our conference paper and to re-write as much as possible as my 
own. All writing I claim as my own although it is modeled after and inspired by material 
that we wrote together and may contain some exact phrases from her writing. Also, I 
credit Eger for her collaborative work in data collection and supervision in this project. 
The original idea for this second article came from her dissertation, without which none 
of this would be possible (Eger 2010b, 2010a). She is therefore a co-author by merit for 
all sections of this dissertation that pertain to the second study. 
4.1 First Study: "Economic Equality and Social Welfare: Policy Preferences in 
Five Nations" 
The first study shows evidence that the public are not merely self-interested, but also 
ideologically motivated and institutionally conditioned. Using survey data from large, 
representative national samples in Australia, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Finland, and 
Poland (N=13,294), structural equation estimates correcting for measurement error show 
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that those with economic egalitarian ideologies are much more supportive of social 
policies. This is consistent with Weber's theorizing on value and instrumental rationality. 
I also show that a legacy of Communist institutions increases support of social policy 
consistent with institutional theory, although the limited number of cases makes this 
finding speculative. Ultimately, egalitarian ideologies are more important than self-
interest and Communist institutions in shaping preferences for social policies of 
government control of social services, price controls for basic needs, and subsidies for 
basic needs.  
4.1.1 Data and Methods 
Existing research on ideology and public opinion toward social policy is somewhat biased 
toward highly developed western nations, especially the US (Gelissen 2000; Jæger 
2006b) and some of the findings also derive from small, urban samples (Feldman and 
Steenbergen 2001; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989). To further investigate public opinion 
and social policy both cross-nationally and representatively, I select large samples from 
Australia, Bulgaria, Finland, the Netherlands, and Poland. This gives a mix of western 
countries and two formerly Communist countries. These countries are part of a unique 
dataset not previously utilized to model ideology and public opinion. This data includes 
Australia which provides a highly developed English-speaking alternative to extend the 
work done on US samples, and the Netherlands and Finland provide continental and 
Nordic European comparisons. Testing these hypotheses in formerly Communist 
countries of Poland and Bulgaria in comparison to the others, offers investigation of 
similar Communist institutions in different economic settings. Poland was rather 
successful in early transition compared with Bulgaria’s turbulence and economic 
difficulties (Blanchard 1997).  
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This investigation uses International Survey of Economic Attitudes (ISEA) data. It 
is a survey started in 1991 and conducted in subsequent waves (Kelley, Evans, and 
Zagorski 2007). The ISEA data used in this analysis are from 1994 to 1999 in Australia, 
Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Finland, and Poland and pooled into one large cross-section as 
the surveys were started and completed at different points during this period. The 
respondents include a representative sampling of each country (N=13,294). A comparison 
with national census data confirms that the ISEA data are sufficiently representative 
national samples from the mid 1990s (Sikora 1997). The Australian data were based on 
simple random samples of Australians conducted by the ISEA principals. The data are 
from 1994, 1995, and 1999 (N=5,572). The Institute of Sociology, Bulgarian Academy of 
Sciences completed the Bulgarian edition in 1997 (N=1,273). Turku University 
conducted the Finnish edition in 1994 (N=1,720). The Center for Social Opinion 
Research did the Polish edition in 1994 and 1997 (N=3,796). Interuniversity Center for 
Social Science Theory and Methodology completed The Netherlands edition of the 
survey in 1998 (N=933). For further details on survey methods in Australia, Bulgaria, 
Finland and Poland see (Sikora 2005:241). 
Measurements of independent variables with means, standard deviations, and test 
re-test reliabilities; along with multi-item scale means, standard deviations, and alpha 
reliabilities are presented in Table 5. Self-interest variables include family income, 
education, and occupational status; and I measure demographic variables of male, church 
attendance, and formerly Communist institutions. Question wording and means for multi-
item, latent intervening variables egalitarian ideology and government effectiveness, and 
latent dependent variables capturing public opinion toward social policy that include 
government control of social services, price controls, and subsidies are in Table 5 
through Table 10 respectively showing the face-validity of the scales with similar 
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questions and question wordings. The measurement of egalitarianism includes five 
questions that ask about differences in income and wealth in society; government 
effectiveness includes three questions about the quality of government services; 
government control of social services includes six questions about the role of the 
government in service provisions; subsidies includes four questions asking about 
subsidization of various basic goods; price controls includes four questions specifically 
asking about governmental regulation of prices.  
Table 6 through Table 10 also show the interval scoring for each response 
category on a scale from 0 to 100. Although recoding questions with a four- or five-point 
set of answer categories to equal intervals is conventional, and alternative coding may 
yield the same results as equal intervals scoring, in this analysis ordinal probit regressions 
predicting intervals for each scale item for dependent and intervening variables reveals 
some substantial deviation from equal intervals (Daykin and Moffatt 2002). In other 
words coding the variables with 0 to represent strongly disagree, 25 somewhat disagree, 
50 neutral, 75 somewhat agree, and 100 strongly disagree does not capture the differences 
in respondents’ attitudes between response categories. This divergence warrants the use 
of predicted intervals, i.e. optimal intervals, as opposed to equal intervals (Jacoby 1999) 
(see Table 28, Table 29, Table 30, Table 31, and Table 32 in Technical Appendix One). 
As discussed earlier, the public tend to be supportive of social policies and looking at 
Table 5 the respective means for government control of social services, price controls, 
and subsidies are 57.6 (neutral coded at 39), 49.8 (no logical midpoint, some price 
controlling coded at 10 and total controlling coded at 100) and 54.1 (neutral coded at 30). 
These numbers show that the public tend to be on the favoring side for each social policy; 
i.e. the average response being greater than “neutral” or in the middle, based on relative 
scoring intervals. Also for each scale item high alpha reliabilities suggest strong construct 
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validity. Not shown are the appropriately large inter-item correlations, similar 
correlations with other variables and factor analyses confirming one underlying factor per 
concept, in total and holding within each country, further demonstrating appropriate 
construction of each scale (see Table 33, Technical Appendix One). 
Table 5. Measurement and Descriptives for All Variables used in Modeling Public 
Opinion toward various Social Policies 
 
aMeans for multi-item scales calculated from unequal interval scoring see Technical Appendix One, 
and numbers in parentheses represent unequal interval midpoint for all scale variables except 
government control of social services where 10 equals some government control and 100 equals total 
control. Test retest reliability for single-item variables calculated from the Australian survey and alpha 
reliabilities calculated for multi-item variables. By country descriptive statistics for latent variables 
available in Table 34 Technical Appendix One.  
Table 6 shows measurement of egalitarianism based on answers to five questions: 
“Do you agree or disagree…” that: “Differences in income in [respondent’s country] are 
Variable Measurement N Meana s.d. Reliability
Education Years of school completed 13,182 11.2 3.3 0.87
Occupational Status Scored from 0 (farm laborer) 
to 100 (higher professional)
12,272 46.1 28.0 0.88
Family Income Ratio to average wages of 
semi-skilled, full-time male 
workers in respondent's 
11,727 1.6 1.5 0.71
Male Male = 1; Female = 0 13,152 0.5 0.5 0.99
Age In years 13,294 46.7 16.1 1.00
Church Attendance Natural log of days per year; 
"never" scored at .5 days
13,050 1.5 1.8 0.84
Former Communist Bulgaria and Poland = 1;           
Other = 0
13,294 0.4 0.5 1.00
Economic 
Egalitarianism
Multi-item, see Table 6 n/a 57.3(29) 28.6 0.90
Government 
Effectiveness
Multi-item, see Table 7 n/a 30.3(50) 22.9 0.80
Social Services 
(gov't. control of)
Multi-item, see Table 8 n/a 57.6(10) 29.6 0.89
Price Controls          
(for basic needs)
Multi-item, see Table 9 n/a 49.8(39) 24.8 0.82
Subsidies                  
(for basic needs)
Multi-item, see Table 10 n/a 54.1(30) 25.7 0.79
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too large”; “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income 
between people with high incomes and those with low incomes”; “There is too much of a 
difference between rich and poor in this country”; “Income and wealth should be 
redistributed toward ordinary people”; and “One of the most important aims in this 
country over the next ten years should be to reduce the differences between rich and 
poor.” Based on predicted probit modeling, if the respondent strongly disagrees with the 
statement I code it a 0, somewhat disagree 7, neutral 29, somewhat agree 53, and strongly 
agree scored 100. As the first row of numbers in the table demonstrates, 1% of 
respondents strongly disagreed that differences in income in their country were too large, 
while 10% somewhat disagreed, 13% neutral, 37% somewhat agreed, and 39% strongly 
agreed. The average response for the question was 63, or just above somewhat agree. 
Similarly the average response to the government’s responsibility to reduce differences in 
income was 51, too much difference between rich and poor 65, income and wealth should 
be redistributed 52, and the most important aim over the next 10 years is to reduce 
differences 56. Overall, these numbers show that the public on average are somewhat or 
strongly in favor of reducing economic inequality. 
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Table 6. Measurement of Economic Egalitarian Ideology 
 
Note: N=13,294 with minor variation in response rates. Mean non-response 5%. Table presented verbatim 
in English, translated for non-English speaking countries. Interval coding derived from ordinal probit 
regression (details in Technical Appendix One). 
I measure opinions about government effectiveness. Although, I do not 
hypothesize about the effects here, I contend that this is a critical control for public 
opinion toward social policy. I assume that those who see their government as inefficient 
or ineffective will be less likely to support it in general, and this includes social policy. I 
measure this variable as a control to ensure that any findings related to self-interest, 
ideology or institutions are robust. The measurement of government effectiveness in 
Table 7 comes from responses to the question “Government and private enterprises both 
have their good points and bad ones. Which do you think is…” and includes the items 
“Most efficient, most productive?”, “Most flexible, responds quickly to new opportunities 
and new conditions?”, and “Most profitable?” I recoded responses into predicted unequal 
intervals so that if the respondent says that private enterprise is extremely more effective 
than the government it is coded 0, somewhat more 24, both are equally effective 50, 
government is somewhat more effective 85, and government extremely more effective 
100. In the first row for example, when asked about which is “Most efficient, most 
Do you agree or disagree…
No!! No ?? Yes Yes!!
(0) (7) (29) (53) (100) Mean
Differences in income in {country} are too large. 1 10 13 37 39 100 63
It is the responsibility of the government to reduce 
the differences in income between people with 
high incomes and those with low incomes.
5 17 17 34 28 100 51
There is too much of a difference between rich 
and poor in this country. 2 9 12 36 41 100 65
Income and wealth should be redistributed toward 
ordinary people. 4 15 22 33 26 100 52
One of the most important aims in this country 
over the next ten years should be to reduce 
differences between rich and poor.
4 11 17 37 31 100 56
Answer choices, interval coding, and 
frequencies(%)
Total
%
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productive?”, 23% of respondents said private is most effective, 49% felt it somewhat 
more effective, 15% thought private and government enterprise were equally effective, 
10% said that government was somewhat more effective, and 4% government most 
effective. The average score is a 31 suggesting that most members of the public see 
government as somewhat less effective than private enterprise. Similarly the average for 
flexibility was 26, and for profitability 32, demonstrating an overall tendency to favor 
private enterprise amongst those surveyed. 
Table 7. Measurement of Government Effectiveness 
 
Note: N=13,294 with minor variation in response rates. Mean non-response 4%. Table presented verbatim 
in English, translated for non-English speaking countries. Interval coding derived from ordinal probit 
regression (details in Technical Appendix One) 
The measurement of the dependent variable government control of social services 
in Table 8 comes from responses to the question: “What part should the government play 
in running companies in these industries…” and includes items “hospitals”, “doctors and 
dentists”, “schools”, “universities”, “day-care centers for children”, and “old age homes”. 
I recoded responses into predicted intervals so that if the respondent says that the 
government should have no role it is coded 0, some role 10, regulate important aspects 
but leave the day-to-day alone 12, and regulate all aspects 100. In the first row for 
example, when asked about hospitals, 2% of respondents say no role, 21% some, 39% 
important aspects, and 39% all aspects. The average score is a 67, in other words, the 
Priv!! Priv = Govt Govt!
(0) (24) (50) (85) (100) Mean
Most efficient, most productive? 23 49 15 10 4 100 31
Most flexible, responds quickly to new 
opportunities and new conditions? 27 53 11 7 3 100 26
Most profitable? 23 47 15 11 4 100 32
Answer choices, coding, and frequencies(%)
Total%
Government and private enterprises: Which do you think is…
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public tend to believe that the government should run some or all aspects of social 
services. Similarly the average for doctors and dentists is 52, schools 63, universities 57, 
day-care 50, and old age homes 57. Overall, the public support some degree, if not full, 
government provision of social services. 
Table 8. Dependent Variable, Measurement of Government Control of Social Services 
 
Note: N=13,294 with minor variation in response rates. Mean non-response 5%. Table presented verbatim 
in English, translated for non-English speaking countries. Interval coding derived from ordinal probit 
regression (details in Technical Appendix One) 
The measurement of price controls in Table 9 comes from answers to this four 
item question battery: “Should the government regulate prices or should they be set by 
the free market?” for “electricity”, “basic foods”, “rent for houses and flats”, and 
“doctor’s fee and hospital charges”. I recode questions into unequal intervals. If the 
respondent says prices should be set entirely by the free market it is a score of 0, if they 
say mostly set by the free market it is 16, if they are neutral 39, mostly by the government 
52, and if they should be set entirely by the government 100. In the first row for example, 
when asked about price controls for electricity, 5% of respondents say that it should be 
set entirely by the free market, 16% mostly by the free market, 19% neutral, 35% mostly 
by the government, and 26% entirely by the government. The average score is a 54, in 
other words, there is more overall support of the government regulating the price of 
None Some Imp. All
(0) (10) (12) (100) Mean
Hospitals 2 21 39 39 100 67
Doctors and dentists 7 34 32 27 100 52
Schools 2 24 40 34 100 63
Universities 5 29 35 31 100 57
Dav-care centers for children 8 37 30 26 100 50
Old age homes 4 32 33 32 100 57
Total
%
What part should the government play in running companies in these industries…
Answer choices, coding, and frequencies(%)
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electricity than not. The means of the other items show a similar pattern with average 
support for basic foods at 43, rents for houses and flats 43, and doctor’s fee and hospital 
charges 59. Overall the public tend to favor price controls for basic needs. 
Table 9. Dependent Variable, Measurement of Price Controls for Basic Needs 
 
Note: N=13,294 with minor variation in response rates. Mean non-response 4%. Table presented verbatim 
in English, translated for non-English speaking countries. Interval coding derived from ordinal probit 
regression (details in Technical Appendix One) 
The measurement of subsidies in Table 10 comes from the results of this question: 
“To keep prices low, should the government subsidize the production of…” and it asks 
for “electricity”, “basic foods”, “construction of houses and flats”, and “doctors and 
hospitals”. Here again I recoded responses based on probit scores so that if the respondent 
says government should definitely not subsidize it is a 0, probably should not 11, neutral 
30, government probably should 57, and if the government definitely should 100. In the 
first row for example, when asked about subsidies for electricity, 6% of respondents say 
that the government should not subsidize, 17% probably should not, 16% neutral, 35% 
probably should, and 26% definitely should. The average score is a 51, in other words, 
there is more support of the government subsidizing electricity than not. Similarly the 
average for basic foods is 46, construction of houses and flats 48, and doctors and 
hospitals 70. Overall the public tend to favor government subsidies for basic needs. 
Free!! Free = Govt Govt!!
(0) (16) (39) (52) (100) Mean
Electricity 5 16 19 35 26 100 54
Basic foods 9 28 21 25 17 100 43
Rents for houses and flats 8 27 23 27 16 100 43
Doctor's fee and hospital charges 3 9 17 42 30 100 59
Should the government regulate prices or should they be set by the free market…
Answer choices, coding, and frequencies(%)
Total
%
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Table 10. Dependent Variable, Measurement of Subsidies for Basic Needs 
 
Note: N=13,294 with minor variation in response rates. Mean non-response 4%. Table presented verbatim 
in English, translated for non-English speaking countries. Interval coding derived from ordinal probit 
regression (details in Technical Appendix One) 
I test the hypothetical causal relationships of ideology to various public opinions 
using structural equation modeling (SEM). This modeling gives results similar in style to 
OLS regression and factor analytic techniques, but offers improvements in measurement 
modeling and the reduction of errors (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1982; Wolfle 2003). 
Empirically I model ideology in its intervening position, based on Weber's theoretical 
model in Chapter 2.2 and Figure 2. I do this through a first test of the influence of 
egalitarianism on public opinion independently, and a second test while controlling for 
self-interest and institutional effects on the DVs and ideology. In other words, I 
operationalize egalitarian values as an intervening variable between SES and institutions 
on the left, and policy preference variables on the right side of my path model. If self-
interest or institutional regime have important effects on egalitarianism, then the second 
model will show a large increase in the explained variance (r-squared) and a large 
decrease in the effects of egalitarian values on policy preferences (standardized 
coefficients); conversely, if the proposed influence of self-interest and institutions on 
egalitarianism is small then the variance will not change much and the effects of 
egalitarianism will remain robust. 
No!! No ?? Yes Yes!!
(0) (11) (30) (57) (100) Mean
Electricity 6 17 16 37 23 100 51
Basic foods 8 23 17 33 20 100 46
Construction of houses and flats 6 20 19 34 21 100 48
Doctors and hospitals 2 6 8 39 45 100 70
To keep prices low, should the government subsidize the production of…
Answer choices, coding, and frequencies(%)
Total
%
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4.1.2 Model Results 
I present standardized coefficients in the following model to demonstrate the relative 
impact of the causal variables on the dependent variables. Figure 4 presents evidence that 
economic egalitarianism exerts a large influence on support for government control of 
social services, price controls, and subsidies. This influence is of magnitude 0.26, 0.33, 
0.40 respectively out of 1.00 (for those not used to SEM these offer the same information 
as standardized OLS coefficients). This large influence is present after accounting for 
demographics, SES, national institutions, and opinions toward the effectiveness of 
government provisions.  
Figure 3 also presents evidence that being from a formerly Communist country 
influences support for all three social policies albeit slightly less so than egalitarian 
ideology; 0.27 for government control of social services, 0.20 for price controls and 0.20 
for subsidies. Socioeconomic factors play a smaller part. SES measures have an overall 
combined influence on government control of social services, price controls and subsidies 
equal to or less than a third the influence of egalitarian values at -0.10, -0.14, and -0.15 
respectively. The negative sign shows that those higher in SES have lower levels of 
welfare policy support. There is a relationship between education, income, and status of 
occupation, but these do not measure one underlying concept. This model should be 
understood only as a representation of the combined effect of all three, also known as a 
sheaf coefficient, while keeping in mind that they do not measure one common 
underlying factor. The sheaf represents self-interest overall for ease of comparison with 
institutionalism and instrumental rationality. To help deal with this issue, I create a 
baseline structural model to test the influence of each SES measure individually (see 
Table 13). As shown in these tables the individual influences of the SES variables are 
much smaller than institutional and especially ideological influences.  The model in 
81 
 
 
Figure 4 includes the demographic variables age, sex, and church attendance, but they are 
not shown as they have little to no influence on policy preferences, the results for these 
variables and all independent variables presented in Table 13. 
 Figure 4. Structural Equation Estimates Predicting Public Opinion toward Social Policies 
 
Note: Data from the International Survey of Economic Attitudes, 1994-1999; Figure source: Breznau (2010:473) 
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Also shown in Figure 4 are the relatively large effects that institutions and SES 
exert on egalitarian values (0.29 and -0.28 out of 1.00). Therefore I decompose the model 
in two stages to test the extent, if at all, that these two variables explain the relationship 
between egalitarianism and public opinion. Table 11 shows the first results which are 
estimates of the direct impact of SES and institutions on the intervening variables of 
ideology and government effectiveness, and Table 12 shows the first results of the direct 
effects of egalitarian ideology controlling only for attitudes toward government 
effectiveness and demographics (without SES or institutions). The full model is shown in 
Table 13 and this demonstrates the added influence of SES and Communist institutions in 
addition to egalitarianism on all three DVs. The large influence of SES and demographics 
on egalitarian ideology (0.29 and -0.28) does little to change the explanatory power of 
egalitarianism in influencing public opinion, evidenced by a fractional or nominal r-
squared change between the first and second stages; from 0.18 to 0.24 for social services, 
from 0.31 to 0.35 for price controls, and 0.33 to 0.36 for subsidies (note that "r-squared" 
here is used to represent the squared multiple correlation which is the equivalent measure 
in SEM). Furthermore, the influence of egalitarianism on public opinion measured by 
standardized coefficients remains large after controlling for SES and institutions; 0.26 for 
social services, 0.33 for price controls, and 0.40 for subsidies. The significant effects of 
institutions and SES on egalitarian ideology and the DVs represent only a fraction of the 
modeled effects in Figure 4 lending the most weight to ideology as a predictor of public 
opinion.
 Table 11. Structural Equation Estimates Correcting for Measurement Error for Intervening Variables 
 
aStandardized regression estimates taken from separate SEM where income, occupational status and 
education are estimated with their individual effects combined into a sheaf variable.  
 
Table 12. Structural Equation Estimates Correcting for Measurement Error for Dependent Variables without SES and Institutional Variables 
 
Note: N=13,294. "Std." refers to standardized coefficients. 
Metric s.e. Std. Metric s.e. Std.
Former Communist 13.42 0.46  0.29***  6.66 0.48  0.16***
Family income -2.73 0.20 -0.16*** -1.84 0.21 -0.12***
Education -1.06 0.12 -0.15*** -1.27 0.13 -0.19***
Occupational status -0.07 0.01 -0.08*** -0.04 0.01 -0.05**
SES sheafa - - -0.28*** - - -0.29***
Age 0.03 0.02  0.02*  0.03 0.02  0.02*
Male -2.09 0.39 -0.05*** -4.19 0.40 -0.10***
Church Attendance -0.04 0.14 ns -0.46 0.15 -0.04**
r-squared
Egalitarian values Government effective
0.22 0.14
Metric s.e. Std. Metric s.e. Std. Metric s.e. Std.
Egalitarian Ideology 0.31 0.01  0.36*** 0.34 0.01  0.43*** 0.36 0.01  0.52***
Government Effectiveness 0.15 0.01  0.13*** 0.24 0.01  0.23*** 0.10 0.01  0.11***
Age -0.01 0.02 ns 0.07 0.01  0.05*** -0.06 0.01 -0.04***
Male 2.74 0.36  0.06*** -0.90 0.43 -0.02* -2.38 0.38 -0.06***
Church Attendance 0.14 0.16 ns 0.48 0.15  0.03** 0.69 0.13  0.05***
r-squared
Social Services Price Controls Subsidies
0.18 0.31 0.33
 
 
 
Table 13. Full Model of Structural Equation Estimates, Identical Model with Figure 3. 
 
aStandardized regression for separate SEM where income, occupational status and education are estimated with their individual effects combined into a sheaf 
variable 
Note: N=13,294. "Std." refers to standardized coefficients.  
Metric s.e. Std. Metric s.e. Std. Metric s.e. Std.
Egalitarian ideology 0.24 0.01  0.26*** 0.30 0.01  0.33*** 0.32 0.01  0.40***
Government Effectiveness 0.09 0.01  0.10*** 0.19 0.01  0.19*** 0.07 0.01  0.08***
Former Communist 11.19 0.44  0.27*** 8.79 0.46  0.20*** 7.46 0.40  0.20***
Family Income -0.34 0.19 -0.02* -1.45 0.19 -0.09*** -0.27 0.17 ns
Education -0.60 0.12 -0.09*** -0.44 0.12 -0.07*** -0.37 0.10 -0.06***
Occupational Status 0.01 0.01 ns -0.01 0.01 ns -0.04 0.01 -0.06***
SES sheafa - - -0.10*** - - -0.13*** - - -0.15***
Age -0.04 0.01 -0.03** 0.03 0.01  0.02* -0.09 0.01 -0.08***
Male 1.64 0.36  0.04*** -1.80 0.37 -0.04*** -3.02 0.32 -0.08***
Church Attendance -0.89 0.13 -0.07*** -0.62 0.14 -0.05*** -0.36 0.12 -0.03**
r-squared
Social Services Price Controls Subsidies
0.24 0.35 0.36
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In order to test the overall goodness-of-fit (GOF) of the model I impute missing 
data instead of losing almost half of the cases to incomplete information. Therefore, I 
utilize single imputation, with 5 repeated imputations allowing randomly generated error. 
I average the 5 datasets containing predicted values for the missing cases and make one 
final imputed dataset. The averaging 5 repeated predictions smoothes the outliers and 
helps reduce random noise without eliminating it completely (see Technical Appendix 
One). In some cases there was not enough information to successfully impute missing 
values and preserve the integrity of the data leaving a total of N=11,589 (out of a possible 
N=13,294). The model achieves a RMSEA of 0.072 (for all other GOF measures see 
Table 35, Technical Appendix One). Note that the RMSEA (and all other GOF measures) 
show that my model is an improvement from the independence model, and within 
generally accepted ranges in the literature as representing a decent fitting model (Byrne 
2001).  
4.1.3 Country Comparisons 
In order to test for country-level differences, and to rule out the possibility that the 
findings are dominated by the Australian sample, I run separate models for each country. 
This reveals a consistent influence of egalitarian values on support of social policies 
across all five countries. Table 14 shows metric coefficients, significance tests, and slope 
tests for all independent variables on dependent variables government control of social 
services, price controls and subsidies. Slope tests (see Paternoster et al. 1998) using 
Australia as the comparison case confirm that for each dependent variable only one 
country differs significantly in the relationship of egalitarian ideology to social policy. 
For government control of social services and subsidies, Finland has slightly smaller 
strength coefficients (0.13 and 0.13 respectively) albeit in the same direction as Australia 
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and the other countries. For price controls, Poland differs from Australia but again the 
coefficient goes in the expected direction, this time representative of a slightly stronger 
relationship (0.31). 
Table 14. Metric Coefficients from SEM by Country with Slope Tests for Differences 
 
Note: Coefficients in italics significantly different from Australia in slope test; p < .01. Coefficients listed in 
table are significant in structural model; p > .01. Church attendance not measured in Finland. 
Australia Bulgaria Finland Netherlands Poland
Egalitarian Ideology 0.17 0.23 0.13 0.18 0.22
Effectiveness 0.16 0.14 ns ns 0.14
Family Income ns -2.55 ns ns -1.32
Education ns ns ns ns -1.70
Occupational Status ns ns ns ns ns
Age -0.07 ns ns ns ns
Male 3.93 ns 3.12 4.27 ns
Church Attendance -0.80 ns n/a ns ns
Australia Bulgaria Finland Netherlands Poland
Egalitarian Ideology 0.24 0.28 0.23 0.27 0.31
Effectiveness 0.21 0.15 0.16 ns 0.19
Family Income -1.68 ns ns -2.38 -1.14
Education ns -1.71 ns ns -1.26
Occupational Status ns ns ns ns ns
Age ns ns ns ns ns
Male -1.81 1.53 -2.80 ns ns
Church Attendance ns ns n/a ns ns
Australia Bulgaria Finland Netherlands Poland
Egalitarian Ideology 0.28 0.29 0.13 0.23 0.29
Effectiveness 0.10 0.12 0.07 ns 0.05
Family Income -1.77 2.41 -0.90 -2.06 ns
Education ns -1.62 ns ns -0.80
Occupational Status ns ns ns ns ns
Age -0.12 ns ns ns ns
Male -3.78 ns -2.78 -3.49 -1.86
Church Attendance ns ns n/a -1.03 ns
Government Control of Social Services
Price Controls for Basic Needs
Subsidies for Basic Needs
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In Australia, Bulgaria and Poland those who see government as more effective 
tend to support each of the 3 policies similarly, whereas in Finland and the Netherlands 
the relationship is different and small or insignificant in each case. As for the IVs, SES 
and demographics vary widely across all five nations and in most cases the relationships 
are not significant. The exception is education in Bulgaria and Poland. In support of price 
controls and subsidies those Bulgarians who are more educated are more likely to oppose 
the policies. For all three policies, the Poles who are more educated are more likely to 
oppose the policy. These relationships vary markedly from the other three nations where 
education has no significant effect on policy preferences in any of the models. The 
important fact remains that egalitarian ideology functions similarly in all five countries in 
its relationship to public opinion toward social policy. 
4.1.4 Discussion 
Those with ideological egalitarianism are most likely to support social policies of social 
service provision of health, education and welfare; and price controls and subsidies for 
basic needs of electricity, food, housing, and health care. This relationship holds true in 
Australia, Bulgaria, Finland, the Netherlands and Poland. The strength of the relationship 
does not vary substantially in magnitude. 
Citizens of formerly Communist countries are more likely to support all social 
policies than their traditionally free market counterparts. The publics in Bulgaria and 
Poland are far more supportive of all three policies than those in Australia, The 
Netherlands, and Finland. Socioeconomic-status (SES) and demographic characteristics 
including income, education, occupational status, sex, age, and church attendance show 
little to no importance in explaining support for welfare policies. Put another way, what 
an individual stands to gain or lose from these policies matters only slightly in 
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comparison to institutions and ideology. Egalitarian ideology is 2 to 3 times more 
powerful in its capacity to predict policy preferences than three SES factors combined, 
and exponentially more than each individually.  
A side finding emerged in this analysis that education in five out of six instances 
in Bulgaria and Poland proved extremely important in addition to egalitarian ideology in 
shaping opinion. This was not true in the other three countries where it mattered little to 
none. I discuss these findings in further detail in Chapter 7. 
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4.2 Second Study: "Group Dynamics, Social Policy and Public Opinion in 
Western Europe" 
Comparative analyses of European countries struggle to find evidence of a relationship 
between ethnic diversity and reduced public support of social policy. Most of the 
evidence of a relationship comes from comparisons of countries. The theory of in-group 
bias suggests that the impact of diversity should occur in local social settings, as opposed 
to at the country-level. In-group bias should lead native inhabitants of a given country to 
reduce their support for social policy in the presence of greater immigration generated 
diversity. Greater numbers of foreign-born in a region create more visibility of 
immigrants and this will activate in-group bias which is a preference to share collective 
resources only with the native in-group. This should reduce public opinion supporting 
social policy. This second study tests this hypothesis by looking at the percentage of 
foreign-born residents of regions within countries of Western Europe using data from the 
ESS and three-level regression models. With the collaborative work of Maureen A. Eger, 
this study shows that immigration-generated ethnic diversity reduces support for social 
policy including universal health care and old-age welfare. 
4.2.1 Data and Methods 
In this second study, Eger and I investigate public opinion in 14 Western European 
countries. Individual-level data come from the European Social Survey (ESS), a 
comprehensive, biennial multi-country survey covering over 30 countries in Europe from 
2002 to 2010. The determinants of public opinion are tested in the 4th round of the ESS 
(2008) because it includes a special module on social welfare policy. This survey has 
representative random samples at the regional-level. The regions sampled in the ESS 
correspond to the European Union’s Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 
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(NUTS). These geographical units represent administratively, and often historically 
distinct political areas in each country. NUTS-level designation (1, 2, or 3) is based on 
population size (see Technical Appendix Two, Table 36 for more details).  
Our research examines how the presence of immigrants impacts native-born 
public opinion towards social policy; thus, we include only native-born individuals in our 
sample. We drop all individuals with missing data on any of the variables in our model 
(about 5%). Our main sample includes all Western European countries in the survey 
except Portugal due to a lack of compatibility between NUTS regions and Portuguese 
census regions. In total we analyze 22,835 native-born individuals at the micro-level, 
nested in 112 regions at the meso-level, in 14 countries at the macro-level; these are 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Eastern Germany, Western Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, and Great Britain. Table 
15 provides descriptive statistics on the individual-level and regional-level data employed 
in the current analyses. We split Germany into East and West because public opinion and 
socioeconomics differs between these two former countries (Roller 1994). We also split 
Berlin into former East and West in terms of individuals, although measurement 
limitations force us to capture all of Berlin when measuring meso-level data. 
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Table 15. Summary Statistics, ESS 2008 
 
 
Our DVs come from ESS questions about the provision of social policy. We use 
three questions to measure different public opinions. The first question measures income 
redistribution asking how much the respondent agrees with the following statement: “The 
government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.” Answer 
choices range from “strongly disagree” through “strongly agree.” The next two questions 
Individual-level N Mean S.D. Measure
Redistribution 22,835 69.0 26.1 0 strongly 
disagree
100 strongly 
agree
The government should take 
measures to reduce differences in 
income levels.
Health Care 23,005 85.8 15.5 0 none 100 fully 
responsible
How much responsibility 
governments should have to  
…ensure adequate health care for 
the sick?
Old-Age 
Welfare
23,003 82.5 16.4 0 none 100 fully 
responsible
How much responsibility 
governments should have to 
…ensure a reasonable standard of 
living for the old?
Education 23,049 12.6 4.01 In years
Age 23,049 48.1 18.3 In years
Female 23,049 0.52 0.50 Female = 1
At Risk 23,049 0.29 0.46 Retired, sick, disabled or 
unemployed past 7 days = 1
Union 23,049 0.44 0.50 Currently/formerly in a union = 1
Suburban 23,049 0.14 0.35 Suburban dwelling = 1
Anti-immigrant 23,049 47.8 20.8 Three items immigrants: bad/good, 
undermine/enrich cultural life, make 
country worse/better place to live.
Regional-level N Mean S.D. Measure
Foreign-born 112 11.1 7.15 % of population born in a foreign 
country
Tertiary Degree 112 28.8 6.28 % of population with tertiary 
degree
GDP Per Capita 112 33.9 16.8 GDP per capita in k Euros
Vote Left 112 43.6 11.7 % of population that voted for 
traditional left parties in most 
recent national election
Vote Neo-
National
112 6.66 8.78 % of population that voted for anti-
immigrant parties in most recent 
national election
12.3 67.5
0.00 37.9
1.98 37.2
14.5 48.3
14.9 120.6
0 1
0 100
Minimum Maximum
0 1
0 1
0 1
Minimum Maximum
0 23
15 85
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are from the special welfare state module (to date only asked in 2008) and measure public 
opinion toward government provision of health care and old-age welfare. The questions 
are worded similarly and capture attitudes regarding the level of responsibility the 
government should take to either “…ensure adequate health care for the sick?” or 
“…ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old?” A 10-response Likert-scale, 
ranging from 0, “no responsibility,” to 10, “fully responsible,” captures respondents’ 
attitudes. For ease of interpretation, all three variables are transformed into equal intervals 
ranging from 0-100.   
Regional-level data come from a unique dataset complied from Eurostat, the 
European Election Database, and national censes. Although information on the foreign-
born population is available for the nation-state in Eurostat and other comparative 
databases, at the regional level there is no comprehensive source. Therefore, between 
2011-2012, we searched national censes’ databases in order to locate this measurement. 
Further details on regional data collection are available in Technical Appendix Three, 
Table 36 and Table 37. 
We argue that immigration-generated ethnic diversity reduces public support of 
social policy. To test this hypothesis we utilize the variable percent foreign-born by 
region. In general, immigrants are more likely to differ linguistically, culturally, and 
phenotypically from native-born populations. We argue that these differences are 
perceptible and thus likely to focus attention on group boundaries and activate in-group 
bias. Although it is true that other types of ethnic diversity exist in each of these countries 
(e.g. historic, linguistic, or religious minority populations), our goal is to measure the 
impact of the ethnic diversity created by immigration across all of the countries. Thus, we 
use a standard measure that is comparable across Europe. The percentage of the 
population that is born-abroad captures the proportion of the population that is a first-
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generation immigrant, regardless of country of origin, naturalization status, length of stay, 
or any other way that the immigrant population could be sub-divided. It is important to 
note that this is the only measure of immigration that is available at the regional-level 
across these 14 countries.  
To test a hypothesis about the effect of a regional variable on an individual-level 
outcome, we rely on multilevel linear regression modeling. The structure of our dataset is 
nested, with individuals residing in regions that make up countries. A three-level model 
takes into account the clustered nature of the data and the repeated observations of 
characteristics specific to each of the 112 regions. Moreover, this approach assigns a 
random intercept for each country and region to capture the effects of unobserved 
heterogeneity. These random intercepts include any unobserved characteristics4, but in 
particular they allow us to implicitly control for any qualitative features of national social 
policy systems that structure respective public opinion and might otherwise bias our 
results (see Rothstein 1998; C. Brooks and Manza 2007; Larsen 2006). Allowing a 
random intercept uses up only one degree of freedom per level whereas adding a dummy 
variable for each region and country would use up 112 plus 14 degrees of freedom. Also 
our method clusters regional-level and country-level standard errors so as not to bias the 
results by producing significant effects where there are none (DiPrete and Forristal 1994). 
In order to test our hypotheses, we use a step-by-step approach to modeling the 
data (Hox 1995). For each of the three DVs we first run an empty model (1) with no 
independent variables to test for individual variance at the regional and national levels. 
This provides a baseline for comparing subsequent models and model fits. Next in model 
                                                 
4 For example, the regional impact of percent foreign-born on support for health care might be similar in 
Denmark and Germany; however, overall support is higher in Denmark and lower in Germany (difference 
in country-level intercepts), all else being equal. Within the Netherlands, individuals in Noord-Holland are 
more supportive of income redistribution than individuals in Zeeland for example (difference in regional-
level intercepts), all else being equal. 
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(2) we add only the individual control variables to give a baseline effect and to reset the 
model fit statistics for subsequent comparisons. The next model (3) adds the regional-
level control variables to check how they impact the dependent variable and to see if their 
impact improves the overall GOF. In (4), we add regional percent foreign-born to test our 
in-group bias hypothesis. To support the hypothesis we expect to find significant negative 
coefficients for percent foreign-born as well as an improvement in the GOF. To ensure 
that we are capturing in-group bias and not racism or prejudice, we include individual-
level anti-immigrant sentiment in model (5). We expect to find that the effect of in-group 
bias remains significant while controlling for anti-immigrant sentiment. Finally, we 
calculate predicted marginal effects to demonstrate the size of the effects for our key 
independent variables at the different levels. 
4.2.2 Model Results 
We start with a descriptive picture. Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7 graph the relationship 
between percent foreign-born and average public opinion toward three different social 
policy provisions by region. This gives a first look at the general pattern of these 
measures. In each figure we distinguish data points by country and include an overall 
fitted line and list the correlation between the two variables in a box attached to the 
figure. 
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Figure 5. Average Public Support of Redistribution by Region, Western Europe 2008 
 
Figure 6. Average Public Support of Health Care, Western Europe 2008 
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Figure 7. Average Public Support of Old-Age Welfare, Western Europe 2008 
 
 
Figure 5 shows a splattering of data points without a clear linear relationship 
between foreign-born and income redistribution. The fitted line reveals that there is a 
slight negative pattern such that regions with higher percentages of foreign-born are on 
average less supportive of redistribution, and the regional-level correlation is modest at -
0.20 (micro- and meso-level correlations for all variables available in Technical 
Appendix Two, Table 38 and Table 39). Figure 6 shows a stronger relationship visually 
so that regions with larger foreign-born populations clearly have less public support of 
health care, with a strong correlation of -0.50. Figure 7 shows the strongest visual 
negative relationship with public opinion toward old-age welfare, although the correlation 
is identically strong as opinion toward health care at -0.50. 
All three figures demonstrate that there is great variation in rates of support by 
country. For example, Greece has some of the highest support for all three forms of social 
policy; Denmark has the lowest average support for redistribution and average support for 
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health care and old-age welfare; and in West Germany support for old-age welfare is 
relatively low. Opinions tend to cluster by country. However, Figure 6 and Figure 7 show 
that within countries there is often a negative visual relationship between immigration 
and public opinion. Thus, these figures offer initial support of the in-group bias 
hypothesis. 
Our multilevel modeling allows us to determine how much of the visual 
relationship in the figures is driven by percent foreign-born by region, or instead by other 
factors expected to influence public opinion at the micro-, meso- and macro- levels. Table 
16 reports results from our models for income redistribution. 
Table 16. Multilevel Linear Models of Public Opinion toward Redistribution 
 
aI = individual; R = region; C = country / N = 22,835 individuals; 112 regions; 14 countries. 
bMetric coefficients reported in models (1) through (5). 
cAIC value calculated as the change from Model 1 which has an AIC of 211,380. 
Note: Western Europe, 2008; Sources: ESS; Eurostat; and national statistical bureaus. 
In Table 16, model (1) reports the grand intercept for the empty model, which is 
the mean of income redistribution (see Table 15). Results indicate that the variance in the 
intercept is roughly 8 at the regional-level, 65 at the country-level, and 608 at the 
Levela (1)b (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept I 69.00*** 73.23*** 75.54*** 75.19*** 75.87***
Education (years) I  -0.69***  -0.69***  -0.69***  -0.70***
Age (years) I  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01
Female I   4.06***   4.06***   4.06***   4.07***
At Risk I   2.83***   2.82***   2.83***   2.85***
Union I   4.99***   4.96***   4.95***   4.94***
Suburban I -1.34**  -1.23*  -1.22*  -1.23*
Tertiary Degrees (%) R    0.00    0.00   0.00
GDP (Euros) R    0.00   -0.05  -0.05
Vote Left (%) R    0.08*    0.09*   0.09*
Vote Neo-National (%) R   -0.32**   -0.33**  -0.33**
Foreign Born (%) R   -0.11  -0.11
Anti-Immigrant I   0.01
AICc 0 -672 -687 -688 -687
Intercept (variance) C 64.58 66.74 56.16 59.05 59.37
Intercept (variance) R 7.78 7.09 4.63 4.32 4.36
Residual (variance) I 608.30 590.42 590.51 590.53 590.48
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individual-level. The ratio of these variances to the total individual variance (also known 
as rho or intra-class correlation) suggests that 9.5% of the individual variance can be 
explained by country-level differences and 1.2% by regional differences. This model sets 
the baseline Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) value at 211,380. The AIC value is 
calculated to represent the distance between the modeled relationships and the 
distribution of the data in the matrix (i.e. the difference between the model and 
empirically observed reality). It is not useful as a direct measurement of model fit but 
may be used as a point of comparison of fit for subsequent models. If additional variables 
reduce the value of AIC by 10, the model is substantially improved, and if the value of 
AIC decreases by 7, the model fit can be considered moderately improved (Burnham and 
Anderson 2004). In (2), we add individual-level control variables, and, in (3), we include 
control variables at the regional-level. We test the in-group hypothesis in (4) by adding 
percent foreign-born by region and then see if this is has an effect that is independent of 
anti-immigrant sentiment in model (5).   
Results from model (2) reveal that education significantly affects public opinion 
towards income redistribution. Females, individuals “at-risk,” and current/former union 
members are also more supportive. Age does not have a significant effect on attitudes. 
Finally, those living in suburban dwellings are less supportive than those in rural and 
urban dwellings. When compared to the empty model, the decrease in AIC indicates an 
improvement in model fit.  
The coefficients in (3) indicate that regional development does not affect public 
opinion. Neither the percentage of the population with a tertiary degree nor regional GDP 
per capita has significant effects. However, the political climate of the region does matter 
with the percentage of the population that voted for a traditional left party in the previous 
national election positively affecting support for redistribution, while the percentage of 
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the population that voted for a neo-national party reduces support. The decrease in AIC 
again demonstrates an increase in model fitness.  
Contrary to our expectations, percent foreign-born in model (4) does not have a 
significant effect on public opinion, and its addition does not improve the model’s fit. 
Thus the test in model (5) is largely irrelevant for our purposes; however we find that 
negative attitudes towards immigrants do not impact public opinion towards 
redistribution, nor does the inclusion of this variable in the model alter the non-existent 
relationship between percent foreign-born and support for redistribution. 
Table 17 next reports results from our analysis of support for government 
provision of health care. This second analysis follows the same pattern as the first. 
Results from (2) and (3) are somewhat similar to results reported in Table 16 except that 
neither being at-risk nor the regional proportion of neo-national voters has an effect on 
support for health care. On the other hand, the percentage of the population that holds a 
tertiary degree does. These variables are primarily included to ensure that the findings are 
robust. Results from (4) diverge from the model of public opinion toward redistribution in 
that they indicate a significant impact of foreign-born on support for health care and AIC 
values indicate a moderate improvement in model fit. Model (5) shows that anti-
immigrant sentiment negatively impacts support for health care, but the statistically 
significant effect of foreign-born at the meso-level does not disappear while controlling 
for anti-immigrant sentiment at the micro-level. This model conforms to our expectations. 
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Table 17. Multilevel Linear Models of Public Opinion toward Health Care 
 
aI = individual; R = region; C = country / N = 23,005 individuals; 112 regions; 14 countries. 
bMetric coefficients reported in models (1) through (5). 
cAIC value calculated as the change from Model 1 which has an AIC of 189,386. 
Note: Western Europe, 2008; Sources: ESS; Eurostat; and national statistical bureaus. 
Table 18 reports results from our analysis of attitudes about government provision 
of old-age welfare. Results from (2) and (3) are somewhat similar to results reported from 
the previous two analyses. A noteworthy, but unsurprising difference is that age is a 
significant predictor of old-age welfare. Model (4) shows that an increase in percent 
foreign-born by region leads to a decrease in public opinion toward old-age welfare. AIC 
values indicate that the inclusion of this variable substantially improves the model fit. 
Model (5) shows that anti-immigrant sentiment does not significantly impact attitudes 
towards old-age welfare nor improve the model fit.  
Levela (1)b (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept I 85.59*** 83.50*** 78.23*** 77.97*** 80.38***
Education (years) I   0.07**   0.07*   0.07*   0.02
Age (years) I   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00
Female I   0.85***   0.86***   0.85***   0.88***
At Risk I  -0.26  -0.27  -0.26  -0.17
Union I   1.95***  1.95***   1.94***   1.89***
Suburban I  -1.09*** -1.15*** -1.14***  -1.16***
Tertiary Degrees (%) R   0.14**   0.17***   0.17***
GDP (Euros) R  -0.05  -0.02  -0.02
Vote Left (%) R   0.08**   0.08**   0.09**
Vote Neo-National (%) R  -0.08  -0.10  -0.10
Foreign Born (%) R  -0.13**  -0.13**
Anti-Immigrant I  -0.04***
AICc 0 -103 -116 -123 -165
Intercept (variance) C 20.21 19.22 16.32 12.38 13.28
Intercept (variance) R 2.43 2.48 1.96 1.86 1.92
Residual (variance) I 218.48 217.38 217.33 217.31 216.87
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Table 18. Multilevel Linear Models of Public Opinion toward Old-Age Welfare 
 
aI = individual; R = region; C = country / N = 23,003 individuals; 112 regions; 14 countries. 
bMetric coefficients reported in models (1) through (5). 
cAIC value calculated as the change from Model 1 which has an AIC of 191,187. 
Note: Western Europe, 2008; Sources: ESS; Eurostat; and national statistical bureaus. 
In order to check the robustness of the findings on the negative impact of foreign-
born on health care and old age welfare we engage in a series of sensitivity analyses. 
These are alternative model specifications that utilize subsets of our main sample with the 
inclusion of individual level variables of occupational status, household income and 
subjective political affiliation from left-to-right. Additionally we add a country-level 
measure to the main model of percent foreign-born, and regional level measures of 
population and population density. The results of these are available in Technical 
Appendix Two (Table 40, Table 41, and Table 42). Although some of these additional 
variables have significant effects on public opinion, there is only one case where the 
coefficient for the effect of foreign-born changes, otherwise it remains consistent in 
direction, significance and size across the sensitivity analyses. The one change is in a 
model predicting health care that includes population and population density by region. 
Levela (1)b (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept I 82.15*** 82.70*** 79.60*** 79.33*** 79.53***
Education (years) I  -0.24***  -0.24***  -0.24***  -0.24***
Age (years) I   0.01*    0.01*   0.01*   0.01*
Female I   1.57***   1.57***   1.57***   1.57***
At Risk I   0.16   0.15   0.15   0.16
Union I   2.17***   2.16***   2.15***   2.15***
Suburban I  -0.83**  -0.85**  -0.84**  -0.84**
Tertiary Degrees (%) R   0.15*   0.19**   0.19**
GDP (Euros) R  -0.08*  -0.04  -0.04
Vote Left (%) R   0.07*   0.07*   0.07*
Vote Neo-National (%) R  -0.19*  -0.20*  -0.20*
Foreign Born (%) R  -0.20***  -0.21***
Anti-Immigrant I   0.00
AICc 0 -242 -250 -260 -258
Intercept (variance) C 26.24 24.62 24.03 18.44 18.50
Intercept (variance) R 6.40 6.39 5.17 4.71 4.72
Residual (variance) I 235.79 233.20 233.20 233.19 233.18
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The effect of foreign-born shifts from a significant -0.11 to an insignificant -0.09. This 
may be a problem of multicolinearity, because the model fit does not improve at all and 
population density and percent foreign-born by region correlate at 0.42 (see Technical 
Appendix Two, Table 39), hopefully further research may sort this out. Nonetheless, I 
conclude that our findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity analyses. Public opinion 
toward health care and old-age welfare is decreased by immigration generated ethnic 
diversity. 
In order to determine how large of a significant impact foreign-born has on public 
opinion we construct predicted marginal means for all variables. Table 19 lists these 
means which may be understood as similar to first differences. The first two columns 
show the variables and level of measurement. The 3rd and 4th columns reveal a low and a 
high score for each variable. These are calculated as one half of a standard deviation from 
the overall mean in each direction, and thus represent a full standard deviation of the 
spread of each given variable. For dichotomous variables we simply use 0 and 1. The 
standard deviation of the variance is listed in the bottom three rows of the table for the 
empty-model (without IVs) along with a percent of the total deviation listed in italics. 
Then the next columns are divided by results for each of the three dependent variables. 
Starting with income redistribution, the columns low and high indicate average marginal 
means for support of income redistribution again at one standard deviation around the 
mean. These predicted means are calculated by holding the effect of all other independent 
variables constant in addition to the constant average impact of regional and country-level 
random-intercepts. The column labeled ß is a measure of how much opinion changes 
between the low and high scores in comparison to how much opinion and income 
redistribution deviate at each level. They may be understood in the same way as 
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standardized coefficients and the bold numbers indicate that the metric coefficient used 
for their calculation was significant at least at p<.05. 
 Table 19. Predicted Marginal Effects of Independent Variables on Public Opinion toward Social Policy 
 
aI = individual; R = region; C = country 
bColumn "ß" equals the predicted marginal change in an individual opinion (from low to high scoring on each independent variable with all others held at their means 
including the random-intercepts by region and country) expressed as a standard deviation in the variance of the DV at that level (taken from the empty-model standard 
deviations at the bottom of the table). These may be interpreted similarly to standardized coefficients in OLS regression. Values in bold are significant at p<.05. 
Levela low high low high ßb low high ßb low high ßb
Education (years) I 10.7 14.5 70.31 67.65 -0.11 85.58 85.67 0.01 82.74 81.83 -0.06
Age (years) I 39.0 57.2 69.05 68.85 -0.01 85.62 85.64 0.00 82.14 82.41 0.02
Female I 0 1 66.83 70.90 0.17 85.17 86.05 0.06 81.46 83.03 0.10
At Risk I 0 1 68.11 70.96 0.12 85.68 85.51 -0.01 82.23 82.39 0.01
Union I 0 1 66.77 71.71 0.20 84.80 86.69 0.13 81.33 83.48 0.14
Suburban I 0 1 69.12 67.89 -0.05 85.79 84.63 -0.08 82.40 81.55 -0.06
Tertiary Degrees (%) R 26.2 31.5 68.94 68.95 0.00 84.97 85.86 0.57 81.54 82.53 0.39
GDP (Euros) R 29.1 38.7 69.35 68.86 -0.18 85.81 85.59 -0.14 82.56 82.22 -0.13
Vote Left (%) R 39.9 47.2 68.82 69.45 0.23 85.50 86.13 0.40 82.17 82.70 0.21
Vote Neo-National (%) R 5.4 7.9 69.71 68.88 -0.30 85.85 85.61 -0.15 82.74 82.23 -0.20
Foreign Born (%) R 8.5 13.6 69.20 68.64 -0.20 85.93 85.25 -0.44 82.74 81.70 -0.41
Anti-Immigrant I 38.3 57.4 69.04 68.85 -0.01 85.96 85.29 -0.05 82.31 82.25 0.00
Empty-model SD I 69.5% 70.9% 66.8%
Percent of deviance R 7.9% 7.5% 11.0%
C 22.7% 21.6% 22.3%
2.79 1.56 2.53
8.04 4.50 5.12
24.66 14.78 15.36
Margins Redistribution Health Care Old-Age Welfare
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The most important values are those calculated for the impact of foreign-born. For 
income redistribution, the original metric coefficient resulting from the multilevel 
regression modeling is not significant, thus the standardized effect of -0.20 may be 
disregarded as potential random measurement error. For health care we see that the 
average marginal change in public opinion is roughly -0.7 (calculated by taking the low 
margin of 85.93 and subtracting it from the high margin of 85.25). Although this number 
appears small when the scale is potentially calculated out of 100, it is in fact quite large. 
The regional standard deviation of public opinion (all else equal) is 1.56 as listed in the 
bottom rows under the label "Empty-model SD". Most of the standard deviation from the 
overall variance may be explained at the individual and country-levels. However, -0.7 is 
44% of the regional standard deviation in public opinion toward health care. And this 
represents a very large effect at the regional level, the second largest in the model behind 
tertiary degrees, all else equal. A similar story is told for the effect of foreign-born on 
public opinion toward old-age welfare. The marginal average change is roughly -1 (82.75 
subtracted from 81.70) and this is a change of about 41% of the variation at the regional 
level and is the largest standardized effect in the model for old-age welfare. 
4.2.3 Discussion 
Section 4.2 of this chapter presented tests of the in-group bias hypothesis that 
immigration generated ethnic diversity reduces public opinion in support of social policy. 
Using a comparative strategy and multilevel modeling, my research collaborator Eger and 
I find that the proportion of a region’s population that is foreign-born has a negative 
effect on support for government provision of health care and old-age welfare. These 
results hold up against a variety of robustness checks and after controlling for the impact 
of anti-immigrant sentiment. When all else is equal, foreign-born is the largest 
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standardized effect in the model predicting old-age welfare and second largest in 
predicting health care. In both cases the addition of foreign-born by region improved the 
model fit compared with models that were otherwise identical. These results are 
consistent with previous research that demonstrates a negative relationship between the 
size of region’s immigrant population and support for universal spending programs in 
Sweden (Eger 2010b), although they are the first of their kind to look at all of Western 
Europe. Finally, individuals who are higher in SES measured by years of education are 
less supportive of redistribution and old-age welfare consistent with self-interest theory. I 
discuss these findings further in Chapter 7. Having tested for the determinants of 
individual-level public opinions in this chapter, I shift my focus to the relationship of 
public opinion to social policy next. 
 
  
109 
 
 
5 CHAPTER FIVE  CAUSALITY OF PUBLIC OPINION AND SOCIAL POLICY 
This chapter picks up on the arguments presented in Chapter 2.4 on the importance of 
individualism, corporatism and the differences between English-speaking and European 
historical institutions. I present two competing arguments to explain the cross-national 
alignment of opinion and policy. One is a feedback loop between opinion and policy the 
other is an institutional co-determination of opinion and policy. Using data from the ISSP 
and various country-level sources I provide tentative answers to the questions: Is this 
cross-national patterning of public opinion and social policy the result of opinion-policy 
causality? Or is it the result of an institutional factor that brings them into alignment? 
Or, are both true?  
What is known from research in the social, economic and political sciences is that 
sometimes opinion appears to shape policy and sometimes policy to shape opinion. On 
the one hand, opinion feedback occurs when various democratic processes facilitate 
opinion to cause policy-makers to alter or introduce new policies; and on the other, policy 
feedback occurs when policies shape opinions through creation of public clienteles reliant 
on social policies and publics who normatively support these policies. When both exist, 
the relationship of opinion and policy exists in a feedback loop, where each exerts an 
influence on the other over time leading them towards equilibrium with each other.  
Looking at the advanced democratic nation-states of the world reveals a pattern 
that looks like equilibrium. Where public opinion is low, social policy spending is also 
low and vice-versa. Figure 8 plots opinion and social policy using data from the ISSP and 
OECD. It shows a clear patterning of data with a positive linear relationship; greater 
public support equates with greater spending.  
 Figure 8. Public Opinion and Social Policy in 19 Advanced Democracies 
 
Note: Data from ISSP and OECD; Two-letter country codes found on p. vii.
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The relationship in Figure 8 could be a product of a feedback loop between 
opinion and policy, or it could be the result of some external forces that simultaneously 
impact both opinion and policy in a similar manner leading them towards alignment. 
Figure 9 plots public opinion and social policy in a different way by dividing these same 
countries into English-speaking and European groups. In the left panel, the average 
spending on social policy is plotted for each group of countries from 1960 to 2008; the 
thick solid line represents the average for European countries and the thick dot-dash line 
for the English-speaking. Standard deviation bands are presented for each as 
corresponding thin lines. In the right panel, public opinion by country and year is plotted 
in triangles for European countries and crosses for the English-speaking countries. 
 Figure 9. Social Policy Spending and Recent Public Opinion Data in Two Families of Institutions 
 
Note: Figure adapted from (Breznau 2011), data from OECD, ILO and ISSP. Countries included are the 16 from Brooks and Manza (2007).
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Figure 9 demonstrates how stable the social policy differences are between the two 
groups of countries over time. It also shows a pattern of opinion between the two in the 
right panel, albeit with more variation. As discussed in Chapter 2.3, each of these groups 
has institutional similarities such as individualistic social norms and corporatist political 
institutions. In this chapter I provide theoretical explanations for the cross-national 
patterning of public opinion and social policy. 
5.1 Feedback Loop: A General Theory of Opinion-Policy Causality 
There is a standing debate over causality between public opinion and social policy 
(Burstein and Freudenburg 1978; Burstein 1998, 2003, 2006). According to democratic 
theory public opinion should shape policy in what may be labeled policy responsiveness 
or policy feedback (Downs 1957; Dahl et al. 2003; C. Brooks and Manza 2006a). 
Burstein's review of opinion-policy research (1998, 2003), much of it covering social 
welfare, suggests that opinion probably shapes policy. Amidst Burstein's rank of 
reviewed studies, some show consistency between public opinion toward a policy change 
preceding an actual change (c.f. Monroe 1998) while others demonstrate a significant co-
variation of opinion and welfare policy in the presence of other predictor variables (c.f. 
Erikson, McIver, and G. C. Wright 1987).  
On the other hand, the literature on increasing returns and institutions offers 
strong evidence that social policy shapes opinion, i.e. institutional feedback or opinion 
feedback (Key 1961; Pierson 2000; Hacker and Pierson 2010). One of Key's foundational 
claims about democratic governments is that they create and maintain public opinion in 
the first place (Mettler and Soss 2004). Furthermore, self-interest drives public opinion to 
adapt to social policy, for example where there are more individuals benefitting from 
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social policies and greater levels of benefits, more individuals will express support of 
social policy or greater strengths of support. If each causes the other, then the logical 
conclusion is that opinion and policy operate in a feedback loop (Soroka and Wlezien 
2005b, 2005a).  
For a feedback loop to exist, public opinion must shape policy. Furthermore, if the 
opinion-policy relationship is to be placed into a generally applicable theory for all 
democracies, then opinion must exert a ubiquitous impact on policy, not just at specific 
historical moments such as elections, social movements, or debates in the public sphere. 
Otherwise it is not a loop. To date the evidence of a permanent or general loop is sketchy. 
There is strong evidence of specific moments of opinion impacting policy but there are 
also many moments when it does not. This suggests that each case is unique and that 
opinion might shape policy, but not that opinion continuously or generally shapes policy. 
Without a continuous link of opinion with policy, the feedback loop is not complete. 
There are researchers who find evidence of a specific impact of opinion on policy, 
i.e. the occasional link. For example, evidence can be found in the late 1980s and early 
90s in New Zealand where the public became so fed up with policy makers pursuing their 
own neoliberal agendas, that they fought to change the country's constitution and electoral 
structure to a proportional electorate democracy (Vowles 1995). Another specific 
example in the US was the public debate to offer minimum income protection in the 
1960s and 70s which ended up without the passing of a guaranteed income policy 
because public opinion, mired in deservingness and cultural categorizations, tended 
toward opposition (Steensland 2006). Another two examples are when policy-makers 
followed public opinion instead of special interest elites in the 1940s with the formation 
of the British National Health Service and in the 1960s with the American Medicare act 
(Jacobs 1992). Or more recently in the US when the Obama administration was able to 
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introduce a comprehensive health coverage plan despite the pressures of private health 
care lobbies, thanks to a public majority of around 60% in favor of universal care in the 
preceding years (Saad 2008). Studies of this nature are evidence of context-specific 
historical moments where opinion impacted policy.  
On the other hand there is evidence that sometimes opinion is disregarded or is 
not taken into account in policy making. There is evidence within Great Britain, Canada, 
the US, France and Germany that opinion and policy (including social policy) are only 
sporadically correlated (J. E. Brooks 1985, 1987, 1990). A closer inspection of the 
heavily referenced findings of Page and R.Y. Shapiro reveals that opinion is only 
correlated with welfare (i.e. "social issues") and becomes insignificant in a predictive 
model (1983: Table 7). Finally, a review by Papadakis (1992) brings up a similar 
argument as the normative distinction made by Wegener and Liebig (1995) by suggesting 
that individuals from various publics often supporting expanding social policy and 
privatization of welfare. 
As the specific evidence of an occasional impact and an occasional non-impact 
suggests, scholars have struggled to show a general impact of opinion on policy across 
countries and over time, i.e. they cannot connect the occasional links to form a feedback 
loop. The idea of a general theory of opinion shaping policy is thus lacking. It is an 
argument that is based on correlation, not causal evidence. Many scholars show that in 
countries where opinion is highly in favor of redistribution, redistributive spending is also 
high as shown in the previous Figures (Coughlin 1980; Esping-Andersen 1990; Andreβ 
and Heien 2001; Gilbert and Terrell 2002). Also in countries with more universally 
accessible social policy provisions (in lieu of means-testing) public support is more 
universal (Larsen 2008; Castles 2009; Crepaz and Damron 2009).  
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In some ground-breaking research, Brooks and Manza (2006a, 2006b) use pooled 
cross-sections to identify a significant linear relationship of one year lagged public 
opinion with social welfare spending. They find this relationship across most OECD 
countries in the presence of controls for other policy causing factors, and their study was 
a first of its kind in attempting to empirically substantiate the impact of opinion on policy. 
They make a theoretical argument that despite recent (neo)liberal shifts from the 1970s 
onward and mounting pressures of competition in a global economy pushing an agenda of 
welfare retrenchment, all advanced OECD nations have increased welfare spending as a 
percentage of GDP until the turn of the millennium (OECD 2012), which is where their 
data ends. Brooks and Manza argue that public opinion, due to its embeddedness in social 
policy in general, is the reason for this.  
Soroka and Wlezien (2010) offer some alternative and ostensibly supportive 
evidence for Brooks and Manza and the general theory of opinion causing policy. They 
model a step-wise, opinion-policy feedback process in the US, Great Britain, and Canada. 
Using pooled time series, they show that a change in social policy almost always leads to 
a change in public opinion which in turn is a significant predictor of a change in the 
policy (Wlezien 1995, 2004; Soroka and Wlezien 2005b, 2005a). This is a two-stage 
process. First policy changes, then opinion responds (like a "thermostat" in their analogy), 
then the policy corrects taking on account the new level of public opinion. What happens 
in their data is that when social policy spending decreases, public opinion supporting it 
increases until the spending level 'recovers'. Although this is evidence that opinion shapes 
policy (i.e. prevents retrenchment) and appears to support Brooks and Manza, a crucial 
step is that the opinion itself is primed or triggered first by policy change. However, 
Soroka and Wlezien observe the same pattern in the reverse direction. When social policy 
begins to expand and spending increases, public opinion then decreases until the policy 
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spending is corrected downwards. This negates the idea that the public are embedded in 
welfare states tend to expand over great lengths of time. This is instead evidence that the 
public merely reacts to policy change in either direction, i.e. that policy causes opinion, 
and not so much the other way around. I am aware of no methodological attempts to 
model this relationship reciprocally except for the step-by-step formulation of Soroka and 
Wlezien and therefore the idea of a feedback loop is thus far un-tested in empirical social 
science work. 
5.2 Institutional Alignment: Institutional Determinants of Opinion-Policy 
Although the evidence of a general feedback loop between opinion and policy is scarce, 
the alignment of the two by country is strong. Institutional theory suggests that social and 
political institutions exert a causal impact on both public opinion and social policy, and if 
the impact is similar then this should explain alignment cross-nationally. The arguments 
outlined in Chapter 2.4 suggest that social and political institutions and their promotion of 
norms shape public opinion and a similar theoretical relationship may be derived that 
institutions also shape social policy. I suggest that opinion and policy may be 
simultaneously shaped by institutional norms, leading to a theory of institutional 
alignment. In this section I look again at individualism, corporatism and the historical 
differences between the English-speaking and European societies in order to derive 
hypotheses about institutional alignment. 
As discussed in Chapter 2.4.1, societies that have stronger individualism norms 
should have public opinions less supportive of social policy. Individualism should 
discourage governments from getting involved with individuals in their socioeconomic 
actions, except to guarantee safety in pursuing their interests. To quote Sniderman and 
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Hagen (1985), individualism "is a bedrock belief in an ethic of self-reliance. Individuals 
must take care of themselves" (quoted in Fine 1992:316). Norms guide the framing of 
issues, such that more individualistic societies should be less likely to develop social 
policy agendas related to poverty or health problems because these are seen as individual 
rather than collective issues (Burstein 1991). Also, individuals who live in a society with 
greater norms of individualism (i.e. blame the individual) may feel psychological distress 
when obtaining welfare or redistribution (Ensminger 1995) and this may reduce overall 
usage of social policy. With this norm pressing upon the repeated activities of individuals 
seeking welfare, policy makers, and bureaucratic organizations distributing social policy 
provisions, social policy should be shaped over time by individualism. Conversely, the 
lack of individualism should have the impact of bolstering government intervention and 
promote the idea of collective responsibility of a society for its members. Figure 10 
shows the relationship of individualism to public opinion and Figure 11 shows 
individualism with social policy.  
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Figure 10. Individualism and Average Public Opinion, 1985-2008 
 
Note: Data from Hofstede (1984) and ISSP. Country labels found on p. vii. 
Figure 11. Individualism and Social Policy, 2006 
 
Note: Data from Hofstede (1984) and OECD 2006. Country labels found on p. vii. 
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Although I will analyze the data presented above in more detail in Chapter 6, it is useful 
here to see the patterns. There is a relatively clear relationship of individualism to public 
opinion and a somewhat clear one with social policy, where more individualism is 
associated with less public support and less social policy spending.  For example, 
individualistic countries such as the US and Australia are the least supportive of social 
policy, also they happen to be the lowest spenders on social policy, whereas the less 
individualistic (i.e. more collectivistic) countries such as Portugal and Austria have highly 
supportive publics and moderate to large commitments to social policy.  
Corporatist political institutions also should shape social policy in a manner 
similar to their hypothesized impact on public opinion. A typical strong corporatist 
system includes aspects of business and labor incorporated in formal state institutions. In 
this setting the state has a heavy hand in market and social organization (Hicks and 
Swank 1992). There is a strong amount of (coerced) cooperation between the various 
interests of market and society and this includes employee organizations that vie for 
strong unemployment, pensions and other forms of protection for lower status jobs 
(Lijphart and Crepaz 1991). This cooperative (or 'collective') political system is 
institutionalized in the norms of repeated political activities, such as a regular presence of 
unions and employee organizations in policy making. On the other hand, more pluralist 
systems have norms where the winners of competition outside of the state's formal 
institutions earn more exclusive interests in setting social policy. Labor and employee 
organizations rarely have enough power to be the winners when competing against 
powerful private firms. Consider the US for example. Without the state imposing 
reconciliation of labor and owner/manager interests, labor tends to lose as it lacks access 
to power, capital and organization (Marx 1887). Figure 12 plots the relationship of 
corporatism with public opinion and Figure 13 the same for social policy. 
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Figure 12. Corporatism and Average Public Opinion, 1985-2008 
 
Note: Data from Lijphart and Crepaz (1991) and ISSP. Country labels found on p. vii. 
Figure 13. Corporatism and Social Policy Spending, 2006 
 
Note: Data from Lijphart and Crepaz (1991) and OECD 2006. Country labels found on p. vii. 
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With corporatist political institutional norms, as with individualistic social norms, there is 
an apparent cross-national pattern where more corporatist and less individualistic 
countries such as Sweden and Austria have greater public opinion in favor of social 
policy and greater spending on social policy.  
Institutions pattern cross-nationally. The norms embedded in social and political 
institutions should help to repeat what was before into what is to come. I argue that this is 
due to the historical similarities of institutions across certain societies. Corporatism as we 
know it today in Europe stems from the collective problems of societies enduring 
repeated destructive wars, the various attempts at unifying different regional systems of 
government such as fiefdoms and kingdoms, and efforts to develop a socialist solution to 
the conflicts generated by markets (Briggs 1961). Societies and their markets achieved 
peace only through collective cooperation and social controls. After the lessons of 
devastating wars, Europe formally united economically and eventually socially with the 
Economic Community and then EU. Many social, economic and political practices were 
spread from European societies to one another, welfare systems for example spread from 
small localities to ever larger welfare societies, and eventually welfare nation-states (King 
2011); centralized government regulation to prevent fraud resulted after many cases of 
local mismanagement (Collier and Messick 1975); and pension systems harmonized out 
of  necessity amongst the earliest European states and continued through present times in 
an expanding Europe (Cornelisse and Goudswaard 2002). Today we see the prospect for 
a future of collectivized welfare societies with the EU attempting to legislate on social 
policy, although it has not much footing thus far (Taylor-Gooby 2005). Nonetheless, there 
is a uniquely European family of institutions with anti-individualistic norms, a historical 
institutional path dating back to the Carolingian Empire and the Latin language (if not 
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before), which result in similarities in social policy when compared to the pluralistic 
English-speaking institutions.  
Politically speaking, Europe also includes Christendom. Political parties often 
have religious components and church and state are mixed together (Evelyne Huber et al. 
1993). Although the United Kingdom has church intertwined in politics, its former 
colonies boast the greatest levels of church and state separation in the world (J. Fox 
2004). More importantly, different forms of democracy emerged between these two 
groups. Europe is home to more left-leaning politics with labor unions and social 
democratic parties having significant power. There are the Protestant social democracies 
of the Scandinavian north and conservative Protestant and Catholic democracies of the 
middle and south. Both of these types of political systems have strong government roles 
in providing welfare for citizens. Also, these societies are some of the earliest adopters of 
social security, except for Great Britain, and they are consensus-based democracies with 
power sharing across parties based on electoral results (Collier and Messick 1975; 
Esping-Andersen 1990; Hicks and Swank 1992).  
The European case is that of a welfare project which gave rise to welfare systems 
that followed a 'natural' European course toward universal protections and large welfare 
states. However, the British case deviated from this universal European welfare project, 
perhaps due to industrial revolution and the rise of individualistic norms, and exported its' 
institutions to the New World (Feagin 1975). The English language represents a shared 
social institution of the English-speaking nations. The school systems of these nations 
reflect the British system. Many of the social customs and power structures are a product 
of liberal influences, and ideas move freely amongst the educational and political 
institutions of the English-speaking nations (Ashford 1987). For example liberalism 
surged in the US at the turn of the 19th Century (re)infusing Britain with liberal market 
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values, and resulting in political backlashes against proposals to provide and expand 
social policy in both nations (Orloff and Skocpol 1984). For these reasons, the English-
speaking societies have institutional similarities that diffuse amongst each other and are a 
collective departure from those of Europe. 
It is presumptuous to simply group the countries in these two clusters without 
acknowledging that each country follows a unique path throughout history, in some cases 
having opposing political and economic trajectories. I merely suggest that there are 
institutional features that distinguish these two, and this is a common argument of 
scholars who cross-nationally compare welfare states (see review in Arts and Gelissen 
2002). Descriptively this dichotomy achieves what is impossible to measure, namely the 
simultaneity of a horde of underlying institutional norms that appear to work together to 
align opinion and policy. I acknowledge that some of the within-group similarities of 
institutions were arrived at via divergent or even conflicting paths (Dore et al. 1999; Hall 
and Soskice 2001). But I assert that although there is convergence, diffusion and learning 
across the institutions of both groups, there is more taking place within the two due to 
geographic closeness (i.e. Europe) or isolation (i.e. British diasporas), and historical 
similarities (European history and British colonialism) (Collier and Messick 1975; 
Castles 1993; Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Hu and Manning 2010) 
Timing is important in my institutional framework. The social construction of 
welfare after the Great Depression and massive, destructive wars marks the great 
expansion and bureaucratization of welfare in the history of human societies, ultimately 
reaching an apex of growth in the ‘Golden Age’ of welfare in the 1960s and 70s (Esping-
Andersen 1996; Bonoli 2007). Also, it is the era where the nation-state came to 
prominence as the primary unit of political organization and this deeply embedded social 
welfare institutions, norms and repeated precedents into national societies; thus 
125 
 
 
guaranteeing path dependency for welfare institutions, policy and public opinion (Weir 
and Skocpol 1985; Pierson 2000). Figure 14 is a reproduction of Figure 8 showing the 
relationship of public opinion and social policy; however, this time I strip away the 
country labels and simply present English-speaking countries with crosses and European 
countries with triangles. 
Figure 14. Public Opinion and Social Policy by Family of Institutions, 1985-2008 
 
Note: Data from ISSP and OECD. 
In the above figure there are two institutional families. The distinction is not mutually 
exclusive in terms of policy and opinion as some countries overlap. But the pattern 
reveals two mostly distinct groups. The picture in Figure 14 is a visual guide to my theory 
of institutional alignment. 
I identified two mechanisms for the institutional alignment of public opinion and 
social policy in this section: individualism and corporatism should shape public opinion 
and social policy in similar directions. More individualistic and pluralistic societies 
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should have public opinion less in favor of, and spend less on social policy. Meanwhile, 
less individualistic and more corporatist countries should have public opinion more in 
favor of, and more spending on, social policy. I attach a third way of measuring 
institutions by grouping them into two families of institutions. In this scheme I admit that 
there is no mechanism at play (i.e. Europe is not a cause), but offer this approach because 
it is useful for identifying macro-level phenomena that have clear historical institutional 
patterns. Even though the mechanisms are not clear, it is useful to think about these two 
types of societies as two black-boxes of distinct institutional norms. 
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6 CHAPTER SIX    TESTING FOR FEEDBACK AND ALIGNMENT 
In this chapter I engage in an analysis of public opinion and social policy at the country-
level. First I use linear regression models to look at the uni-directional relationships 
between opinion and policy. Then, I utilize non-linear models to test for a feedback loop 
and institutional alignment as hypothesized in Chapter 5. The work in this chapter is from 
my third empirical study and the dataset I utilize for this purpose contains 62 observations 
of 19 countries at different time points. This data has many limitations due to its small 
size. Therefore this work is provisional and should be handled with kid gloves both in the 
sense that the findings are delicate and that other researchers' conclusions based on this 
work may be fragile. However, this work represents a breakthrough in testing what has 
been a theoretical relationship arguably as long as democracy has existed as a political 
system, but not a demonstrable empirical relationship. At the time of the completion of 
this book, it is what I know to be the only test of cross-national simultaneous causality 
between public opinion and social policy ever published. 
6.1 Third Study: "Alignment or Feedback? The Relationship of Public Opinion 
and Social Policy in Advanced Democracies" 
This study looks at aggregated public opinion data and analyzes it in comparison to 
OECD data and measures of individualism and corporatism that each captures social and 
political institutional norms at the country-level. 
6.1.1 Data and Methods 
In order to investigate the relationship of public opinion and social policy, I created a 
cross-national data set from individual-level pooled cross-sections and country-level data. 
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As the dataset is quite small I publish it in its entirety in Technical Appendix Three 
(Table 43 and Table 44). The construction of the data using ISSP individual-level data is 
similar to the practice used by Brooks and Manza (2006a) in their groundbreaking work, 
although they had a smaller dataset and did not measure individualism or corporatism. I 
list my measurements and descriptive statistics in section 6.1.3, Table 21. My reciprocal 
DVs are public opinion and social policy. 
I measure public opinion toward social policy from two questions in the 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP) that were fielded in the "Role of 
Government" and "Religion" rotating modules during period 1985-2008. The first 
question relates to the role of the government in reducing income inequality. The second 
relates to government provision of employment. These questions measure preferences 
ranging from “definitely should not be” and “probably should not be” to “probably should 
be” and “definitely should be” the government's responsibility to do these things. These 
questions are a subset of a larger group of questions found only in the "Role of 
Government" module which ask about unemployment, price and industry controls, and 
pensions and health care, and all seven questions together form one latent variable (see 
Technical Appendix Three, Table 46). I use these two questions as proxies for this latent 
variable of general support of social policy. I aggregate the factor scoring of the two 
questions at the individual-level into country-time observations.  
I measure social policy as the amount of spending by each country in a given year 
as a percentage of GDP at PPP on welfare and redistribution, as outlined in Chapter 3, 
and I measure English-speaking countries and institutions of individualism and 
corporatism also as defined in Chapter 3.4. As social policy tends to expand over time, I 
utilize a measure of year that is centered for each country. For example, the US is 
measured at various periods from 1985-2006, a 21 year window. I take the midpoint of 
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this 21 year window and code it zero and then take the distance in years of each 
observation from this midpoint. Three countries are measured only once during this 
timeframe and these are thus coded to zero. Unfortunately there is no ideal solution to 
having an unbalanced set of cross-sections as the ISSP was only fielded in a handful of 
countries in its earliest iterations.  
Testing for reciprocal causation between two DVs requires a non-linear approach 
to identification of regression parameters. Essentially there are two regression equations, 
one predicting the first DV using the second DV as an IV along with other predictors, and 
another one predicting the second DV using the first DV as an IV. Running these two 
equations separately will not take into account the possible relationship of each DV to the 
other, i.e. the non-recursive nature of their equations. SEM is a process allowing for 
simultaneous estimation of each DVs impact on the other while estimating parameters 
from both equations (Bollen 1989). There is a caveat that the simultaneous equations aim 
to identify two effects (i.e. coefficients) where there is only one correlation between 
public opinion and social policy. This is not possible mathematically, the system is not 
recursive. The addition of instrumental variables is my way of solving this problem. I 
utilize SEM software of MPlus 6 to construct non-recursive, instrumental variables 
models. 
In order to utilize an instrumental variables approach, the two DVs must be 
relatively stable and the model must be identifiable. First, the two variables must be in a 
state of stable equilibrium when they are measured. Public opinion is measured via 
sampling over the course of roughly a year (with minor variation by country). Therefore 
the public opinion measure may be said to be a general measure of one year. The social 
policy measure is the amount of spending over the same fiscal year. This is beneficial, 
because both measures cover a similar time period, and include events throughout the 
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same time period within each. Even though they may fluctuate within the year, there are 
opportunities to recover and to stabilize over the course of sampling; they may be said to 
at least be in a yearly equilibrium. There are of course problems if public opinion changes 
policy so that it has a long term effect on spending (i.e. taking it out of equilibrium due to 
growth over time), and this model will miss the direct effect of public opinion on policy 
many years later in case there is one. However, as the main thrust of this work is testing 
for a general theory of a feedback loop between opinion and policy I proceed in this 
exploratory endeavor, and admit that capturing the exact nature of effects (i.e. timing and 
duration) is not possible here. Causality is helped by the fact that all but two countries in 
the analysis are observed at more than one time point. This gives the opportunity for 
different opinions and different policy measurements. If opinion is higher, then the 
expectation is that spending will be higher, within the same country, although the main 
focus here is on cross-national comparison.  
Second, the model must be identifiable. Identification is possible only when there 
are more variables with correlations than unknown parameters being estimated. For 
example, when there is only one IV and two DVs (i.e. x causes y and z, and y and z are 
reciprocally related), then there are four parameters and only three correlations and the 
model is underidentified. An instrumental variable is one that is causally linked (and 
correlated) with one of the DVs, but not the other. Adding one instrumental variable will 
create a fourth unknown parameter but it will add two more correlations to the matrix, 
one with its respective DV and one with the other IV leading to a model with 5 unknown 
parameters and 5 correlations, which is just identified. However, just identified models 
have only one solution so they fit the data 'perfectly' and cannot differentiate covariance 
structures into different possible outcomes. Thus adding a second instrumental variable 
leads to an overidentified model, the preferred kind, with 8 correlations and 6 unknown 
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parameters. This comes down to the matrix algebra, estimation algorithms and 
operationalization of equations in SEM which is discussed elsewhere (Jöreskog and 
Sörbom 1982; B. O. Muthén and Satorra 1995; Schaubroeck 1990; Byrne 2001). The 
purpose of this dissertation is to use SEM to test for causality and thus I do not discuss 
the mathematics in further detail here. 
There are a range of possible techniques for modeling reciprocal causation with 
instrumental variables. I do not use cross-lagged variables because I already face a small-
N situation and cross-lagging would reduce the dataset by one observation per country, 
thus I would go from 62 to 43 cases. Also, I choose maximum likelihood estimation (ML) 
over two-stage (or three-stage) least squares estimation (2SLS) because the ML estimator 
uses more information and simultaneously estimates all relationships. Finally, I cluster 
the standard errors by country to account for the non-independence of observations in 
different years from the same country. 
There is an issue with applying SEM techniques to a sample of countries, versus a 
sample of individuals. In fact, the countries I use to test my hypotheses are not a sample 
at all, and instead they are selected due to their status as advanced democracies and with 
available ISSP data. Thus, they are not statistically representative of the larger population 
of countries of the world. This brings up an issue of generalizing the findings to other 
countries, because countries are not as similar as humans (or other living things). Each 
country is a unique mix of history, size, composition, etc. Thus, the results of this 
research are mostly only applicable to the countries included in the sample. Additionally, 
this lack of sampling from a larger population brings up some issues in calculation of 
significance values. The theory behind the calculation of t-statistics and p-values is 
intended to rule out luck (i.e. probability) as a cause of linear relationships (i.e. non-zero 
coefficients). However, this assumes that a random sample were drawn from a larger 
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population of cases, and the statistics may be interpreted as the likelihood that the finding 
exists empirically, as opposed to being a product of the potential distribution of traits in a 
random draw from the larger population. This is not the case with these countries. I 
propose two points to help in dealing with these issues. The first is that the significance 
statistics should be a focus of the research herein. I relax the statistical assumptions such 
that I focus on results where p<.25. This is due to the small number of cases, and the lack 
of sampling. I merely want to identify strong patterns in the available data. Using a p-
statistic of less than .25 allows for a relationship that seems to fit roughly %75 of the 
cases (to put it in rough non-technical terms).This would suggest that about 47 out of 65 
countries are fit the linear patterns identified by the coefficients. 
6.1.2 Modeling  
Selection of instrumental variables is a difficult process due to theoretical and empirical 
constraints. The choice of instruments should be driven first by theory and then 
confirmed with measurement. There must be logical, causal reasoning to employ an 
instrumental variable. Otherwise the assumptions of the model will break down and the 
results are prone to being un-interpretable random noise. However, instruments must be 
empirically valid, and strongly correlated with a corresponding DV while mostly 
uncorrelated with the other DV in the model. Data limitations limit what variables may be 
selected to utilize as instruments due to my reliance on secondary data. I select here 
instrumental variables that fit both theoretical and empirical requirements. For the public 
opinion instrument I choose female labor force participation (FLP) and for the social 
policy instrument I choose the percentage of individuals who are currently married or 
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cohabitating in a country5.  
Female labor force participation theoretically causes a reduction in support of 
social policy across the advanced democratic welfare states. This occurs for three primary 
reasons. The first is that individual SES (i.e. self-interest as outlined in Chapter 2.1) is 
directly related to public opinion, with higher SES leading to less support of social policy. 
Women tend to be lower in SES as individuals, regardless of their family SES. Working 
women, although facing status discrimination, still have higher SES than non-working 
women on average. Most importantly, countries with higher rates of working women 
have less of a traditional male breadwinner model and fewer single parents, thus women 
are less likely to be in roles where they rely on others for their welfare, arguably leading 
them to be less welfare oriented in opinions. Second, the exposure of women to the 
institutional features of employment may also shape opinions of those working towards 
less support of social policy. Therefore, a greater share of women in employment means a 
greater share of women influenced by institutional norms outside of the household that 
may lead them to be less supportive of social policy. The data from the ISSP confirm this 
descriptively at the individual level seen in Table 20. In all but three countries, women 
who are working full-time are less supportive of social policy then women who are full-
time housewives according to ISSP data for 2006. 
                                                 
5 Married is not appropriate/wrong. At the publication of this dissertation the author became aware of a 
‘Scandinavian’ problem where the percentage of people cohabitating skews the marriage figures and 
renders this instrument irrational. This will be corrected when this chapter is published as an article. 
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Table 20. Female Public Opinion by Housewife Status, 2006 
 
Note: Calculated by author from individual level ISSP, average public 
opinion of full-time employed female minus average of housewife by 
country. 
This is a descriptive picture for illustrative purposes and further research is necessary to 
better identify the mechanisms that lead to lower support; however, it sheds a positive 
light on the usage of FLP as an instrument for public opinion because the measure of FLP 
is independent from ISSP data, yet conforms to the preferred correlations regarding the 
usage of instrumental variables (as shown later by correlations in Table 22).  
The third reason for usage of FLP comes from what is known about welfare 
regimes. FLP is highest in the English-speaking countries and also high in the Nordic 
countries, and these two are nearly polar opposites in terms of spending on social policy. 
On the other hand, FLP is lowest in Germany, France and the Mediterranean countries 
where spending is middle to high in range (Esping-Andersen 1990). Public opinion is 
highest in the Mediterranean countries, followed by the Nordic countries and the lowest 
support is in the English-speaking countries, as discussed in Chapter 5.1. At the same 
Housewife Full-time emp. Difference
Australia -0.28 -0.41 -0.13
Canada -0.45 -0.42 0.03
Denmark -0.16 -0.31 -0.14
Finland 0.72 -0.19 -0.91
France -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
Germany 0.00 -0.05 -0.05
Ireland 0.04 -0.09 -0.13
Japan -0.23 -0.35 -0.11
Netherlands -0.03 -0.25 -0.22
New Zealand -0.56 -0.46 0.11
Norway 0.09 0.10 0.01
Portugal 0.37 0.26 -0.10
Spain 0.23 0.16 -0.07
Sweden -0.13 -0.22 -0.09
Switzerland -0.18 -0.31 -0.12
Great Britain -0.18 -0.28 -0.11
United States -0.38 -0.46 -0.08
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time, social policy spending is highest in the Nordic countries where FLP is relatively 
high, but spending is also highest in France and Germany where FLP is very low. 
Furthermore, spending is the lowest in the Mediterranean countries where FLP is lowest. 
There is evidence that FLP is indirectly related to policy, but this might only be through 
public opinion, for example higher levels of FLP leads to greater political 
enfranchisement of women (and thus their opinions) (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008), and 
as opinion is a variable in the model this indirect relationship should be controlled for. 
There is also evidence that social policy that encourages traditional family structures and 
traditional child support discourages FLP, but this is causality in the other direction 
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Iversen, Rosenbluth, and Soskice 2005). Therefore, I argue that 
FLP is not directly causally related to social policy spending because there is no logical 
pattern across countries.  
I choose marriage as a best-available instrument for social policy although it is 
less ideal than FLP. Countries with more generous maternity leave policies (i.e. more 
spending by the state on social policy) and with policies that require women to be 
dependent on men in order to receive benefits, have larger shares of the population in 
marriage or cohabitation, as seen in much of Europe when compared to the English-
speaking countries. Although this may or may not be a causal relationship of marriage on 
spending, it seems that they might at least be reciprocal; and certainly their relationship is 
empirical with a correlation of 0.28 (Esping-Andersen 1990 and Table 22). Importantly, 
higher rates of marriage should lead to greater spending on social policy in advanced 
welfare societies through dependent and survivor benefits, although this is heavily 
moderated by the nature of these benefits and the shaping of interests by the policies that 
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distribute these benefits (Orloff 1993). Thus marriage theoretically shapes social policy6 
spending through a demographic component, married women receiving funding as tied to 
male workers; again this is moderated by how traditional family norms are and whether 
women tend to be in the labor market or not. I do not have good cause to expect marriage 
to shape public opinion; however the correlations shown later in Table 22 show that 
marriage has a moderate relationship with public opinion (0.19). On the other hand, there 
is some evidence that married persons are less supportive of social policy, but these 
effects are very small, for example the difference between married versus single in 
marginal public opinion is found to be smaller than the difference for each year of 
education (Linos and West 2003:402).  
It is also plausible that marriage is a proxy for something else. Therefore, I choose 
two alternative instruments to run robustness checks. I consider the percentage of GDP 
that is collected in taxes by the federal government and the amount of military spending 
per capita in a given year. Taxes should be related to social policy directly, because social 
policy is measured as a percentage of GDP. Thus, both are anchored by GDP. In fact, 
given no changes in social policy or tax policy, both should be perfectly correlated within 
each country for each year. However, this is not the case because GDP is a measure of the 
total value of goods and services produced in a given country-year, but does not exactly 
measure the full range of wealth creation or more importantly the movement of taxable 
capital, e.g. taxes on housing and retail purchasing for example. The availability of funds 
in a national government's coffer should increase the possibility for spending on social 
policy. This is true given a balanced budget, which nation-states generally do not operate 
within, but nonetheless they strive towards.  
                                                 
6 See footnote 5. 
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The correlation between taxes collected and social policy is very high (0.87), 
while the correlation with public opinion is high (0.49), and this is empirically 
problematic. The amount of tax revenue should only impact public opinion when there is 
a change in tax policy, otherwise the public should not notice how much the government 
is collecting in taxes in total thus it should not impact public opinion directly. Yet, the 
main reason I do not employ taxes collected as my primary instrumental variable is 
because of the endogeneity of this measure with social policy. Although different levels 
of tax collection provide different amounts to spend on social policy all else equal, the 
actual measure of taxes collected directly reflects the tax rates of a country which are a 
key part of the social policy process. Nation-states wishing to spend more on social policy 
must tax more. Thus, there is problem where countries that tax more should lead to public 
opinions in favor of social policy, as they expect to see returns on their high taxes. 
Military spending is an alternative instrumental variable derived from the work of 
Wilensky (1975), who demonstrates that countries that use more of their wealth for 
military spending use less of it for social policy. Ironically, Wilensky's finding does not 
hold whatsoever in the case of advanced democratic countries today. There is the US 
which spends more than most other countries combined on its military, and then there are 
the rest. When the outlier of the US is removed from the list of developed countries, the 
association between military spending and social policy spending becomes positive, i.e. 
those who spend more on one also spend more on the other (correlation of 0.23, see Table 
47 in Technical Appendix Three). Despite the fundamental nature Wilensky's work on 
social policy, the contradictory direction of this association that I find is not surprising. 
This harks back to the rise of nation-states over 100 years ago. Those who sought to unite 
the Germans or the French for example, into one coherent political entity needed to create 
allegiance to a nation-state across the many regional vassals of power. One way of 
138 Chapter Six    Testing for Feedback and Alignment 
 
accomplishing this was to guarantee the safety of those within the state. This was 
accomplished through the production of a large military. The history of Europe is a 
history of struggle between political entities. Those states that were the most successful 
had the most powerful centralized structures; this may remain true today due to path 
dependency. Or at least it seems that states that are more centralized spend more on all 
forms of policy per capita. The exception is of course the US whose role as global 
military superpower is entirely exceptional when compared with all other advanced 
democracies. Therefore, in an analysis using the instrumental variable military spending, 
the US cases must be left out. 
Figure 15. Theoretical Path Diagram Modeling an Instrumental Approach to the 
Relationship of Public Opinion and Social Policy 
 
Figure 15 presents a path diagram of the theoretical relationship among public 
opinion and social policy. The text within boxes represents observed variables. The boxes 
on the left hand side of the diagram for aged, individualism and corporatism all represent 
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potential IVs that might demographically or institutionally align public opinion and social 
policy. The solid arrows represent causal paths. These are unknown parameters that I will 
estimate using SEM. Identifying the effects of these arrowed relationships will test the 
hypothesis of institutional alignment. The top and bottom boxes with FLP and married 
represent the two instruments7. The box for married may be substituted with taxes 
collected and military spending as theoretical linkages to employ for alternative 
sensitivity models. There is no arrow connecting FLP to social policy or married to public 
opinion. These two paths are specifically theorized to be non-causal as is required by an 
instrumental variables approach. Finally the oval with public opinion in it is a latent 
variable. It is not observed directly, but based on an aggregated average factor score of 
the two questions from the ISSP, and along with social policy these two variables are the 
dependent variables in the model. The floating solid arrows that point between them are 
the reciprocal causal paths. The estimation of these will test the hypothesis of a feedback 
loop. 
 
6.1.3 Results 
The descriptive statistics by country-time and country are available in Table 21. 
Measurements of variables are discussed in Chapter 3. Table 22 gives correlations for all 
the variables utilized in this analysis by country-time observation. 
                                                 
7 See footnote 5 
 Table 21. Descriptive Statistics for Public Opinion and Social Policy Dataset 
 
Note: N=62 cases, By country N=19, except for the military spending descriptives which exclude the US, thus N=56 and country N=18 
Dependent           
Variables Concept Measurement Data Source Mean S.D. Min Max
By Country 
Mean
Public Opinion DV: Aggregate attitudes 
toward social policy
Two-item factor collapsed to country-time 
means. Government (1) reduce income 
differences and (2) provide jobs; Cronbach's 
alpha at the individual level = 0.65.
ISSP.  Religion I & 
II, Role of 
Government I, II, 
III & IV
0.00 1.00 -2.21 1.82 0.10
Social Policy DV: A country's 
commitment to welfare and 
redistribution
Social welfare spending as a % of GDP at PPP OECD.  Social 
Expenditures 
Database
20.53 4.92 11.99 31.59 21.49
FLP Instrument for public 
opinion; social institution, 
traditional breadwinner 
norms
Working age women active in the labor force 
as a % of total working age women
OECD . Annual 
Labor Force 
Surveys
63.75 9.49 38.00 80.19 64.89
Married Instrument for social 
policy
Percent of persons currently married or a 
cohabiting partner
ISSP.  Aggregated 
from individual-
level data
73.01 5.45 57.55 82.10 73.26
Taxes Collected Alternative instrumental 
variable to married
Tax monies collected as a percent of GDP for 
that fiscal year
OECD.  Tax 
Statistics Data
35.76 6.54 25.49 51.07 49.64
Mililtary Spending Alternative instrumental 
variable to married
Per capita spending on the mililtary, measured 
at PPP/1,000
SIPRI 0.45 0.18 0.18 0.84 0.42
Aged Demographic structure, 
health and pensions
Population aged 65 and over as a % of the 
total population
OECD.  Social 
Indicators.
14.77 2.36 10.69 21.50 15.18
Individualism Social institution Individualistic norms Hofstede (1984) 73.53 14.15 27 91 69.32
Corporatism Political institution Degree of coordination of social, state and 
market interests
Lipjhart and 
Crepaz(1991)
-0.17 0.99 -1.34 1.60 0
English-speaking Historical institutions English-speaking countries =1; European =0 0.48 0.50 0 1 0.37
  
Table 22. Correlations of Variables by Country-Time Point, N=62 
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Public Opinion 1.00
Social Policy (spending) 0.53 1.00
FLP -0.42 0.08 1.00
Married (%) 0.19 0.28 0.10 1.00
Taxes Collected 0.49 0.87 0.06 0.18 1.00
Military Spending per capita -0.42 -0.22 0.28 -0.44 -0.16 1.00
Aged (% ≥65) 0.47 0.59 0.10 0.17 0.42 -0.16 1.00
Individualism (Hofstede) -0.60 -0.37 0.18 -0.20 -0.16 0.58 -0.53 1.00
Corporatism (Crepaz & Lijphart) 0.56 0.58 0.10 0.17 0.54 -0.26 0.44 -0.57 1.00
English-speaking -0.67 -0.79 0.09 -0.15 -0.69 0.21 -0.58 0.50 -0.76 1.00
Year (centered) -0.05 0.08 0.35 0.03 0.02 -0.11 0.22 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 1.00
Education (Years) 0.19 0.05 0.04 -0.13 0.11 -0.14 0.27 -0.24 0.20 -0.21 0.19 1.00
GDP at PPP -0.22 -0.04 0.57 -0.27 0.05 0.30 0.06 0.14 0.27 -0.09 0.63 0.34 1.00
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Before testing reciprocal models I first engage in linear regressions predicting 
public opinion using social policy as an IV, and then alternatively predicting social policy 
using public opinion as an IV. This helps to identify important variables and tests whether 
this data confirms previous research that suggests that social policy shapes public opinion 
and that public opinion shapes social policy (see Chapters 1, 2 and 5). As this is not the 
main focus of my analysis I present the results of these linear regressions in a simple 
format in Table 23 and Table 24 that show only standardized coefficients and significance 
indicators. 
 
 
 
Table 23. Linear Regression Models Predicting Public Opinion toward Social Policy 
 
Note: N=62, clustered in 19 countries; preferred model shaded in grey; standardized regression coefficients; †p<.25 *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
 
Table 24. Linear Regression Models Predicting Social Policy in Spending as a % of GDP 
 
Note: N=62, clustered in 19 countries; preferred model shaded in grey; standardized regression coefficients; †p<.25 *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Social Policy -- 0.38*** -- 0.37** 0.42*** 0.22† 0.33** -- 0.11 -- 0.24† 0.16
Aged 0.52*** 0.28* 0.32** 0.12 -- 0.22† -- 0.21† 0.19† 0.26† 0.15 0.12
Married 0.16 0.09 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
FLP -0.48*** -0.49*** -0.39*** -0.41*** -0.39*** -0.50*** -0.49*** -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.47*** -0.46*** -0.42***
Individualism -- -- -0.36* -0.33* -0.37** -- -- -- -- -0.14 -0.18 -0.19
Corporatism -- -- -- -- -- 0.39** 0.42** -- -- 0.41** 0.30* 0.20†
English-Speaking -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.51*** -0.44* -- -- -0.19
r-squared 0.47 0.56 0.53 0.62 0.61 0.65 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.67
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Public Opinion -- 0.44** 0.30* 0.35* 0.46*** -- 0.27† 0.16 -- -0.05 -- 0.24† 0.01
Aged 0.56*** 0.34* 0.42** 0.46** -- 0.40** -- 0.35* 0.18† 0.18† 0.45*** 0.41*** 0.22*
Married 0.18† 0.11 0.15† 0.16† 0.18† 0.15† 0.16† 0.14† 0.15† 0.15† 0.16† 0.15† 0.16
FLP 0.01 0.23* -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Individualism -- -- -- 0.12 -0.06 -- -- -- -- -- 0.16 0.24 0.13
Corporatism -- -- -- -- -- 0.38*** 0.40** 0.31* -- -- 0.45** 0.38* -0.01
English-Speaking -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.66*** -0.69*** -- -- -0.70***
r-squared 0.38 0.48 0.45 0.46 0.31 0.50 0.42 0.51 0.67 0.67 0.51 0.54 0.68
144 Chapter Six    Testing for Feedback and Alignment 
 
As there are only 62 observations in 19 countries I am limited in degrees of 
freedom to work with. Thus, I test 12 different configurations of variables in the first 
model predicting public opinion in Table 23. In column 1, I test a basic model with a 
demographic independent variable, aged, and the two instruments. Then model 2 adds 
social policy to see if overall spending predicts public opinion with these three controls. 
The results from columns 1 and 2 suggest that social policy is a strong predictor of public 
opinion with a significant standardized coefficient of 0.38. They also point out that FLP is 
a strong predictor of public opinion giving evidence of its utility as an instrument, 
meanwhile married is not significant in the model. Finally, in both 1 and 2 the effect of 
aged is very strong in both models with a standardized coefficient of 0.52 and 0.28 
respectively. This suggests countries with more persons aged 65 and older have higher 
support of social policy. Columns 3 through 5 give results of regressions with the addition 
of the variable individualism. In all 3 models individualism is a strong predictor of public 
opinion (-0.36, -0.33 and -0.37), with more individualistic social institutions predicting 
lower support of social policy. Columns 6 and 7 add corporatism instead of individualism 
and demonstrate that more corporatist political institutions predict greater support of 
social policy (0.39 and 0.42). Models 8 and 9 show that English-speaking countries have 
much lower support of social policy than their European counterparts. Finally, columns 
10 through 12 mostly show that there are not enough degrees of freedom compared with 
high correlations to allow all independent variables into the model. The effects all 
collapse into each other, although the sustained significance of FLP and corporatism 
suggest these may be the strongest predictor IVs. I shaded column 6 because it is the 
preferred model here. It has only three variables and a high r-squared of 0.62. The only 
other models achieving an r-squared that is higher have too many variables or have the 
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variable English-speaking which is useful descriptively but lacks a mechanism to use as a 
causal variable. 
Turning to the liner predictions in the other direction, predicting social policy 
listed in Table 24, I show in columns 1 and 2 that aged population (standardized 
coefficients of 0.56 and 0.34) is also a strong predictor of social policy as is public 
opinion (0.44). Married has trouble staying significant in column 2. This may be due to 
such a small number of cases compared to the number of variables and is also probably 
due to the fact that married is not an ideal instrument. Furthermore, I get a surprising 
effect of FLP on social policy despite the correlation shown in Table 22 which is very 
small. This modeling technique suffers from case number restrictions and no instrument 
is expected to be perfect. Looking at column 3 helps to solve some of the mystery about 
FLP and married. Removing FLP drops the r-squared only slightly (from 0.48 to 0.45) 
and returns married to significance. This suggests that there is some endogeneity between 
married and FLP despite the fact that the correlation is only 0.10; however, the significant 
impact of FLP on social policy is very small in explained variance terms so again I 
proceed cautiously toward the reciprocal model. Columns 4 and 5 show that 
individualism is not a predictor of social policy. Columns 6 through 7 show that 
corporatism is a significant predictor (at 0.38, 0.40 and 0.31) and that more corporatist 
political institutions lead to greater levels of social policy spending, and this effect is 
similar in size and direction on public opinion. This suggests that individualism is not a 
strong candidate for institutional alignment, but corporatism is. Models 9 and 10 again 
descriptively offer the picture of English-speaking nations as qualitatively different from 
European ones due to far less spending on social policy. Finally, models 11 through 13 
show that too many variables crash significance values. In almost all models aged has a 
significant positive effect suggesting that demographics also leads to opinion-policy 
146 Chapter Six    Testing for Feedback and Alignment 
 
alignment as societies with more persons at 65 and older are more supportive of social 
policy and spend more on it. I highlight model 6 because it parsimoniously predicts social 
policy with only 3 variables and the highest r-squared except for models with English-
speaking as an IV. 
The results from the linear regressions suggest that feedback and alignment are 
possible given that public opinion and social policy are both significant predictors of each 
other as shown in the somewhat consistent effects across all models, and that corporatism 
is a strong and similarly sized predictor of each as seen in the preferred models (columns 
shaded in grey in Table 23 and Table 24). In order to further test these hypotheses I turn 
to the results of models that test for reciprocal causation between public opinion and 
social policy while allowing for institutional alignment from corporatism and other 
possible institutional variables. The results of these non-recursive structural equation 
models are presented in Table 25. 
 
 
 
Table 25. Instrumental Variables Models Predicting Reciprocal Causation between Public Opinion and Social Policy 
 
†p<.25 *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
Note: N=62, clustered in 19 countries. Data sources in Table 21. Non-recursive SEMs predicting simultaneous effects for both DVs. The 
variable public opinion estimated as a latent variable of itself with a reliability of 0.35 calculated from the individual level data. 
ß ß ß ß ß
Social Policy 0.46 *** 0.09 0.55 *** 0.11 0.37 ** 0.37 0.44 † 0.09 0.24 † 0.05
(0.03) (0.02) (0.19) (0.05) (0.03)
FLP (instrument) – 0.51 *** – 0.05 – 0.42 *** – 0.04 – 0.50 *** – 0.50 – 0.45 *** – 0.05 – 0.50 *** – 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01)
Aged 0.28 * 0.11 0.22 † 0.09
(0.06) (0.07)
Individualism – 0.33 ** – 0.02
(0.01)
Corporatism 0.41 ** 0.41 0.38 ** 0.38
(0.18) (0.18)
English-Speaking – 0.31 – 0.59
(0.54)
intercept – 10.07 17.92 1.71 0.35 1.12
-> Social Policy ß ß ß ß ß
Public Opinion – 0.06 – 0.29 – 0.31 – 1.53 – 0.07 – 0.07 – 0.29 † – 1.46 – 0.03 – 0.14
(0.64) (1.82) (0.21) (0.89) (0.78)
Married (instrument) 0.19 † 0.17 0.24 † 0.21 0.19 † 0.19 0.19 † 0.17 0.15 † 0.14
(0.11) (0.17) (0.16) (0.11) (0.10)
Aged 0.58 *** 1.22 0.40 ** 0.84
(0.45) (0.39)
Individualism – 0.51 † – 0.18
(0.14)
Corporatism 0.59 *** 0.59 0.39 ** 1.95
(0.21) (0.85)
English-Speaking – 0.96 *** – 9.34
(2.19)
intercept – 0.18 2.21 8.37 9.42 -1.44
Demographic/Political
coeff.(se)
coeff.(se)
coeff.(se) coeff.(se) coeff.(se)-> Public Opinion
Demographics Social Institutions Political Institutions Historical Institutions
coeff.(se)coeff.(se)coeff.(se)coeff.(se)
coeff.(se)
 Table 26. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Instrumental Variables Models shown in Table 25. 
 
Note: an undetermined  r-squared is a result of a standardized residual variance greater than 1, meaning the model is unstable.  
GOF indicies
CFI 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.89 1.00
r2 Public Opinion 0.61*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.62*** 0.65***
r2 Social Policy     0.35* Undetermined 0.34** 0.61*** 0.49***
AIC 1,606 1,831 1,489 1,369 1,741
free parameters 9 9 9 9 11
RMSEA 0.18 (0.02/0.36) 0.00 (0.00/0.18) 0.00 (0.00/0.21) 0.23 (0.09/0.40) 0.00 (0.00/0.20)
SRMR 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
Demographics Social Institutions Political Institutions Historical Institutions Demographic/Political
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The top panel of Table 25 presents the results predicting public opinion, the lower 
panel presents them for social policy and Table 26 presents GOF measures. The five 
headings across the top of the table correspond to different models each with a different 
IV configuration and always the same two instrumental variables of FLP and married. 
The first heading is a demographics model with aged as an IV. In the first column under 
this heading the standardized coefficients are presented. These results show that social 
policy is a large and significant predictor of public opinion, while controlling for any 
effect of public opinion on social policy, with a score of 0.46. Furthermore, aged is also a 
strong standardized predictor at 0.28. In the second column under the demographic 
heading I present metric coefficients. These are not important for my hypothesis testing8. 
Finally in the effects on public opinion, the instrument of FLP also has a strong 
significant standardized effect of -0.51. These effects are very large, but given that I am 
dealing with countries and there are only 62 cases they should not be understood in the 
same way as individual level data. They are utilized here for the purpose of comparing 
effect sizes. Looking down at the results of the demographic model for social policy 
reveals that public opinion is not a significant predictor of social policy. If it were 
significant, the effect is negative and very small (-0.06) which goes against the logic of 
greater opinion leading to greater social policy. In this model, aged also has an even 
larger significant effect at 0.58, and the instrument married is just significant with a 
moderate sized effect of 0.19.  
Next the model results for social institutions show a similar story to the 
demographics model. Social policy is a strong predictor of public opinion at 0.55, but 
public opinion is not a significant predictor of social policy at -0.31. In this model public 
                                                 
8 They reveal what the standardized coefficients translate into. Thus, the metric coefficient of 0.09 for social 
policy suggests that for every percentage point more of GDP that a country spends on social policy, public 
opinion increases by 0.09 of one standard deviation (as the public opinion variable is a standardized factor 
score). I will not discuss the metric coefficients further in this section. 
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opinion appears to have a larger negative effect, but again it is highly insignificant and 
cannot be trusted as a real effect. The impact of individualism is strong for public opinion 
at -0.33 and just significant but very large for social policy at -0.51. Thus, countries with 
more individualistic norms have lower public opinion and less social policy. The 
instruments do not deviate much from the demographic model. Next the political 
institutions model shows again similar results relating to opinion-policy as the 
demographics and social institutions models. Social policy is a major predictor of public 
opinion at 0.37 while public opinion is an insignificant predictor of social policy. 
Consistent with the preferred models in the linear regressions, corporatism performs very 
well as a predictor of both public opinion (0.41) and social policy (0.59). Societies that 
have more corporatist political institutions have greater public support and less social 
policy. The instruments again behave as expected. 
I run a model with the English-speaking family of institutions IV and results are 
similar to the other models with social policy being a strong predictor of public opinion at 
0.44, except that public opinion turns out to be a significant predictor of social policy in 
this model at -0.29. Both of these coefficients are arguably significant at p<.25. The 
impact of English-speaking is insignificant for public opinion and massive for social 
policy at -0.96; and the instruments behave as expected. This model explains almost all of 
social policy. English-speaking is not understood as a causal variable but the difference in 
social policy across societies may be explained almost entirely by being in the English-
speaking or European group along with public opinion and percent married. 
The final model includes two IVs of aged and corporatism. This model is derived 
from the linear models which suggest that corporatism is important for both DVs and 
aged is important for social policy. This model has the same results as the others with 
respect to reciprocal effects between the DVs. Social policy is a predictor of public 
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opinion (0.24) but not vice-versa (-0.03). The effects of aged and the instruments are not 
surprising. What is important is that institutional alignment appears again in this model 
with corporatism exerting a significant, large and similarly sized effect on both public 
opinion (0.38) and social policy (0.39). Aged also has a demographic alignment effect 
with 0.22 for public opinion and 0.40 for social policy, although the effects favor social 
policy all else equal. 
Looking at the bottom of Table 26 the GOF indices show that all models are at or 
near 1.0 in the CFI (which compares the proposed model to a null model without the 
proposed correlations). Models over 0.93 are considered good fitting. It is not so 
surprising that all the models fit well given the small number of cases because each 
specified path in the model greatly reduces overall residual error (Byrne 2001). 
Furthermore, all have RMSEA within confidence intervals below 0.5, and all have low 
SRMR close to 0.1. The models diverge with respect to the r-squared measures and the 
AIC scores. I do not prefer the English-speaking model because it is far away from any 
theoretically causal assumptions. The social institutions model is not preferable because 
the r-squared for social policy is undetermined. This means that the model reached 
equilibrium between the two equations with a result that does not explain any variance in 
social policy9. In other words the 'reciprocal' model explains only public opinion, not 
social policy. Therefore demographics, political institutions and the final combined model 
are the only reasonable models. The political institutions model is a better model than the 
demographics model with a lower AIC (1,489 as opposed to 1,606) and an RMSEA of 
0.00 as opposed to 0.18; however both explain nearly the same amount of variance in 
public opinion (r-squared of 0.61 and 0.63 respectively) and social policy (0.35 and 0.34). 
                                                 
9 In fact it does the opposite and introduces variance into social policy where the residual variance from the 
equation is larger than the observed variance in the social policy variable, i.e. a standardized residual 
greater than 1 (see Technical Appendix Three). 
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The AIC in the combined demographic and political institutions model is higher, but this 
is due to 11 estimated parameters as opposed to 9 in the other model fitting into only 62 
cases. The final model explains the most in the data without raising any red flags in its 
convergence. Therefore this is the preferred model and it explains the most variance in 
terms of the r-square value in both public opinion (0.65) and social policy (0.49).  
All models are identified and converged and therefore offer some useful 
information about the opinion-policy relationship; however, I focus on the demographic 
and political institutions model. Figure 16 presents the results from this model in a path 
diagram to aid in interpretation. 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Instrumental Variables Reciprocal Causation Structural Path Diagram 
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Social Policy
Public Opinion
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The diagram does not present any new information compared with Table 25.  
Although the GOF statistics are highly acceptable and the preferred model 
converged normally, I check the residual correlations to determine if there are any major 
problems with these results.  
Table 27. Residual Correlations of SEM Models 
 
The standardized and normalized residuals provide information about the 
correlations between residual variances in the model for each variable. This is another 
way of interpreting how well the model fits. The larger the number in each table, the 
greater the amount of unexplained variance is correlated with other unexplained variance 
(Hausman 1978). The larger the number the more cause for concern that there are either 
omitted variables or omitted pathways that might warrant introduction into the model. As 
I have a model that lacks degrees of freedom I cannot easily add variables or pathways, 
Variable PO SP PO SP PO SP PO SP PO SP
Public Opinion (PO) 0.88 0.40 0.47 0.62 0.04
Social Policy (SP) 0.07 -0.05 -0.70 999 0.11 999 -0.08 -0.02 0.09 -0.01
FLP 999 -0.17 0.11 0.19 -0.09 -0.62 999 999 999 -0.34
Married 0.26 -0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.25 -0.03 0.24 -0.23 0.29 -0.02
Aged 0.00 999 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.00 999
Individualism -- -- 0.00 999 -- -- -- -- -- --
Corporatism -- -- -- -- 0.00 0.00 -- -- 0.00 0.00
English-speaking -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.00 0.00 -- --
Public Opinion 0.40 0.14 0.16 0.27 0.03
Social Policy 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00
FLP -0.04 -0.10 0.06 0.12 -0.04 -0.14 0.05 0.12 -0.03 -0.13
Married 0.21 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.20 -0.02 0.18 -0.07 0.22 -0.01
Aged 0.00 0.00 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.00 0.00
Individualism -- -- 0.00 0.00 -- -- -- -- -- --
Corporatism -- -- -- -- 0.00 0.00 -- -- 0.00 0.00
English-speaking -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.00 0.00 -- --
Normalized Residual Correlations
Standardized Residual Correlations
Historical 
InstitutionsDemographic
Social 
Institutions
Political 
Institutions
Demographic/ 
Political
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without removing some. Looking at the first four models (i.e. demographic, social, 
political and historical), it is clear that there is disconcerting unexplained variance in the 
relationship of public opinion and social policy. This is shown in the first row of both 
standardized and normalized results which are 0.88, 0.40, 0.47, and 0.62 standardized and 
0.40, 0.14, 0.16, and 0.27 normalized. Taken by themselves, these values show in the 
standardized case (interpret as possible scores out of 1) that there are strong correlations 
between the unexplained variance for each dependent variable. This is highly problematic 
because the goal of the model is to explain the relationship of the two DVs to each other. 
These first four models have largely failed to do this. Secondly, in comparison to the 
other correlations in each respective model, the one between the residuals of the DVs is 
the largest or nearly the largest. This means that the main problems with unexplained 
variance lie with the DVs, again this is what the models hope to avoid and this is not 
desirable. The fifth model (demographic/political institutions) does not have this problem. 
The standardized and normalized residual correlations in the model are low at 0.04 and 
0.03 respectively. This means that the model has successfully predicted most of the 
variance in the DVs. And this is conclusive evidence that this is the preferred model out 
of those tested.  
The next concern is with the residual correlations among the IVs and DVs and the 
IVs with each other. Focusing now only on the preferred model, there are two numbers 
that stand out. These are the residual correlations between FLP and social policy and 
married and public opinion. These numbers are directly a product of the instrumental 
variables modeling approach. The paths between FLP and social policy and married and 
public opinion are specifically set to 0. This is problematic because there are actually 
correlations between each (as shown in Table 22), and these correlations cannot be 
explained by other covariates. Regardless of the theoretical arguments over the 
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appropriateness of the instrumental variables, they are not perfect. Perfection is not the 
goal here, and the residual correlations are moderate but not large. Finally, the 999 values 
in the standardized residual correlations are a product negative variance, in this case the 
normalized residual correlations are appropriate to use as a means of comparison (B. O. 
Muthén and L. K. Muthén 2007). 
6.1.4 Sensitivity Results 
The instrumental variable of married has some questionable theoretical links to social 
policy as discussed in section 6.1.2, also these SEM models are delicate due to a small 
number of cases. Therefore in order to validate the robustness of my SEM results, I 
engage in two alternative modeling strategies utilizing different instrumental variables in 
the place of married. In the first instance I employ taxes collected and in the second 
military spending, results presented in Technical Appendix Three, Table 48 and Table 49. 
These models are identical to those in the main models except for the variable married is 
swapped out. The results of these models are best utilized as a test of the feedback loop 
hypothesis. There is a large endogeneity problem with taxes collected and corporatism 
both theoretically (more centralization of societies' interests requires levying more taxes) 
and empirically (r=0.54). Also, military spending requires dropping the US as an outlier 
and this brings down the generalizability of the model. Looking only at results for the 
reciprocal part of the models demonstrates findings supportive of those in the main 
model, in 3 out of 5 models social policy has a significant impact on public opinion while 
in only 1 out of 5 public opinion has a significant impact on social policy. The coefficient 
of public opinion in this one model is negative and therefore contradicts the idea that 
greater public opinion toward social policy increases social policy. 
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In the models using the instrumental variable of military spending both the 
feedback loop and institutional alignment hypotheses are tested. Results support the main 
model suggesting that there is not a feedback loop, as all five models show a significant 
impact of social policy on public opinion while only 2 out of 5 show an impact of public 
opinion on social policy. As with the previous models, the significant coefficients for 
public opinion are negative thus flying in the face of the feedback loop and the idea that 
public opinion shapes policy. Turning to the institutional alignment hypothesis, the 
preferred model of institutions and demographics shows that corporatism has a significant 
and somewhat similarly sized impact on both public opinion (0.39) and social policy 
(0.49). This supports the main model findings that corporatist institutional norms align 
opinion and policy. 
6.2 Discussion 
I do not find evidence of a feedback loop between public opinion and social policy. What 
happens in these 19 countries in various years from 1985 through 2008 is that social 
policy predicts public opinion. It appears that social policy tends to attract opinion toward 
it. Meanwhile, public opinion has no impact on social policy after controlling for the 
impact of social policy on public opinion. The largest effects in the model are due to the 
alignment of public opinion and social policy by political institutions. Corporatism exerts 
a large and similarly sized effect on both. This supports the institutional alignment 
hypothesis. Finally, the percentage of the population aged 65 and over has a large impact 
on social policy and a moderate impact on public opinion consistent with previous 
studies. These conclusions are based on the preferred model which is the 
demographics/political institutions model. This model is preferable due to the best GOF 
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statistics, highest r-squared for both DVs, and minimal problems with residual 
correlations. Individualism may have an impact on reducing both public opinion and 
social policy, but modeling its causal influence leads to a less preferable model. Overall, 
the black-box of norms contained in English-speaking versus European families of 
institutions is a powerful predictor of both public opinion and social policy. The grouping 
of these two countries is mostly a descriptive exercise as it is not possible to isolate the 
mechanisms that lead to their distinct opinion and policy levels. The main findings are 
supported in two sets of sensitivity analyses that suggest that there is no feedback loop 
and that corporatism aligns opinion and policy. These findings should be interpreted as a 
first step in sorting out the opinion-policy relationship but should be taken lightly as there 
are a small number of cases and an unbalanced dataset. 
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN  PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC OPINION AND SOCIAL POLICY 
In this chapter I review the results of my three empirical studies which I then use to draw 
some theoretical conclusions. I discuss the findings, their interpretation and limitations in 
7.1. This is organized by study under the sub-headings First Study (7.1.1), Second Study 
(7.1.2) and Third Study (7.1.3). Next I relate my findings to the theoretical perspectives 
motivating this research in 7.2. This is organized by sub-headings Self-Interest (7.2.1), 
Ideology (7.2.2), In-Group Bias (7.2.3), Institutions (7.2.4), and Opinion-Policy (7.2.5). I 
conclude with some remarks on my own perspectives on democracy, public opinion and 
social policy.  
7.1 Empirical Discussion 
The three empirical works in this dissertation take on a diverse and broad range of 
hypotheses related to public opinion and social policy. In this section I first discuss some 
general limitations with cross-sectional data analysis, and then I will summarize each 
work and discuss each of the findings along with specific limitations.  
Empirical analysis provides no confirmation of causality. Furthermore, cross-
sectional studies like those contained in this dissertation are especially prone to problems 
making arguments about changes over time. Causality remains a theoretical undertaking. 
This work identifies patterns and correlates that lend evidence to causal theories. The 
patterns themselves also contain uncertainty. The data are limited because surveys have 
measurement errors associated with the sampling framework and the questions. Also, 
unobserved factors may exert simultaneous impacts on both IVs and DVs and potentially 
bias the results. I have attempted to control for or rule out as many of these factors as 
possible in the first two studies. I try to control for factors and measurement issues that 
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might blur the relationships between micro-level SES and ideology, meso-level 
development, politics and group dynamics, and macro-level institutions and 
demographics. Much further research is necessary to validate my findings. Although 
comparative longitudinal data analysis also does not guarantee causality, the possibility of 
expanding this work using panel data sets should grow in the future with the continued 
work done in cross-national surveys done in the European Community Household Panel 
and the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe. 
7.1.1 First Study 
In the first study using ISEA data (timeframe mid-1990s; N=13,294; country N=5) I show 
that economic egalitarian ideology is a major predictor of public opinion toward social 
policy. Furthermore, self-interest plays a smaller role with those higher in SES being less 
supportive of social policy. Finally, in formerly Communist Poland and Bulgaria the 
public are much more supportive of social policy than their peers in Australia, Finland 
and the Netherlands, all else equal. These findings highlight the importance of ideology, 
structural position and institutions in shaping public opinion. 
The findings of this study are robust. They hold up when analyzing each country 
separately. This demonstrates that the findings are not driven by Australian data which 
accounts for about one-third of all cases analyzed. There is only miniscule variation by 
country in the ideology-public opinion link by country. Finland shows a smaller impact of 
ideology on public opinion toward social services and subsidies compared with the other 
countries, and Poland shows a larger impact on price controls in comparison with the 
others. These differences are slight and overall the relationship is positive and large in all 
countries for all three DVs where greater egalitarianism leads to more support of social 
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policy in the form of price controls, subsidies and government provision of welfare and 
redistribution. 
Further research might look at reasons for these minor across-country differences. 
For example, the rapid transition of Poland to a market economy after 1990 (as opposed 
to the slow progress of Bulgaria) may have contributed to a larger gap between 
individuals who were elites with market preferences (as in presumably anti-egalitarian 
and anti-price controls) compared with those who were faring worse under the new 
competitive market and held on to egalitarian ideology and pro-price control opinions. 
Also, in Finland, the smaller impact of egalitarian ideology on social services and 
subsidies might be a product of the social democratic system where social services and 
subsidies benefit all levels of the population, and are seen as part of a defining feature of 
citizenship. Thus, whether egalitarian or not, individuals may support social services and 
subsidies as a social right. Moreover, Finland faced an economic recession after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union which also brought a small wave of Russian immigrants who 
were more likely to be in low paying jobs and in need of welfare, therefore group bias 
may have lead native Finns to be less supportive of social services and subsidies despite 
being ideologically egalitarian. More research should consider these issues, and seek to 
determine how long the institutional impact of Communism lasts after formal dissolution. 
Although it has a diverse range of countries, this study remains limited by only 5 
cases at the country-level. It is not clear that Finland and the Netherlands are adequate 
proxies for all of Western Europe nor that Bulgaria and Poland are for all formerly 
Communist countries. Also, assessing the impact of Communist institutions is limited by 
the fact that Poland and Bulgaria had lower GDP and higher corruption in the 1990s than 
Western European countries, and these features could explain the lower support of social 
policy instead of their formerly Communist institutional norms.  
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7.1.2 Second Study 
In the second study using ESS data plus a unique regional database constructed with my 
colleague Maureen A. Eger (2007-2009; N=22,049; regional N=112; country N=14) we 
find that a greater percentage of foreign-born persons in a region leads to a reduction in 
native-born public opinion toward social policy. This effect is found throughout Western 
Europe offering general support of the in-group bias hypothesis. This finding is the first 
of its kind to demonstrate this effect consistently across many countries. Percent foreign-
born by region has a negative and significant effect on support for health care and old age 
care, and this effect can explain more than 40% of the variation in public opinion at the 
regional level (predicted marginal change of 0.44 and 0.41 of a standard deviation, see 
Table 19). Furthermore, the impact of foreign-born is distinct from anti-immigrant 
sentiment lending support to the idea that in-group bias is a general mechanism operating 
across individuals regardless of racism or prejudice toward immigrants.  
This research has some limitations. It is not comparative across all welfare states. 
It cannot compare Western Europe with the English-speaking countries other than Great 
Britain because of data limitations; the ESS was not fielded in the US or Australia for 
example. The questions on health care and old-age welfare were only asked in 2008 with 
the special welfare module of the ESS, thus longitudinal comparison which might give 
better information about the causal mechanisms is not possible. Furthermore, the models 
explain a large portion of the variance in individual attitudes toward health care and old-
age care at the regional level, but the regional level has the least amount of variance of all 
three levels for each DV. The individual-level has the most variance followed by the 
country-level. Thus, it is important to place limitations on the conclusions I draw. Percent 
foreign-born must be taken as a factor that operates in addition to the many that are 
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already known to shape public opinion. Alone it cannot explain massive shifts in 
individual attitudes or public opinion, only smaller trends.  
Further research should address two empirical points. The first is that foreign-born 
as a general measure has some problems. It does not distinguish country of origin. This is 
a benefit when conceptualizing in-group bias as a very general phenomenon, but a 
hindrance when looking for more detailed mechanisms. Much of the immigration 
discussion revolves around immigrants from Muslim countries. However, percent 
foreign-born is the only measure that is truly comparable across Western Europe so we 
cannot capture Muslim immigration or other specific effects by group of immigrant. 
Nevertheless, if we had a variable that did measure the impact of the most salient 
immigrant group(s) in a region we believe our results would be even stronger. On a 
related note, measuring the impact of immigration-generated ethnic diversity at the city-
level or neighborhood-level on public opinion would also benefit this type of research, 
because some of the NUTS regions are geographically quite large and contain more than 
one city. Unfortunately, cross-national survey data and census data do not yet measure 
this comparatively.   
The second point is that these DVs are taken from single questions in the ESS. 
Multiple-item scales are always preferable for reducing measurement error; however, this 
is not possible as each question is distinct as a construct. This is evidenced by the face 
validity of the questions which suggests that they are different due to their phrasing about 
social policy areas of redistribution, health, and old-age. It is also evidenced in the 
findings which show that the effects of IVs on each of these are different across the 
models, which violates a criterion of measurement validity where all IVs should have 
similar effects on (i.e. correlations with) the variables that would otherwise make a scale. 
If anything, this research points out that others should exercise caution when lumping 
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opinions toward income redistribution with health care to form a 'welfare attitudes' scale 
as is often practiced. 
7.1.3 Third Study 
In the third study using ISEA data (1985-2008; country N=18; country-time N=61) I find 
no evidence of a feedback loop between public opinion and social policy at the country-
level. In other words, no evidence of reciprocal causation. Instead I find support of what 
is often identified in the literature, of an effect of social policy on public opinion, 
otherwise known as institutional feedback, institutional logic, or opinion responsiveness. 
Furthermore, I find strong predictive power of corporatism and the percent of the 
population over 64 on both social policy and public opinion in similar directions and 
sizes, and these factors lead to alignment of public opinion and social policy cross-
nationally.  
This research is exploratory. It is a first-of-a-kind test of the possibility of a 
simultaneous reciprocal relationship between public opinion and social policy. The 
conclusion must be taken lightly. For example, the social institution of individualism had 
an effect on public opinion and social policy but this effect came in a model that did not 
have as strong of a GOF as the model with corporatism and aged population. 
Furthermore, many other variables have been shown to influence social policy and public 
opinion such as the amount of left party control of various parts of the government, the 
history of religious ties to politics, number of veto players, working class disruption and 
lobbying, level of federalism, globalization, activities of the power elite in shaping 
persuasive media, and many more (Zaller 1992; Hicks and Misra 1993; Evelyne Huber et 
al. 1993; Brady, Beckfield, and Seeleib-Kaiser 2005; C. Brooks and Manza 2007). These 
variables are all highly interrelated, and thus placing faith in any one of them is to miss 
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the point (Lijphart and Crepaz 1991; Lijphart 1999). There are not enough countries to 
accurately sort out what-causes-what in the complicated array of social and political 
institutions that comprise advanced democratic societies. The samples size is small but it 
is still a large improvement upon much of the previous work at the country-level which 
has major findings based on less than 20 cases, and sometimes as few as 8 (for examples 
see: Hicks and Swank 1992; Evelyne Huber et al. 1993; Swank 1998; Kenworthy 1999; 
Iversen and Cusack 2000; Castles 2002; Hicks and Kenworthy 2003; Bradley et al. 2003; 
Mehrtens III 2004; Brady et al. 2005; Castles and Obinger 2007; Iversen and Stephens 
2008). 
The primary purpose of this study was to test for a reciprocal relationship between 
public opinion and social policy while allowing for the effects of institutions as IVs. 
Thus, it was less important to know exactly what was explaining the most variance out of 
the selected IVs, and more important to have some control for the institutional and 
demographic landscapes of different countries. As more and more data becomes available 
in the ISSP and other cross-national surveys, further research may benefit from a 
reduction in the small-N problem that plagues comparative social policy research (Shalev 
2007). There is also a case selection issue. The countries with available data on the ISSP 
were not randomly sampled, and instead reflect a research agenda from each country with 
researchers who are willing and able to participate. This brings up issues when attempting 
to generalize these findings to countries outside of the sample. 
There is also a measurement issue with the individual-level data. I was unable to 
utilize a measurement model to capture public opinion, again due to lack of cases. Thus I 
had to take the mean public opinion constructed from a factor model at the individual 
level and treat it as an observed variable with a known measurement error. It would be 
preferable to allow the SEM software to interpret measurement error by allowing the two 
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variables that form the public opinion scale to be in the data and designating them as 
measures of a latent variable. Unfortunately this is not possible. It is possible with 62 
cases in uni-directional modeling, but with my non-recursive models, having a second 
dependent variable quickly uses up all the degrees of freedom given that the data are 
clustered into 19 countries. Thus, I was only able to allow the measurement error from the 
two variables tapping public opinion based on their Cronbach's alpha, and even this 
introduces a degree of freedom restriction by having an extra error path that is known in 
the model. 
Finally, there are potential problems with the instrumental variables. Female labor 
force participation is a compelling variable due to its high correlations and especially the 
theoretical relationship it has with public opinion. Also, it does not seem to have a direct 
link with social policy. For example, it is a difficult argument to make that female public 
opinion toward welfare and redistribution cause them to enter the labor market; however, 
it is possible that causality exists in reverse where the nature of social policy shapes 
public opinion in women, and they may be compelled to work where social policy is low 
as in the English-speaking countries, or where the cost of living is exceedingly high and 
the state helps deal with this by creating jobs for women in the public sector as in the 
Nordic countries. But these are indirect theoretical linkages so are only a small concern.  
The argument that percent married in a country shapes social policy spending is 
much harder to make. This also shows in the moderate correlations of married with social 
policy. Also the correlation drops to 0.04 when the US cases are removed from the 
dataset (see Table 47). Thus, married may be proxying American exceptionalism. 
Furthermore, social policy provisions that are weak or not family-oriented may create 
unfavorable conditions for married persons leading to greater divorce rates, and this 
would turn the causal arrow in reverse. Thus, I employ two second sets of models with 
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two different instrumental variables. One is the amount of taxes collected and the other is 
the military spending of a country in a given year. These models offer similar results as 
the preferred model. They suggest that there is not a feedback loop, that policy shapes 
opinion, and that institutional corporatism aligns opinion and policy. I thus conclude that 
there is a valuable empirical contribution to social science in the main models. This is 
furthered by the statistics shown in the GOF and normalized residual correlations, which 
suggest that the preferred model is the best possible of all utilized, and not a bad fit in 
general. 
7.2 Theoretical Implications 
The results of my cumulative work offer support to various theoretical perspectives on 
public opinion and social policy. These findings about public opinion provide insights 
into human nature and the social construction of reality. They show that ideology, in-
group bias and institutions are all associated with public opinion and the nature of 
societies in general. This contributes to a multilevel understanding of social worlds. 
Individuals are bound in regions which are bound in nation-states. Individuals are 
ideologically motivated and these ideologies are interrelated with regional and country-
level characteristics. These influence socialization and opportunities for the individuals. 
Individuals also perceive themselves to belong in groups, and are cautious about sharing 
with other groups. This in-group bias probably has an impact on socialization of 
ideologies. I report the theories and hypotheses that I considered in my three studies and 
how my results relate to these in the following sections. The final section 7.2.5 discusses 
new theoretical ground and how these findings implicate the opinion-policy relationship 
in a democratic framework. 
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7.2.1 Self-Interest 
The theory of self-interest is one of the more general theories tossed around in social 
science discussions, and there are many variants of what constitutes self-interest. 
Therefore, I narrow the field by focusing on material self-interest. As discussed in 
Chapter 2.1, those who have more to gain should support social policy and those who 
have more to lose should oppose it. 
My only study that was explicitly testing this theoretical perspective was the first 
one. I showed that those higher in income, education and occupational status were less 
supportive of social policy. I did this in two ways, first by measuring income, education 
and occupational status individually and then by taking all three and constructing an SES 
sheaf. This allowed for seeing individual determinants and getting some sense of what 
was driving the self-interest on the one hand, and it allowed for a larger picture of class as 
a pseudo-latent measure constructed from these three SES measures. The results shown in 
4.1.2, Table 13 indicate that education is the most consistent factor driving the negative 
effect of SES on support for social services, and price controls and subsidies for basic 
needs. It is the largest predictor of support of social services and subsides and second to 
income in the prediction of price controls. Income is a larger negative predictor of price 
controls and a very small negative predictor of social services, and occupational status is 
a moderate predictor of subsides but insignificant for social services and price controls.  
The 'material' gains to be had from social services include the provision of 
education by the government (see Table 8) which makes it somewhat surprising that those 
who are highly educated would be less supportive of social policy. However, keeping in 
mind that those higher in education have greater levels of wealth at their disposal, it is 
possible that they are self-interested in guarding that wealth against redistribution as tax 
monies converted into social services. This argument is weakened because I measure 
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income directly and the effect is small (i.e. the income effect is parsed out from 
education) and income taxes are a major source of tax redistribution. However, property, 
consumption and estate taxes may hit the highly educated (i.e. higher class) even when 
they do not have high incomes. Occupational status has no effect on support for social 
services. This is surprising because those in higher status occupations are better suited to 
take care of themselves and their families. Thus they are not in need of the social services 
that the government provides. However, this is all conflated with the fact that high status 
individuals are paying higher taxes no matter what their preferences are toward social 
policy. Thus, an argument could easily be made that taxation as a given, leads the high 
class to support spending on education, health care and old-age care as consistent with the 
status quo, just like all the other classes, i.e. path dependency of what the current system 
provides shaping what people want. Or, they are expecting returns on their tax monies. 
Support of price controls is most highly discouraged by those who are higher in 
income and moderately so by those who are more highly educated. This is very consistent 
with material self-interest. Presumably those who have high incomes do not need price 
controls. Furthermore, those who have high incomes and work in the private sector are 
likely to be aware of the risk of profit loss or inefficiency that results from government 
imposed price ceilings.  
Unlike price controls which are likely to be a product of legislation alone, 
subsidies require government spending. This spending is likely to be redistributive using 
the tax dollars from the well-off and moving it to funding basic needs, i.e. that which is 
consumed by those in need. However, looking at the question on subsidies in Table 10, 
electricity and food are included in this measurement as targets of subsidization. Those 
with high incomes presumably utilize more electricity with larger sized houses or greater 
quantities of houses. Furthermore they presumably spend more on food with more 
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expensive tastes. Thus, they may see government subsidies as benefitting them although 
this is at a more specific level than measuring general opinion on subsidies. As for 
occupational status, I do not have a theoretical argument why it matters for subsidies 
specifically, but none of the other DVs. 
In all the models of the first study, SES as a whole (taken as a sheaf coefficient) 
had an impact that was roughly one-third the size of egalitarian ideology and half that of 
institutions. Therefore, I conclude that self-interest in general is an important process for 
public opinion formation, but there are other things that matter much more. Also, I do not 
have the mechanism pinned down here. Those with higher SES have greater access to 
materials. They are also less supportive of material redistribution. But redistribution is 
only one part of what social policy does. For example, social policy leads to greater trust 
amongst citizens and is a kind of citizen and state-building activity (Skocpol and Amenta 
1986; Rothstein 1998), and it pools risks across a population (Barr 2000). By providing 
measures of security and trust for individuals in a population, social policy can prevent 
revolution, revolt and crime, and all of these things could risk the status and wealth of 
those higher in SES. Furthermore, testing this model in Australia, Bulgaria, Finland, the 
Netherlands and Poland may not provide a model suitable to conclude something about 
self-interest in the rest of the world. Finally, the Communist experience may have 
rearranged the assumed association of class with public opinion toward social policy. As 
shown in the results by country in Table 14, there is a different impact of education in 
Bulgaria and Poland. This may be blurring the general sheaf coefficient and its 
components in the pooled model. Thus, the mechanisms are difficult to sort out and lay 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
In the second and third studies I did not explicitly aim to tackle an impact of self-
interest. I wanted merely to provide a control of it at a basic level in my models. I will not 
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discuss the third study here as it controlled only for age. Although it is important to note 
that those higher in age have self-interest in social policy, such as pensions and health 
care, as they are the ones that are at a much higher risk of needing pension income or 
experiencing declining health. The second study shows that those who are higher in 
education are less supportive of redistribution and old-age welfare, but not health care in 
all of Western Europe. I only tested for an impact of income and occupational status in 
sensitivity models run on a sub-sample of the data. In these models (Table 40, Table 41, 
and Table 42) I find that income and occupational status have significant negative effects 
on redistribution and old-age welfare but not health care. This supports self-interest as 
discussed above. The SES variables may not have an impact on public opinion toward 
health care because it is such a fundamental component of the Western European 
universal welfare states. Regardless of status, in all of Western Europe, health care is 
offered by the government. This varies by country and there are private markets 
connected with or even within the public markets, but health care is mandatory in these 
countries and it is not difficult to get, because it is either universally provided, provided in 
large part by employers, or it is means-tested and those with little or no income can afford 
it. Finally, age is a significant positive predictor of opinions toward old-age welfare 
following the logic of self interest.  
I also found in the second study that regional structural characteristics shaped 
individual public opinion. These results were somewhat unexpected. Regions with greater 
percentages of tertiary education completion are more supportive of health care and old-
age welfare all else equal. Simultaneously, regions with greater wealth, measured as 
regional GDP per capita, appear less supportive of all three DVs although the effects are 
not significant and face a colinearity problem with regional education (see correlations 
Table 38). Thus individual education reduces support in some cases while regional, meso-
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level education levels increase it. This regional effect may be a product of modernization 
instead of self-interest, with support of social policy increasing with contextual 'post-
materialism' (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). But this is both outside the scope of self-
interest and this book. 
In general, it was not the focus of this dissertation to test if people are materially 
self-interested. I merely aim to confirm that self-interest is in place in these models as 
expected, and that I want to allow for self-interest to be part of the opinion formation 
process so that it does not interfere with the testing of other theoretical perspectives. What 
I want to add to the self-interest literature is confirmation that self-interest alone does not 
explain much (see Rothstein 1998:123-127). Individuals make tradeoffs in their attitudes 
between self-interest and ideological 'interests', and sometimes they have opinions that fit 
with larger institutional contexts or meso-level group contexts. All of these things shape 
public opinion simultaneously. Thus self-interest, like the other theoretical determinants 
of public opinion and social policy are only pieces of a larger puzzle 
7.2.2 Ideology 
In my first study, I took an explicit approach to testing Weber's theory of action with 
respect to value and instrumental rationality. I found that those with more economically 
egalitarian ideologies (i.e. believing that resources should be shared or more equally 
distributed in society) were more supportive of social services, and price controls and 
subsidies of basic needs. This is strong support of Weber's theory, but the mechanisms are 
blurred. As discussed in Chapter 2.2, value-rationality would be one where individuals 
have ideologies that have nothing to do with the likelihood of potential outcomes, 
whereas instrumental-rationality places the mechanism in positions that are focused 
entirely on achieving goals for society, and require rational calculation of the possibility 
173 
 
 
of achieving them. The question is then: What is egalitarian ideology, a value or a goal? 
A careful re-reading of the questions utilized to construct the latent measure of ideology 
listed in Table 6 reveals that both appear to be true, i.e. have face-validity. On the one 
hand, the questions that ask about government responsibility to reduce income differences 
and the notion that income and wealth should be redistributed appear to be ideological 
'values', while the questions that ask about the reduction of differences in the respondent's 
country, whether there is too much difference in that country, and asking about the goals 
of society to reduce income inequality over the next 10 years appear to be ideological 
'goals'. Therefore, I cannot differentiate between them. I assert that both probably 
function simultaneously. Those who have ideological 'values' (unrelated to outcomes) 
about redistribution in general should be more supportive of social policy because it 
redistributes and therefore aligns with their ideologies. Whereas those who see income 
redistribution as a goal should support social policy because it achieves this. Although 
over a hundred years of work exists since Weber's theorizing, I attempt to add to the 
discussion by brining instrumental rationality to bear on public opinion toward social 
policy. Furthermore, I find that in my first study, it is by far the largest effect on public 
opinion in the model. 
There is a theoretical concern with predicting an attitude with another attitude. 
The measurement of ideology was taken from the ISEA survey just like the measures of 
the DVs. I concede that there may be some endogeneity between attitudes toward 
egalitarian distributions of resources and attitudes toward social policy. But using 
measurement theory I show that each is a separate construct (see factor analysis results in 
Table 33), and most importantly the items in the scale for egalitarian ideology are mostly 
ideological as opposed to operational (Free and Cantril 1968). In other words they have a 
level of abstraction from policy outcomes because they focus more on whether 
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redistribution is good or bad, as opposed to what specific policies the government should 
engage in. Thus further research is necessary that takes a longitudinal perspective. This 
would be the only way to be sure that the egalitarian ideologies of individuals are stable 
while the political attitudes are more erratic, as stability versus change is a primary 
distinction I draw between ideology and public opinions (as discussed in Chapters 1.1 and 
2). 
I did not focus on ideology in the second and third studies. However, a theory of 
the relationship between ideology and public opinion is implicitly tested in the third 
study. Both ideologies and social institutions are normative, the ideologies of individuals 
and the norms of social institutions are reflections of each other. As I discussed in 
Chapter 3.4, sometimes measuring a collective phenomenon is only possible through 
individual observations and vice-versa. Therefore, I argue that my test of the norm of 
individualism as a social institution is a way of assessing the impact of individualistic 
ideology on public opinion across levels. I argue this, but I have no way of distinguishing 
effects at the individual level. In the linear modeling I utilized to inform my reciprocal 
model, I found that individualism had a significant negative impact on public opinion 
while controlling for the effect of social policy (see Table 23). When I moved to a 
reciprocal model the effect of individualism was inconclusive. The problem is that the 
social institutions model shown in Table 25 has some mathematical problems. It is not 
clear that these problems arise from the measurement of individualism or its inclusion as 
the only IV or from other unrelated model identification issues, but the model did not fit 
as well as the preferred model and therefore it was rejected. But individualism did have a 
significant negative impact on public opinion despite this model's rejection. 
What all this points toward is that Weber's theory of rationality is still relevant. 
Clear hypotheses may be tested, and in this dissertation they are found to be in strong 
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support. It brings a new layer to welfare state research which is often focused on politics, 
measurement, typological distinctions and predictive models. Social theory is often 
missing. This research crosses disciplines and suggests that value and instrumental 
rationality models should be included in attitude research. Furthermore it has implications 
for policy-makers and opinion polling agencies that should look for ideological 
orientations when deciding what to measure as public opinion. 
7.2.3 In-Group Bias 
The second study was the only one out of the three to address in-group bias. In regions 
with a greater percentage of foreign-born residents, native-born individuals are less 
supportive of health care and old-age welfare (i.e. pensions) provided by the government. 
This finding is not a product of regional development, as it holds with controls for 
regional education and regional wealth. Also, the finding is robust to the inclusion of anti-
immigrant sentiment, suggesting that in-group/out-group distinctions exist despite racial 
prejudices. In other words, Germans might have a preference to provide welfare only for 
other native Germans, a preference which is intensified or activated with the presence of 
more Turkish or more Italian immigrants for example. The measure of foreign-born used 
in the analysis is blind to immigrant countries of origin, as should be the effect of in-
group bias in general. When country of origin comes into play, in-group bias may be 
intensified or may be altered but I argue that this is a combination of in-group bias and 
prejudice, which are two distinct things. The finding supporting in-group bias is the first 
time immigration has been shown to reduce support for public opinion toward social 
policy systematically in almost all of Western Europe (14 countries), at least as much as I 
am aware of. This is a large step forward in the research in this area.  
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Interestingly, percent foreign-born does not have a significant effect on support 
for income redistribution. While this finding is inconsistent with the in-group bias 
hypothesis and contrary to research on American welfare attitudes which shows that 
diversity undermines support for means-tested social welfare (Luttmer 2001; C. Fox 
2004), it is not overly surprising when considering the history of social policy in Europe. 
Class politics fueled the rise of the European welfare states (Evelyne Huber and Stephens 
2001; Hechter 2004) while historic racial and ethnic diversity of the American working 
class served as an obstacle to class-consciousness and ultimately to welfare state 
development (Lipset and Marks 2000). European welfare states developed during a 
period of time when countries were relatively ethnically homogenous, and class tended to 
be the most salient societal division (Hammar 1985). Unlike “welfare” in the US 
redistribution in the European context was not racialized (e.g., Gilens 1995). Social 
policy in Europe historically redistributed resources to the poor and working class but not 
necessarily to ethnic minorities. I conclude that redistribution today in Western Europe 
remains associated with class differences as opposed to ethnicity. Yet, these distinctions 
are often difficult to disentangle because they are part of a larger multi-categorical matrix 
of status (Collins 2007), and future research should focus on group boundaries based on 
ethnicity, class, religion, and gender in order to understand when, where and which group 
boundaries are most important for public opinion.  
My research with Eger makes several important contributions to social science. 
Diversity generated by immigration makes ethnic and national in-group/out-group 
boundaries salient and affects attitudes towards the universal components of the welfare 
state. The universality of these spending programs implies that everyone in the population 
benefits. Immigration calls into question who is part of the nation and who deserves these 
benefits. Furthermore, most of the research on European welfare state attitudes has 
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focused on differences between countries, generated ostensibly contradictory findings, 
and led scholars to different conclusions about the effect of diversity on public opinion. 
We argue that measuring ethnic diversity at the country-level is not the best way of 
capturing in-group/out-group dynamics. Social categorization is an automatic response to 
one’s environment (Festinger 1954). Environment is a local phenomenon. Trips to the 
market, social responses to climate changes, and local social interactions should be where 
group boundaries are drawn. What happens in other parts of a country should be of little 
importance in the social experience of an individual, other than talking about it with 
individuals in the area. Our research also provides evidence that this phenomenon is not 
limited to the US or Sweden as others have shown.   
We also show in-group bias, i.e. a preference for allocation of resources to one’s 
in-group versus an out-group, is not the same as believing that immigrants make one’s 
country a worse place to live, i.e. anti-immigrant prejudice. We conclude that foreign-
born is not proxying racism or prejudice. Thus, we argue that immigration to a region 
makes ethno-national group boundaries salient, triggers in-group bias, and affects public 
opinion regardless of the respondents’ attitudes towards immigrants. 
This research improves significantly upon previous comparative work and sheds 
light on the relationship between contemporary immigration-generated ethnic diversity 
and welfare state attitudes in Europe. Given different histories of welfare state 
development and historic levels of ethnic diversity, public opinion in the American and 
European contexts are not exactly the same.  Nevertheless, these results suggest that the 
negative effect of ethnic diversity on support for social welfare policy is not an example 
of exceptionalism in the US but instead a general phenomenon, visible at the regional-
level across the advanced welfare states of the world. 
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7.2.4 Institutions 
Institutions exist through their norms, organizing structures, laws, and especially in the 
activities of their members which tend to uphold the institutions as discussed in Chapter 
2.4. This means that the institutions exist. Members are aware of the institutions, and 
outsiders can identify the institutions in a vague or concrete sense. This is true of social 
and political institutions. An English-speaking person can speak English and will have 
some knowledge of how to speak (i.e. the rules of the institution of the English language), 
or a politician knows how to make policy in her system for example what parties to work 
with or fight against (i.e. the rules of the political institution). Furthermore, the 
institutions, whether upheld through law or custom, provide the necessary information to 
enable individual actions. Second, if an institution acts on its own somehow (I might call 
it a 'synergy of individuals over time') then it still requires individuals to transmit the 
institutional 'actions' to one another. So regardless of whether the institution is acting or is 
just a bunch of individuals acting with similar interests, the institution exists and it is thus 
an interesting phenomenon to study with respect to social outcomes. The logic behind 
institutional theory that I investigate will hold whether or not the institution is an 'actor'.  
I am interested in the normative content reproduced in institutions as the 
mechanism that leads institutions to shape policy. I found evidence of this in two of my 
studies. The first study showed that Communism (a total institution) left a lasting impact 
on the ideologies and the public opinions of the societies formerly under its regime. This 
finding is consistent with the work of Sikora and Kelley (1999) who point out that the 
public still tended to favor centrally planned economies after the fall of Communism and 
into the mid 90s. The third study demonstrated that corporatist political institutions have a 
powerful association with both public opinion and social policy. This all suggests that 
institutions shape outcomes of public opinion and social policy. These findings contribute 
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to the neo-institutional thrust of social science over the last 50 years or so which is filled 
with arguments that institutions structure the attitudes and behaviors of individuals 
(Meyer 2008). What is important is that institutions matter, and they matter a lot. I argue 
that institutions consist of norms that dictate how the collective should solve its welfare 
and redistribution issues. The impact of formerly Communist institutions on public 
opinion was nearly as large as individual ideology which was the largest factor in the 
results of the first study (see Figure 4). Also, corporatist political institutions have the 
largest impact on public opinion in the third study (see Figure 16). Their impact in the 
third study is so powerful, that they explain social policy and indirectly have an impact on 
public opinion through social policy.  
These findings call for a closer examination of public opinion from an 
institutional perspective, but with better measurements of institutions. Much of the thrust 
of the "institutional logic" argument with respect to public opinion toward social policy 
has failed to produce clear results, because measurement of "institutions" has been 
restricted to different regime types (for example Arts and Gelissen 2002; Jæger 2006a; 
Larsen 2008). Although there are some patterns of attitudes across regime types, this 
appears to be a Cul-de-sac in the study of public opinion. That is because the regime 
typology is largely based on measurement and there is massive disagreement over this. 
Researchers cannot agree on how many types of welfare states there are, much less how 
to define welfare states in general. Furthermore, some studies show that disaggregating 
overall social spending into domains renders the typical 'three worlds' approach useless 
(Castles 2009), and especially confounding are the studies that expand the scope beyond 
employment and health related measures to including family policy and gender (Jane 
Lewis 1997). 
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Utilizing measures of individualism and corporatism allow for interpretation of 
differences between societies in general (not just welfare states) that are expected to relate 
to welfare and redistribution, but get around the pertinacious typological debates. These 
differences are not imposed by social scientists and are instead based on empirical 
observations as with Hofstede or observations of empirical observations as is the case 
with Lijphart and Crepaz. These measures get at real institutional differences in terms of 
norms of individualism and the organization of interests in a nation-state. These are the 
"institutions" of social science, not of political economy. They come from a social 
constructivist perspective and operationalize institution as an action word, as empirically 
observed repeated activities and the norms that uphold these repeated activities (Berger 
and Luckmann 1967; Jepperson 1991). This contrasts with organizational 
'institutionalism' that operationalizes only formal institutions and their political and 
economic functions. Thus, these 'organizationalists' offer a narrow and almost brick-and-
mortal definition of an institution 
No single measure can capture an institution. For example, measuring language is 
impossible with only one measure. It could be any number of normative contents in the 
words of a language, how the language is utilized in any number of social activities, or 
how the language differs between different social groups. The same is true of my concept 
of social and political institutions. Individualism is a cultural norm, but it does not cover 
all sense of individualism in a society. Different parts of society have different 
individualisms, and individualism may be conceived upon various axes. I offer one 
measurement in the interest of parsimony and as a proxy for that which is immeasurable, 
namely the norm of the institution of individualism in a given society. The same is true of 
corporatism. This is not directly measurable. However, I use a measure that was 
constructed from various other measures to try and get at this latent idea of corporatism 
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which has to do with how much the state organizes various interests that exist in the 
market, in the state, and across individuals, and to get at norms of collective cooperation.  
Due to the measurement problems I also offer a historical perspective. I split the 
advanced democracies into two institutional families, one English-speaking and one 
European. This does not measure any kind of institution directly but it attempts to 
capture, with a very large net, the similarities found in the histories of these countries as 
their various institutions evolved over the past two hundred years and more. This has a 
distinct advantage over the regime typology distinctions which spend most of their time 
disagreeing over which country is in which regime. Whereas British colonialism is a clear 
historical force with which to be reckoned and the English language is a proxy for 
English culture and customs. Also European history through ravaging wars and struggles 
to create peace and economically integrate is a clearly distinct process from the unbridled 
British Empire which was put to rest arguably by its own hand via one of its colonies, as 
opposed to centuries of geopolitical strife in a contained area in Europe. 
My attempts at capturing a simple historical institution nonetheless have one 
problem. That is Japan. Japan is not English-speaking or European. But it has a social 
policy system that is as advanced as most of the other countries I investigate. As I 
discussed in detail, I end up categorizing it in the English-speaking family of institutions 
due to the close ties of the US and Japan after the atomic bombs were let fly as discussed 
in Chapter 3.4. 
I offer my historical institutional dichotomy to serve as a model for future 
typological debates. There is a great deal of interest in typologies and my simple 
distinction gets historical institutions in line. It gets the causal ordering right, unlike the 
varieties of capitalism or worlds of welfare approaches which focus more on what is 
happening in recent times after the formation of nation-states (Hall and Soskice 2001; 
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Esping-Andersen 1990). Of course I do not mean to suggest that these approaches are not 
useful, but I seek to point out that the greater course of history is often over looked when 
building typologies as noted by Castles (1993). I argue that regardless of whether Sweden 
remains an ideal 'social democratic' state, or if New Zealand goes back to being a 
universal welfare state as opposed to liberal one; the historical rise of English 
individualism and the collective struggles in Europe will remain salient to social policy 
and public opinion for many decades if not centuries to come. 
Turning back to Communism, I face some challenges when interpreting the 
impact of formerly Communist institutions. Instead of the total institution of Communism 
infiltrating social, economic and political norms and shaping public opinion, one 
plausible alternative explanation is that after the break-up of the USSR most formerly 
Communist nations found their economies toppled and unstable and this made citizens 
desperate for government help. In other words: Was it Communism or economic strife 
that drove public opinion? Five cases does not allow for strong empirical claims here. 
However, taking the historical institutional argument and adding the fact that greater 
support of social policy in formerly Communist countries exists while controlling for 
SES, it seems that institutional theory is highly plausible. Thus, people who were not hit 
by the painful transition, or not hit as hard and could take care of themselves still tended 
to favor social policy more than their counterparts in the market societies of Europe and 
Australia. This lends further credence to the claims that institutions shape opinions and 
leave behind a legacy after dissolution as these surveys were conducted after the 1990 
formal dissolution of the Communist institutions. The salience of this finding rests in the 
fact that the instillation and disintegration of Communism in Poland and Bulgaria 
provides a 'natural' experiment as both of these countries did not elect Communism; 
rather it arrived via Soviet tanks. 
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One other interesting finding that might help make sense of the Communist 
institutional experience is that in Poland and Bulgaria, the well-educated tended to be 
more opposed to the three forms of social policy. I suggest that the well-educated in 
formerly Communist countries more easily adopted free-market ideology, and saw price 
controls and subsidies as simply reverting back to Communism. Hence, this is an 
institutional argument in reverse where the institution of Communism may never have 
been preferred by the intelligentsia because they were far more likely to be educated in 
Western institutional settings (i.e. schools) and capable of seeing the greater progress 
made in the non-Communist, developed world (Arts and Gijsberts 1998; Firebaugh and 
Sandu 1998). They were aware of the Communist norms and perhaps tried to escape 
them. 
Overall my country-level findings should ignite institutional theory in a modern 
public opinion context. Institutional theory is focused on what institutions do, and public 
opinion shaping is one area that should be added to the list. I do not want to suggest that 
institutions are a tautology of explaining everything, but from a social constructivist 
standpoint they are vastly important. In this dissertation I show that institutions are 
important for opinion and social policy. Further research should look beyond social 
policy in all forms of public policy and concomitant public opinions. The evidence here 
suggests that institutions should matter in other contexts. Finally individuals and policy-
makers should be painfully aware that their efforts are highly restricted by institutional 
settings. Unless they intend to overthrow the institution and change the norms, individual 
actions are limited to working within a controlled institutional framework. 
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7.2.5 A Theory of Opinion-Policy 
One of the most important contributions that I hope this dissertation makes is to dispel the 
myth that public opinion is a general reason for social policy to maintain its levels cross-
nationally. In other words, public opinion in general is not the answer to the question of 
why welfare states persist as suggested by Brooks and Manza (C. Brooks and Manza 
2006a, 2007). Like them and others, I show that when modeled in a linear fashion, public 
opinion appears to have a significant impact on social policy (see Table 24 and review in 
Burstein 1998, 2003) this is a common technique used to explain the strong cross-national 
correlation of opinion-policy. These types of analysis model a world where policy is only 
a product of opinion and other factors. However, when modeled in way that allows policy 
to also impact opinion, something that is known to take place, the effect of public opinion 
disappears. As Kenworthy (2009) points out, public opinion in the 1980s may be 
accurately predicted with spending on social policy measured in the 1960s. This stability 
of social policy suggests that something else is at play in the apparent cross-national 
correlation of opinion-policy. My first response to this is that social policy attracts 
opinion and this leads to opinion responsiveness (i.e. institutional feedback or logic) as a 
general pattern of democratic nation-states, and a large literature explains this via path 
dependency, increasing returns and the creation of social policy clientele (Pierson 2000; 
Larsen 2008; Jordan 2010). However, for these fluid features of society to find 
equilibrium, each must either cause each other, or must be shaped by similar forces 
leading to alignment. These models do not explain what shapes social policy. Clearly I 
show that it is not opinion in general. 
I offer the preliminary explanation of institutional alignment. Corporatism exerts a 
similarly sized effect on social policy and public opinion. Corporatism is only one 
measure of institution, but it is strongly associated with left politics and weak veto power 
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for example which area also features of the political institutional landscape. Most 
importantly, I see the corporatist norms as those that lead individuals to seek collective 
solutions to social problems. These are similar to social norms of collectivism, which are 
also shown to be good predictors of opinion and policy (measured in reverse as 
individualism), although not as strong as corporatism. Thus, I argue that the norms 
generated in repeated activities of social and political institutions lead to social policy and 
public opinion that are in agreement. Public opinion is erratic but it is anchored to social 
policy and social policy and public opinion in a given society are in turn anchored to 
institutional norms. 
My two institutional measures of individualism and corporatism do not capture 
the diverse range of institutions that make up modern democratic societies. However, I 
have shown that there are broad differences in the characteristics of English-speaking 
versus European countries and that these associate with public opinion and social policy. 
The English-speaking societies through some shared institutional histories of British 
colonialism, the English language, and social and political systems, all have lower 
support of and spending on social policy. The European democracies also share some 
common institutional histories with repeated geopolitical conflicts, a history of Latin and 
roots in the Carolingian Empire, and collectivistic solutions to social problems. This 
suggests that taken as institutional black-boxes which contain the sum of norms relating 
to welfare and redistribution, societies divide along historical lines.  
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7.3 Conclusion: Democracy, Public Opinion and Social Policy 
My findings implicate democratic processes. I argue that advanced democracies do not 
lead public opinion to have a general impact on policy, despite the humongous attempts 
of collecting public opinion data on a regular basis undertaken by political and 
independent organizations (i.e. Gallup). Although, politicians are regularly consulting this 
opinion data (Converse 1987), it seems to matter only at certain historical moments when 
a policy is up for changing or the public are particularly aggravated over an issue. This 
may also reflect the fact that policymakers often defer to their own ideological positions 
or to the will of power elites and special interests instead of public opinions (Korpi 1989; 
Burstein and Linton 2002; Druckman and Jacobs 2006). If policy makers and their 
institutional practices cannot be relied on to translate public opinion into policy then it is 
up to the public to take action. This is unfortunately not the case and in general public 
opinion is passive. This means that democracy does not enable or guarantee political 
participation, and instead only offers the opportunity to participate. Without informed and 
engaged citizens, public opinion is like the shared reality of prisoners in Plato's cave. 
They may agree about what they see as it appears to them in shadows, but unless they can 
free themselves from bondage and interact with the social world; their opinions have no 
impact on others. The opinions remain in the cave, regardless of how they were formed. I 
see their imprisonment as analogous to the apathy or lack of action behind public opinion 
in modern democracies.  
Freedom House and others measure democracy and conclude that most advanced 
nations score 10 out of 10. I would like to see an organization that measures public 
opinion in its effectiveness in shaping policy. Then we would know something about 
democracy as it is practiced by citizens, instead of what Freedom House measures which 
is more akin to its namesake as opposed to democratic self-rule. Thus, it is possible that a 
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country is a Freedom House 'perfect ten' yet has no citizens participating in the political 
process. The US is a scary example of a democracy that behaves partially in this way with 
some of the lowest voter turnout rates of all democracies in the world. The problem is that 
those who do not choose to vote impact the results (Franklin 1999). As Neil Peart (1980) 
points out: "If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice". So a country that 
scores a 10 out of 10 on democraticness must have motivated citizens in order that public 
opinion has an impact on policy, otherwise democracy is an empty shell where policy 
makers may do as they please to the public trapped inside. Perhaps compulsory voting 
and a stronger focus on education are some of the best recommendations I can make 
based on the findings of my third study. The idea of a democratic society that is open to 
growth and change hinges on the ability of its members to participate in democracy.  
Attempts to normalize democratic action should take into consideration the 
findings of my three studies. As individuals are ideologically and normatively motivated, 
political elites should try to push an agenda of political participation and informed 
citizenship as social norms. This will lead to a public that engages in the political process 
on its own, without priming, issue salience, or coercion. Furthermore, the public of a 
given society should be united as one in-group blind to ethnic and diverse dividing lines 
and can operate as a public instead of publics in shaping policy. This may require socially 
constructing an out-group to be other countries' citizens, yet this carries with it the danger 
of nationalism or war. Those who would improve their democratic systems beyond 
Freedom (House) should be mindful of self-interest, perhaps finding ways to check this 
motivating force amongst individuals, or force cooperation between competing interests 
such as those found between rich and poor, men and women, black and white, and native 
and immigrant. Although social policy is a way to motivate public opinion, public 
opinion will not motivate social policy until it is infused with actions and intentions. 
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9 TECHNICAL APPENDIX ONE: FIRST STUDY 
9.1 Tables 
Table 28. Predicted Interval Scoring: Egalitarian Ideology 
 
aTaken from ordinal probit regression predicted values which are  
averaged for each answer category. 
bToo few cases for reliable estimation. 
Variable N
Predicted 
meana
Anchor 
to 0
Rescale 0 
to 100
Avg. 
score
Income gap
0 186b -0.31 0.00 0
25 1,214 -0.41 0.00 0.00 7
50 1,721 -0.34 0.07 14.46 29
75 4,750 -0.21 0.20 39.51 53
100 4,975 0.09 0.50 100.00 100
Inequality
0 192b -0.64 0.00
25 1,150 -0.65 0.00 0.00
50 1,585 -0.53 0.12 17.58
75 4,592 -0.31 0.34 49.65
100 5,302 0.04 0.69 100.00
Difference
0 510 -0.90 0.00 0.00
25 1,843 -0.86 0.04 7.24
50 2,784 -0.73 0.16 32.97
75 4,169 -0.62 0.28 56.59
100 3,290 -0.40 0.50 100.00
Redistribute
0 481 -0.83 0.00 0.00
25 1,428 -0.76 0.07 15.97
50 2,155 -0.65 0.18 39.83
75 4,685 -0.56 0.26 59.61
100 3,913 -0.39 0.44 100.00
10yr Goal
0 632 -0.84 0.00 0.00
25 2,160 -0.77 0.07 14.04
50 2,097 -0.65 0.20 39.23
75 4,273 -0.55 0.30 59.65
100 3,575 -0.35 0.50 100.00
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Table 29. Predicted Interval Scoring: Government Effectiveness 
 
aTaken from ordinal probit regression predicted values which are  
averaged for each answer category. 
 
  
Variable N
Predicted 
meana
Anchor 
to 0
Rescale 0 
to 100
Avg. 
score
Effective
0 2,789 -0.46 0.00 0.00 0
25 6,032 -0.41 0.06 12.70 24
50 1,864 -0.31 0.15 33.07 50
75 1,171 -0.14 0.32 72.05 85
100 520 -0.02 0.44 100.00 100
Flexible
0 3,314 -0.70 0.00 0.00
25 6,559 -0.62 0.08 33.04
50 1,330 -0.54 0.16 65.45
75 826 -0.46 0.24 100.00
100 326 -0.40 0.30 100.00
Profitable
0 2,733 -0.79 0.00 0.00
25 5,719 -0.74 0.05 25.87
50 1,787 -0.69 0.10 52.63
75 1,353 -0.63 0.16 82.78
100 522 -0.60 0.19 100.00
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Table 30. Predicted Interval Scoring: Social Services 
 
aTaken from ordinal probit regression predicted values which are  
averaged for each answer category. 
 
  
Variable N
Predicted 
meana
Anchor 
to 0
Rescale 0 
to 100
Avg. 
score
Doctors & dentists
0 838 0.56 0.00 0.00 0
33.3 4,238 0.66 0.09 14.64 10
66.6 4,059 0.72 0.15 23.78 12
100 3,447 1.20 0.64 100.00 100
Hospitals
0 256 0.53 0.00
33.3 2,591 0.53 0.04 10.44
66.6 4,891 0.50 0.00 0.00
100 4,852 0.84 0.34 100.00
Day-care
0 962 0.50 0.00 0.00
33.3 4,602 0.57 0.07 11.98
66.6 3,701 0.64 0.14 23.41
100 3,288 1.09 0.59 100.00
Old-age homes
0 484 0.66 0.00 0.00
33.3 3,964 0.66 0.00 0.24
66.6 4,092 0.68 0.02 4.94
100 3,997 1.11 0.45 100.00
Schools
0 257 0.62 0.00
33.3 3,026 0.57 0.03 8.21
66.6 5,048 0.54 0.00 0.00
100 4,234 0.90 0.36 100.00
Universities
0 624 0.65 0.00 0.00
33.3 3,661 0.73 0.08 17.05
66.6 4,344 0.75 0.10 21.37
100 3,894 1.13 0.48 100.00
208 Technical Appendix One: First Study 
 
Table 31. Predicted Interval Scoring: Price Controls 
 
aTaken from ordinal probit regression predicted values which are  
averaged for each answer category. 
 
  
Variable N
Predicted 
meana
Anchor 
to 0
Rescale 0 
to 100
Avg. 
score
Electricity
0 575 0.62 0.00 0.00 0
25 2,004 0.71 0.09 13.44 16
50 2,422 0.85 0.24 34.95 39
75 4,486 0.92 0.30 44.54 52
100 3,279 1.29 0.67 100.00 100
Basic foods
0 1,168 0.50 0.00 0.00
25 3,566 0.59 0.09 13.31
50 2,738 0.78 0.28 40.73
75 3,213 0.86 0.36 52.93
100 2,147 1.19 0.69 100.00
Housing
0 955 0.52 0.00 0.00
25 3,375 0.66 0.14 14.47
50 2,935 0.94 0.42 42.38
75 3,349 1.13 0.61 61.42
100 2,002 1.51 0.99 100.00
Doctors & hospitals
0 338 0.60 0.00 0.00
25 1,169 0.75 0.15 22.31
50 2,174 0.85 0.25 38.79
75 5,349 0.93 0.33 50.86
100 3,798 1.25 0.65 100.00
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Table 32. Predicted Interval Scoring: Subsidies 
 
aTaken from ordinal probit regression predicted values which are  
averaged for each answer category. 
 
Variable N
Predicted 
meana
Anchor 
to 0
Rescale 0 
to 100
Avg. 
score
Electricity
0 814 0.32 0.00 0.00 0
25 2,189 0.37 0.05 7.64 11
50 2,073 0.49 0.17 25.64 30
75 4,663 0.67 0.35 51.54 57
100 2,972 1.00 0.68 100.00 100
Basic foods
0 972 0.16 0.00 0.00
25 2,971 0.24 0.07 12.81
50 2,140 0.38 0.21 36.54
75 4,162 0.52 0.36 62.10
100 2,556 0.75 0.58 100.00
Housing
0 776 0.40 0.00 0.00
25 2,588 0.48 0.08 10.11
50 2,364 0.66 0.25 33.38
75 4,324 0.87 0.46 60.73
100 2,627 1.17 0.76 100.00
Doctors & hospitals
0 309 0.32 0.00 0.00
25 724 0.40 0.08 12.43
50 1,035 0.48 0.17 26.21
75 5,026 0.65 0.33 52.33
100 5,809 0.95 0.64 100.00
 Table 33. Correlations and Factor Analysis for All Variables 
 
Note: Approximately 13,294 cases, varying somewhat from item to item. Shading denotes inter-item correlations and factor loadings among items in a single scale.  
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Income gap 1.00
Inequality 0.59 1.00
Difference 0.70 0.63 1.00
Redistribute 0.61 0.54 0.64 1.00
10 yr goal 0.64 0.57 0.67 0.58 1.00
Effective 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.20 1.00
Flexible 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.63 1.00
Profitable 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.58 0.55 1.00
Hospitals 0.23 0.20 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.14 0.13 0.12 1.00
Doctors & dentists 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.24 0.25 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.56 1.00
Schools 0.23 0.20 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.48 0.56 1.00
Universities 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.53 0.61 0.53 1.00
Day-care 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.57 0.66 0.57 0.62 1.00
Old age homes 0.24 0.21 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.51 0.60 0.51 0.56 0.60 1.00
P.C. Electricity 0.30 0.26 0.31 0.27 0.28 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.32 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.29 1.00
P.C. Basic Foods 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.44 1.00
P.C. Housing 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.24 0.25 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.46 0.39 1.00
P.C. Doctors & hospitals 0.32 0.29 0.34 0.29 0.31 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.29 0.34 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.31 0.57 0.48 0.50 1.00
Sub. Electricity 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.30 1.00
Sub. Basic Foods 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.24 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.35 1.00
Sub. Housing 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.30 0.37 0.35 1.00
Sub. Doctors & hospitals 0.34 0.30 0.36 0.31 0.33 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.25 0.29 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.36 0.30 0.31 0.39 0.48 0.45 0.48 1.00
Former Communist 0.29 0.26 0.31 0.26 0.28 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.25 0.29 0.25 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.30
Family income -0.16 -0.14 -0.17 -0.15 -0.16 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.14 -0.12 -0.13 -0.15 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.11
Education -0.25 -0.23 -0.27 -0.23 -0.24 -0.23 -0.22 -0.20 -0.16 -0.18 -0.16 -0.17 -0.19 -0.17 -0.21 -0.18 -0.19 -0.23 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.21
Occupational status -0.24 -0.21 -0.25 -0.22 -0.23 -0.19 -0.19 -0.17 -0.15 -0.17 -0.15 -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 -0.19 -0.16 -0.17 -0.21 -0.18 -0.16 -0.18 -0.23
Age 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Male -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.11
Church attendance 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.10
     Factor 1 0.81 0.73 0.86 0.74 0.78 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.32 0.28 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.36 0.30 0.32 0.39 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.42
     Factor 2 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.24 0.25 0.81 0.77 0.72 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.30 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.22
     Factor 3 0.32 0.29 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.81 0.71 0.82 0.74 0.70 0.76 0.39 0.33 0.34 0.42 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.36
     Factor 4 0.41 0.36 0.43 0.37 0.39 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.38 0.44 0.37 0.41 0.44 0.40 0.72 0.61 0.64 0.78 0.38 0.36 0.38 0.49
     Factor 5 0.43 0.39 0.46 0.40 0.42 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.32 0.37 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.45 0.38 0.40 0.49 0.61 0.57 0.61 0.78
Egalitarian Ideology Gov. Effectiveness Social Services Price Controls Subsidies
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Table 34. Descriptive Statistics by Country for Latent Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Gov. effectiveness 5,337 28.28 16.37 0 100
Egalitarian ideology 5,394 60.96 21.27 0 100
Social services 5,357 53.26 18.42 0 100
Price controls 5,370 53.92 19.97 0 100
Subsidies 5,404 55.26 21.00 0 100
Gov. effectiveness 1,148 37.02 28.39 0 100
Egalitarian ideology 1,254 84.13 16.79 5 100
Social services 1,155 81.22 22.42 0 100
Price controls 1,241 77.20 21.22 0 100
Subsidies 1,212 75.95 23.47 0 100
Gov. effectiveness 1,685 28.00 20.31 0 100
Egalitarian ideology 1,713 77.56 24.33 0 100
Social services 1,685 69.88 20.38 0 100
Price controls 1,714 57.99 24.40 0 100
Subsidies 1,713 71.98 18.57 0 100
Gov. effectiveness 887 18.65 17.23 0 100
Egalitarian ideology 876 63.26 22.67 0 100
Social services 889 64.44 19.92 0 100
Price controls 899 56.84 20.29 0 100
Subsidies 909 63.34 23.54 0 100
Gov. effectiveness 3,625 33.92 25.58 0 100
Egalitarian ideology 3,753 78.87 20.44 0 100
Social services 3,604 73.12 25.15 0 100
Price controls 3,715 68.81 23.78 0 100
Subsidies 3,741 75.32 19.72 0 100
Australia
Bulgaria
Finland
The Netherlands
Poland
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Table 35. Goodness-of-Fit Indices for SEM Full Model  
 
Note: Modeled with imputed data (results in Table 13 and Figure 4); N=11,589 
 
  
Chi-square NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF
Defaut 129 20,532 335 0 61
Independence 58 146,777 406 0 362
NCP model NCP LO 90 HI 90
Default 20,197 19,730 20,669
Independence 146,371 145,115 147,634
FMIN model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90
Default 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8
Independence 12.7 12.6 12.5 12.7
RMSEA model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLO
Default 0.072 0.071 0.073 0
Independence 0.176 0.176 0.177 0
AIC model AIC BCC
Default 20,790 20,790
Independence 146,893 146,894
ECVI model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECV
Default 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Independence 12.7 12.6 12.8 12.7
HOELTER 0.05 0.01
Default 214 225
Independence 36 38
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9.2 Stata Syntax 
9.2.1 *Data Prep and Recodes 
*Data available upon request from the author 
 
version 10 
clear 
set mem 500m 
*use "C:\Data\3isea_c.dta" , clear 
set more off,  permanently 
set varlabelpos 12  
set scrollbufsize 250000 
numlabel, add mask("#.") force 
 
*SES and Demographics 
 
recode occs4x (-1=.), copy gen(occstatus) 
label var occstatus “Occupational Status Kelley (1990)” 
tab occstatus 
 
recode malex(-1=.), copy gen(sexm) 
label define sexm 1 male 2 female 
tab sexm 
 
tab agem 
*age imputed by the principals 
 
recode edyrsx (-1=.), copy gen(educ) 
label var educ “Education in Years” 
tab educ 
 
recode famincrx (-1=.)(-9=.), copy gen(famincome) 
label var famincome “Family Income: ratio of semi-skilled full-time worker in r 
country” 
tab famincome 
*calcualted by the principals as a ratio of semi-skilled full-time male wages in 
respondents' countries 
 
recode countryx (36=0)(100=1)(246=0)(528=0)(616=1), gen(east) 
tab east 
 
recode countryx (36=1)(100=0)(246=0)(528=0)(616=0), gen(liberaldem) 
tab liberaldem 
*liberal democracy variable not used in analysis as it does not contribute and 
is only one country, however it is useful for more accurate maximum 
likelihood imputation 
 
*Government Effectiveness 
 
tab gpeffcz  
tab gpflexz  
tab gpproftz 
recode gpeffcz gpflexz gpproftz (-1=.)(1=100)(2=75)(3=50)(4=25)(5=0), gen 
(gvpeff gvpflex gvpprofit) 
tab gvpeff  
tab gvpflex  
tab gvpprofit 
 
pwcorr gvpeff gvpflex gvpprofit 
factor gvpeff gvpflex gvpprofit 
alpha gvpeff gvpflex gvpprofit 
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*Egalitarian Ideology 
 
tab lessineq 
*lessineq already recoded by the principals  
tab lessinex  
tab igapbigx  
tab richpoox  
tab redwlthx  
tab rich10yx 
recode igapbigx richpoox redwlthx rich10yx (-1 
0=.)(1=100)(2=75)(3=50)(4=25)(5=0), gen(incgap richpoor redistinc 
planreduce) 
tab incgap  
tab richpoor  
tab redistinc  
tab planreduce 
pwcorr incgap richpoor redistinc planreduce lessineq 
factor incgap richpoor redistinc planreduce lessineq 
alpha incgap richpoor redistinc planreduce lessineq 
 
*Government Control of Social Services (DV) 
 
tab gcdoctz  
tab gchospz  
tab gckidcz  
tab gcoldcz  
tab gcschlz  
tab gcuniz 
recode gcdoctz gchospz gckidcz gcoldcz gcschlz gcuniz (-
1=.)(1=100)(2=66.7)(3=33.3)(4=0), gen(regdoctor reghosp regdaycare regold 
regschool reguni) 
tab regdoctor  
tab reghosp  
tab regdaycare  
tab regold  
tab regschool  
tab reguni 
pwcorr regdoctor reghosp regdaycare regold regschool reguni 
factor regdoctor reghosp regdaycare regold regschool reguni 
alpha regdoctor reghosp regdaycare regold regschool reguni 
 
*Price Controls Basic Needs (DV) 
 
recode regdoctz regelecz regfoodz reghousz 
(1=100)(2=75)(3=50)(4=25)(5=0)(else=.), gen(regdoct regelec regfood 
reghous) 
pwcorr regdoct regelec regfood reghous 
factor regdoct regelec regfood reghous 
alpha regdoct regelec regfood reghous 
 
*Subsidies Basic Needs (DV) 
 
recode subelecz  subfoodz subhospz subhousz 
(1=100)(2=75)(3=50)(4=25)(5=0)(else=.), gen(govsubelec govsubfood 
govsubhealth govsubhouse) 
pwcorr govsubelec govsubfood govsubhealth govsubhouse 
factor govsubelec govsubfood govsubhealth govsubhouse 
alpha govsubelec govsubfood govsubhealth govsubhouse 
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9.2.2 *Ordinal Probit for Unequal Interval Scoring 
 
*needed to predict interval values 
 
egen egal=rowmean( incgap richpoor redistinc planreduce lessineq) 
tab egal 
 
egen goveff=rowmean( gvpflex gvpprofit gvpeff) 
tab goveff 
 
egen pc=rowmean( regelec regfood reghous regdoct) 
tab pc 
 
egen subs=rowmean( govsubelec govsubfood govsubhouse govsubhealth) 
tab subs 
 
egen gss = rowmean( regdoctor reghosp regdaycare regold regschool reguni) 
 
*Sex 
 
uvis logit sexm goveff egal pc subs, seed(12345) gen(sexmean) 
 
*Egalitarian Ideology 
 
oprobit incgap famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict incgapo, xb 
oprobit richpoor famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict richpooro, xb 
oprobit redistinc famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict redistinco, xb 
oprobit planreduce famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict planreduceo, xb 
oprobit lessineq famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict lessineqo, xb 
 
table incgap, c(m incgapo) 
table richpoor, c(m richpooro) 
table redistinc, c(m redistinco) 
table planreduce, c(m planreduceo) 
table lessineq, c(m lessineqo) 
 
tab incgap 
tab richpoor 
tab redistinc 
tab planreduce 
tab lessineq 
 
recode incgap (25=7)(50=29)(75=53), gen(incgapp) 
corr incgap incgapp 
recode richpoor (25=7)(50=29)(75=53),gen(richpoorp) 
corr richpoor richpoorp 
recode redistinc (25=7)(50=29)(75=53),gen(redistincp) 
corr redistinc redistincp 
recode planreduce (25=7)(50=29)(75=53),gen(planreducep) 
corr planreduce planreducep 
recode lessineq (25=7)(50=29)(75=53),gen(lessineqp) 
corr lessineq lessineqp 
 
egen egalpp=rowmean( incgapp richpoorp redistincp planreducep lessineqp) 
corr egalp egalpp 
 
*Government Effectiveness 
 
oprobit gvpflex famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
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predict gvpflexo, xb 
oprobit gvpeff famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict gvpeffo, xb 
oprobit gvpprofit famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict gvpprofito, xb 
 
table gvpflex, c(m gvpflexo) 
table gvpeff, c(m gvpeffo) 
table gvpprofit, c(m gvpprofito) 
 
tab gvpflex 
tab gvpeff 
tab gvpprofit 
 
recode gvpflex (25=24)(50=50)(75=84), gen(gvpflexp) 
corr gvpflex gvpflexp 
recode gvpeff (25=24)(50=50)(75=84), gen(gvpeffp) 
corr gvpeff gvpeffp 
recode gvpprofit (25=24)(50=50)(75=84), gen(gvpprofitp) 
corr gvpprofit gvpprofitp 
egen goveffp=rowmean( gvpflexp gvpeffp gvpprofitp) 
corr goveff goveffp 
 
*Government Control of Social Services 
 
oprobit regdoctor egalp goveff famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict regdoctoro, xb 
oprobit reghosp egalp goveff famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict reghospo, xb 
oprobit regdaycare egalp goveff famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict regdaycareo, xb 
oprobit regold egalp goveff famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict regoldo, xb 
oprobit regschool egalp goveff famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict regschoolo, xb 
oprobit reguni egalp goveff famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict regunio, xb 
 
table regdoctor, c(m regdoctoro) 
table reghosp, c(m reghospo) 
table regdaycare, c(m regdaycareo) 
table regold, c(m regoldo) 
table regschool, c(m regschoolo) 
table reguni, c(m regunio) 
 
tab regdoctor 
tab reghosp 
tab regdaycare 
tab regold 
tab regschool 
tab reguni 
 
recode regdoctor (33.3=10)(66.6=12),gen(regdoctorp) 
corr regdoctor regdoctorp 
recode reghosp (33.3=10)(66.6=12),gen(reghospp) 
corr reghosp reghospp 
recode regdaycare (33.3=10)(66.6=12),gen(regdaycarep) 
corr regdaycare regdaycarep 
recode regold (33.3=10)(66.6=12),gen(regoldp) 
corr regold regoldp 
recode regschool (33.3=10)(66.6=12),gen(regschoolp) 
corr regschool regschoolp 
recode reguni (33.3=10)(66.6=12),gen(regunip) 
corr reguni regunip 
 
egen regssp=rowmean( regdoctorp reghospp regdaycarep regoldp regschoolp regunip) 
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*Price Controls for Basic Needs 
 
oprobit regelec egalp goveff famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict regeleco, xb 
oprobit regfood egalp goveff famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict regfoodo, xb 
oprobit reghous egalp goveff famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict reghouso, xb 
oprobit regdoct egalp goveff famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict regdocto, xb 
 
table regelec, c(m regeleco) 
table regfood, c(m regfoodo) 
table reghous, c(m reghouso) 
table regdoct, c(m regdocto) 
 
tab regelec 
tab regfood 
tab reghous 
tab regdoct 
 
recode regelec (25=16)(50=39)(75=52), gen(regelecp) 
recode regfood (25=16)(50=39)(75=52), gen(regfoodp) 
recode reghous (25=16)(50=39)(75=52), gen(reghousp) 
recode regdoct (25=16)(50=39)(75=52), gen(regdoctp) 
corr regelec regfood reghous regdoct regelecp regfoodp reghousp regdoctp 
 
egen pcp=rowmean(regelecp regfoodp reghousp regdoctp) 
 
*Subsidies for Basic Needs 
 
oprobit govsubelec egalp goveff famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict govsubeleco, xb 
oprobit govsubfood egalp goveff famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict govsubfoodo, xb 
 
oprobit govsubhouse egalp goveff famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict govsubhouseo, xb 
oprobit govsubhealth egalp goveff famincome educ agem sexm occstatus east 
predict govsubhealtho, xb 
 
table govsubelec, c(m govsubeleco) 
table govsubfood, c(m govsubfoodo) 
table govsubhouse, c(m govsubhouseo) 
table govsubhealth, c(m govsubhealtho) 
 
tab govsubelec 
tab govsubfood 
tab govsubhouse 
tab govsubhealth 
 
recode govsubelec (25=11)(50=30)(75=57),gen(govsubelecp) 
recode govsubfood (25=11)(50=30)(75=57),gen(govsubfoodp) 
recode govsubhouse (25=11)(50=30)(75=57),gen(govsubhousep) 
recode govsubhealth (25=11)(50=30)(75=57),gen(govsubhealthp) 
corr govsubelec govsubfood govsubhouse govsubhealth govsubelecp govsubfoodp 
govsubhousep govsubhealthp 
 
egen subsp=rowmean(govsubelecp govsubfoodp govsubhousep govsubhealthp) 
 
*SEM values 
 
sum incgapp richpoorp redistincp planreducep lessineqp gvpflexp gvpeffp 
gvpprofitp regdoctorp reghospp regdaycarep regoldp regschoolp regunip 
regelecp regfoodp reghousp regdoctp govsubelecp govsubfoodp govsubhousep 
govsubhealthp egalp goveffp regssp pcp subsp 
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save "C:\data\iseat.dta", replace 
9.2.3 *Imputation 
*The full imputation syntax is available from the author. It is omitted to save space. The 
following is an example of how the imputation works. It starts with a regression using all 
variables to predict income. Then it uses a subset of variables based on the more 
significant predictors to obtain extra cases, and then a subset of that, and so on. This 
process is repeated five times for each variable using a different random error generator, 
and then the results are averaged. 
 
uvis regress famincome educ agem sexm occstatus goveff egalp liberaldem east, 
seed(12345) gen(inc1) 
uvis regress inc1 educ agem sexm occstatus liberaldem east, seed(12345) 
gen(inc2) 
uvis regress inc2 educ agem sexm liberaldem east, seed(12345) gen(inc3) 
 
*can’t take out any more variables or will lose effective predictive value 
*now do this 5 times and then average the results 
 
uvis regress famincome educ agem sexm occstatus goveff liberaldem egalp east, 
seed(23456) gen(inc11) 
uvis regress inc11 educ agem sexm occstatus liberaldem east, seed(23456) 
gen(inc12) 
uvis regress inc12 educ agem sexm liberaldem east, seed(23456) gen(inc13) 
 
uvis regress famincome educ agem sexm occstatus goveff liberaldem egalp east, 
seed(34567) gen(inc21) 
uvis regress inc21 educ agem sexm occstatus liberaldem east, seed(34567) 
gen(inc22) 
uvis regress inc22 educ agem sexm liberaldem east, seed(34567) gen(inc23) 
 
uvis regress famincome educ agem sexm occstatus goveff liberaldem egalp east, 
seed(45678) gen(inc31) 
uvis regress inc31 educ agem sexm occstatus liberaldem east, seed(45678) 
gen(inc32) 
uvis regress inc32 educ agem sexm liberaldem east, seed(45678) gen(inc33) 
 
uvis regress famincome educ agem sexm occstatus goveff liberaldem egalp east, 
seed(56789) gen(inc41) 
uvis regress inc41 educ agem sexm occstatus liberaldem east, seed(56789) 
gen(inc42) 
uvis regress inc42 educ agem sexm liberaldem east, seed(56789) gen(inc43) 
 
egen incmean = rowmean(inc3 inc13 inc23 inc33 inc43) 
 
*incmean is now the average of 5 imputations and contains no extreme values, 
negatives or exceedingly high values; however, for some variables this is 
not the case and recoding of outliers was necessary, for example when 
they exceed the maximum or minimum possible value of a variable. 
9.2.4 *Sheaf Coefficients 
*These are calculated based on the regression coefficients for these variables in a 
regression predicting each of the two intervening variables and each of the three DVs. 
The resulting sheaf variable captures the total effect of all three combined. 
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gen sesegal = 2.817*famincome + 1.27*educ + .091*occstatus 
gen sesgoveff = 1.92*famincome + 1.363*educ + .042*occstatus 
gen sesgovss = .528*famincome + .682*educ + .009*occstatus 
gen sespc = 1.434*famincome + .534*educ + .002*occstatus 
gen sessub = .239*famincome + .411*educ + .049*occstatus 
 
sum sesegal sesgoveff sesgovss sespc sessub 
 
*this is a Stata add-on and must be installed first 
stata2mplus using isea_sem 
 
9.2.5 *Decomposition of Effects 
*This needs to be done in SEM, but for now it gets at the point 
 
use "C:\data\iseat.dta", clear 
gen sesegal = 2.817*famincome + 1.27*educ + .091*occstatus 
gen sesgoveff = 1.92*famincome + 1.363*educ + .042*occstatus 
gen sesgovss = .528*famincome + .682*educ + .009*occstatus 
gen sespc = 1.434*famincome + .534*educ + .002*occstatus 
gen sessub = .239*famincome + .411*educ + .049*occstatus 
sum sesegal sesgoveff sesgovss sespc sessub 
reg regssp sesgovss agem sexm lnchgoq, beta 
reg regssp sesgovss egalpp agem sexm lnchgoq, beta 
reg regssp sesgovss egalpp east agem sexm lnchgoq, beta 
reg regssp sesgovss egalpp east goveff agem sexm lnchgoq, beta 
reg pcp sespc agem sexm lnchgoq, beta 
reg pcp sespc egalp agem sexm lnchgoq, beta 
reg pcp sespc egalp east agem sexm lnchgoq, beta 
reg pcp sespc egalp east goveffp agem sexm lnchgoq, beta 
reg subsp sessub agem sexm lnchgoq, beta 
reg subsp sessub egalp agem sexm lnchgoq, beta 
reg subsp sessub egalp east agem sexm lnchgoq, beta 
reg subsp sessub egalp east goveffp agem sexm lnchgoq, beta 
9.3 AMOS Syntax 
'Original Syntax run in AMOS 9. This syntax generates the primary pooled model. Model 
within each country programmed similarly but with the means and standard deviations of 
the by country variables replacing those shown here. Data files generated and Stat-
Transferred to .sav files to run with AMOS.  
 
    Sem.AllImpliedMoments()       
    Sem.Smc()       
    Sem.Standardized()       
    Sem.TextOutput()       
   Sem.TotalEffects()       
       
  '----------- Data & group name.        
    Sem.BeginGroup("C:\data\isea_sem.sav")       
    Sem.GroupName("FullModel")       
  '------------ Measurement equations: observed = TRUE + random_error 
    Sem.AStructure( " east = t_east (1)  + e_east (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " incmean = t_incmean (1)  + e_incmean (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " educ = t_educ (1)  + e_educ (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " occmean = t_occmean (1)  + e_occmean (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " agem = t_agem (1)  + e_agem (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " sexmean = t_sexmean (1)  + e_sexmean (1)" )  
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    Sem.AStructure( " chgomean = t_chgomean (1)  + e_chgomean (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " incgap1 = t_egal2 (1)  + e_incgap1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " lessineq1 = t_egal2  + e_lessineq1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " richpoor1 = t_egal2  + e_richpoor1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " redistinc1 = t_egal2  + e_redistinc1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " planreduce1 = t_egal2  + e_planreduce1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " gvpeff1 = t_goveff (1)  + e_gvpeff1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " gvpflex1 = t_goveff  + e_gvpflex1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " gvpprofit1 = t_goveff  + e_gvpprofit1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " regdoctor1 = t_govss (1)  + e_regdoctor1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " reghosp1 = t_govss  + e_reghosp1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " regdaycare1 = t_govss  + e_regdaycare1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " regold1 = t_govss  + e_regold1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " regschool1 = t_govss  + e_regschool1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " reguni1 = t_govss  + e_reguni1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " regelec1 = t_pricecontrols (1)  + e_regelec1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " regfood1 = t_pricecontrols  + e_regfood1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " reghous1 = t_pricecontrols  + e_reghous1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " regdoct1 = t_pricecontrols  + e_regdoct1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " govsubelec1 = t_subsidies (1)  + e_govsubelec1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " govsubfood1 = t_subsidies  + e_govsubfood1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " govsubhouse1 = t_subsidies  + e_govsubhouse1 (1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " govsubhealth1 = t_subsidies  + e_govsubhealth1 (1)" )  
 
 '------------ Constraints, if any, on the variance of errors to observed 
variables 
    Sem.AStructure( " e_east (0 )" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " e_incmean (0.650062175 )" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " e_educ (1.4462052 )" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " e_occmean (92.8226304 )" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " e_agem (0.4885938 )" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " e_sexmean (3.00027738849585E-03 )" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " e_chgomean (0.523373565 )" )  
 
 '------------ Means & error variances for true "X" [independent, exogenous, 
causal order=1] variables 
    Sem.AStructure( " t_east =  ()  + v_east  (1)" ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " t_incmean =  ()  + v_incmean  (1)" ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " t_educ =  ()  + v_educ  (1)" ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " t_occmean =  ()  + v_occmean  (1)" ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " t_agem =  ()  + v_agem  (1)" ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " t_sexmean =  ()  + v_sexmean  (1)" ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " t_chgomean =  ()  + v_chgomean  (1)" ) 
 
 '------------ Covariances among true "X" independent [causal order=1] variables 
(unless there is only 1 such) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_east  <-->   v_incmean " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_east  <-->   v_educ " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_east  <-->   v_occmean " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_east  <-->   v_agem " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_east  <-->   v_sexmean " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_east  <-->   v_chgomean " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_incmean  <-->   v_educ " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_incmean  <-->   v_occmean " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_incmean  <-->   v_agem " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_incmean  <-->   v_sexmean " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_incmean  <-->   v_chgomean " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_educ  <-->   v_occmean " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_educ  <-->   v_agem " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_educ  <-->   v_sexmean " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_educ  <-->   v_chgomean " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_occmean  <-->   v_agem " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_occmean  <-->   v_sexmean " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_occmean  <-->   v_chgomean " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_agem  <-->   v_sexmean " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_agem  <-->   v_chgomean " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_sexmean  <-->   v_chgomean " ) 
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 '------------- Covariances among true variables of the same causal order (if 
any) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_egal2  <-->   v_goveff " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_govss  <-->   v_pricecontrols " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_govss  <-->   v_subsidies " ) 
    Sem.AStructure( " v_pricecontrols  <-->   v_subsidies " ) 
 
 '------------ Regression equations [among true X and true Y variables]  
    Sem.AStructure( " t_egal2 = t_east + t_incmean + t_educ + t_occmean + t_agem 
+ t_sexmean + t_chgomean + () + v_egal2(1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " t_goveff = t_east + t_incmean + t_educ + t_occmean + 
t_agem + t_sexmean + t_chgomean + () + v_goveff(1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " t_govss = t_east + t_incmean + t_educ + t_occmean + t_agem 
+ t_sexmean + t_chgomean + t_egal2 + t_goveff + () + v_govss(1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " t_pricecontrols = t_east + t_incmean + t_educ + t_occmean 
+ t_agem + t_sexmean + t_chgomean + t_egal2 + t_goveff + () + 
v_pricecontrols(1)" )  
    Sem.AStructure( " t_subsidies = t_east + t_incmean + t_educ + t_occmean + 
t_agem + t_sexmean + t_chgomean + t_egal2 + t_goveff + () + 
v_subsidies(1)" )  
 
  '-------------------- End        
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10 TECHNICAL APPENDIX TWO: SECOND STUDY 
10.1 Tables 
Table 36. Data Sources for Measurement of Percent Foreign-Born by Region 
 
aNUTS 1: Pop = 3-7 million; NUTS 2: Pop = 800,000-2.99 million; NUTS 3: Pop = 150,000-799,999 
bIreland's 8 regions collapsed into 5 in ESS. 
cGreece only published percent foreign citizen, which is the proportion of the population born abroad 
excluding immigrants who have naturalized thus we use imputation based on the ESS sampling to calculate 
foreign-born, see Technical Appendix Two, section 10.2.3. 
 
  
Country NUTSa Geo Unit Count Year Source Accessed Mean SD
Belgium 1 Gewesten/ Régions 3 2007 Stat Bel: http://statbel.fgov.be Apr-11 20.55 18.38
Denmark 2 Regioner 5 2008 Statistics Denmark: 
http://www.dst.dk
May-11 6.23 2.54
Finland 2 Suuralueet 4 2008 Statistics Finland: 
http://www.stat.fi
Jun-11 3.24 1.63
France 1 ZEAT 8 2005 National Institute of Statistics 
and Economic Studies: 
http://www.insee.fr
Apr-11 10.38 5.65
Germany (East) 1 Länder 6 2007 Apr-11 5.89 5.20
Germany (West) 1 Länder 11 2007 Apr-11 14.53 3.10
Greece 2 Perifereies 10  2001c Hellenic Statistical Authority: 
http://www.statistics.gr
Jun-11 6.52 2.40
Ireland   3b Regional Authorities 5 2005 Central Statistics Office: 
http://www.cso.ie
Apr-11 16.30 2.31
Netherlands 2 Provincies 12 2007 Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek: http://statline.cbs.nl
Apr-11 9.20 3.74
Norway 2 Regioner 7 2008 Stat Nord: 
https://www.h2.scb.se/grs/
Jun-11 8.97 4.05
Spain 3 Comunidades y 
ciudades autónomas
18 2007 Instituto Nacional de Estadística: 
http://www.ine.es
Jun-11 9.45 4.75
Sweden 2 Riksområden 8 2007 Statistics Sweden: 
http://www.ssd.scb.se/
Apr-11 11.50 4.59
Switzerland 2 Regionen 7 2010 Federal Swiss Statistics: 
http://www.pxweb.bfs.admin.ch
Apr-12 27.32 6.84
UK 1 Regions 12 2007 Office for National Statistics: 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk
Apr-11 9.02 7.81
German Microcensus: 
https://www.regionalstatistik.de/
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Table 37. Sources of Other Regional Variables 
 
Note: GDP per capita for Ireland's regions imputed, see Technical Appendix Two, section 10.2.3. 
 
 
 
 
Variable Year Accessed
2008 May-11
2008 Apr-11
2008 May-11
2005 Apr-12
2008 Apr-11
2008 Jun-12
Vote Left  2002-
2007
May-11
Vote Neo-
National
 2002-
2007
May-11
Source
% of population that voted for 
traditional left parties in most 
recent national election
Tertiary Degree
GDP Per Capita
% of population that voted for 
anti-immigrant parties in most 
recent national election
Description
Eurostat
The European Election Database; 
Authors' calculations
The European Election Database; 
Authors' calculations
Statistics Norway
Ireland's Central Statistics Office
Eurostat
Ireland's Central Statistics Office
GDP per capita in Euros, 
current mkt. prices
Percentage of population with 
tertiary degree
Swiss Federal Statistics Office
 Table 38. Individual-Level Correlations for All Variables 
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Redistribution (DV) I 1.00
Health Care (DV) I 0.14 1.00
Old-Age Welfare (DV) I 0.22 0.64 1.00
Education (years) I -0.14 0.01 -0.08 1.00
Occupational Status I -0.16 -0.02 -0.10 0.54 1.00
Household Income I -0.16 -0.02 -0.07 0.31 0.33 1.00
Age (years) I 0.06 -0.01 0.03 -0.28 0.00 -0.18 1.00
Female I 0.08 0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 0.02 1.00
At Risk I 0.08 -0.01 0.03 -0.28 -0.11 -0.32 0.59 -0.02 1.00
Union I 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.18 -0.09 0.07 1.00
Suburban I -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.05 1.00
Anti-Immigrant I 0.09 0.00 0.07 -0.28 -0.28 -0.18 0.08 0.03 0.13 -0.14 -0.05 1.00
Subjective Left-Right I -0.24 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 0.01 0.06 0.10 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.13 1.00
Tertiary Degrees (%) R -0.11 -0.01 -0.02 0.12 0.14 0.13 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.17 0.16 -0.22 0.03 1.00
GDP (Euros) R -0.10 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.09 0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.22 0.13 -0.17 0.09 0.63 1.00
Vote Left (%) R 0.07 0.13 0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 -0.07 -0.17 -0.11 1.00
Vote Neo-National (%) R -0.09 -0.14 -0.15 -0.05 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.03 0.21 0.26 -0.16 1.00
Foreign-Born R -0.06 -0.15 -0.17 0.03 0.09 0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.14 0.10 -0.09 -0.03 0.26 0.14 -0.23 0.35 1.00
Population R -0.01 -0.08 -0.10 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.18 0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.17 -0.22 0.03 -0.18 0.08 1.00
Population Density R -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.08 0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.20 -0.01 -0.03 0.23 0.11 -0.09 -0.09 0.34 0.01 1.00
Foreign-Born C -0.06 -0.20 -0.19 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.17 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.35 0.48 0.76 0.04 0.10 1.00
  
Table 39. Regional-Level Correlations for All Variables 
 
aIndividual measures collapsed to their regional means 
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Redistribution (DV) I 1.00
Health Care (DV) I 0.36 1.00
Old-Age Welfare (DV) I 0.48 0.86 1.00
Education (years) I -0.50 -0.13 -0.31 1.00
Occupational Status I -0.66 -0.46 -0.57 0.71 1.00
Household Income I -0.34 -0.14 -0.09 0.20 0.48 1.00
Age (years) I -0.22 -0.17 -0.20 0.01 0.03 -0.26 1.00
Female I 0.22 -0.04 0.15 -0.29 -0.15 -0.18 -0.07 1.00
At Risk I 0.19 -0.07 0.00 -0.05 -0.28 -0.41 0.47 -0.01 1.00
Union I -0.37 0.17 0.14 0.35 0.28 0.36 0.10 -0.33 0.10 1.00
Suburban I -0.36 0.03 -0.13 0.51 0.44 0.15 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 0.16 1.00
Anti-Immigrant I 0.56 0.38 0.44 -0.34 -0.58 -0.35 -0.07 0.22 0.25 -0.38 -0.26 1.00
Subjective Left-Right I -0.26 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 0.08 0.41 -0.04 -0.02 -0.15 0.22 -0.07 0.02 1.00
Tertiary Degrees (%) R -0.38 -0.08 -0.06 0.39 0.57 0.32 -0.12 0.09 -0.22 0.30 0.44 -0.52 -0.10 1.00
GDP (Euros) R -0.41 0.00 -0.03 0.43 0.42 0.43 -0.18 -0.22 -0.29 0.45 0.36 -0.39 0.28 0.55 1.00
Vote Left (%) R 0.19 0.37 0.13 -0.02 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.37 -0.10 0.02 -0.05 0.08 -0.32 -0.24 -0.15 1.00
Vote Neo-National (%) R -0.23 -0.44 -0.37 -0.12 0.30 0.25 -0.05 0.04 -0.18 0.07 -0.10 -0.23 0.21 0.24 0.38 -0.20 1.00
Foreign-Born (%) R -0.20 -0.50 -0.50 0.14 0.40 0.14 -0.16 0.09 -0.24 -0.25 0.25 -0.28 -0.07 0.31 0.23 -0.27 0.36 1.00
Population R -0.06 -0.23 -0.22 0.22 0.15 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.10 -0.24 0.14 0.05 -0.19 0.00 -0.13 -0.05 -0.15 0.07 1.00
Population Density R -0.15 -0.14 -0.19 0.37 0.27 0.06 -0.19 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.51 -0.11 -0.16 0.32 0.21 -0.04 -0.09 0.42 0.03 1.00
Foreign-Born C -0.19 -0.60 -0.53 -0.08 0.28 0.01 0.09 0.14 -0.16 -0.28 0.05 -0.29 -0.04 0.10 0.04 -0.35 0.51 0.72 0.00 0.09 1.00
 Table 40. Public Support of Redistribution, Sensitivity Analyses with Alternative Variables 
 
aLinear score from ISCO (Kelley 1990), missing imputed; bIn deciles based on respondents country, missing imputed; cSelf-placement on left to right political scale, 
higher score=more right, missing imputed.  
Note: I = individual, R = region, C = country; AIC value calculated as the change from Model (S1) which has an AIC of 197,599; restricted sample AIC is not directly 
comparable to the original sample; sources: ESS, Eurostat, and national statistical bureaus. 
  
Original Variables: Level (main model) (S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5) (S6) (S6)
Intercept I 75.87*** 77.10*** 79.31*** 91.05*** 92.30*** 73.91*** 75.88*** 75.76***
Education (years) I  -0.70*** -0.74*** -0.28*** -0.70*** -0.30*** -0.74*** -0.74*** -0.74***
Age (years) I  -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03** 0.06*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Female I   4.07*** 4.17*** 3.62*** 3.42*** 2.99*** 4.17*** 4.18*** 4.17***
At Risk I   2.85*** 3.11*** 1.22* 2.59*** 1.04* 3.11*** 3.11*** 3.11***
Union I   4.94*** 4.99*** 5.38*** 3.34*** 3.72*** 4.99*** 5.00*** 4.99***
Suburban I  -1.23* -1.15* -0.81 -1.17* -0.88 -1.15* -1.16* -1.10*
Tertiary Degrees (%) R   0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 0.00
GDP (Euros) R  -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05
Vote Left (%) R   0.09* 0.09* 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.09* 0.08* 0.10*
Vote Neo-National (%) R  -0.33** -0.33** -0.32** -0.28** -0.27** -0.34** -0.33** -0.31**
Foreign-Born (%) R  -0.11 -0.1 -0.08 -0.1 -0.09 -0.11 omitted -0.06
Anti-Immigrant I   0.01 -0.01 -0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Alternative Variables:
Occupational Statusa I -0.09*** -0.08***
Household Incomeb I -0.09*** -0.07***
Subjective Left-Rightc I -0.32*** -0.31***
Foreign-Born C 0.28 0.15
Population R 0.00
Population Density R 0.00
Individual N 22,835 21,391 21,391 21,391 21,391 21,391 21,391 21,391
AIC n/a 0.0 -358.4 -1,348.9 -1,621.2 1.5 1.8 1.4
  
Table 41. Public Support of Health Care, Sensitivity Analyses with Alternative Variables 
 
aLinear score from ISCO (Kelley 1990), missing imputed; bIn deciles based on respondents country, missing imputed; cSelf-placement on left to right political scale, 
higher score=more right, missing imputed.  
Note: I = individual, R = region, C = country; AIC value calculated as the change from Model (S1) which has an AIC of 177,874; restricted sample AIC is not directly 
comparable to the original sample; sources: ESS, Eurostat, and national statistical bureaus. 
  
Original Variables: Level (main model) (S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5) (S6) (S6)
Intercept I 80.38*** 80.53*** 80.78*** 83.39*** 83.51*** 84.88*** 86.66*** 79.22***
Education (years) I 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04
Age (years) I 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Female I 0.88*** 0.95*** 0.90*** 0.80*** 0.77*** 0.95*** 0.96*** 0.95***
At Risk I -0.17 -0.08 -0.24 -0.18 -0.27 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
Union I 1.89*** 2.03*** 2.06*** 1.69*** 1.71*** 2.02*** 2.03*** 2.03***
Suburban I -1.16*** -1.15*** -1.13*** -1.15*** -1.14*** -1.15*** -1.16*** -1.10***
Tertiary Degrees (%) R 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.17** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.14** 0.20***
GDP (Euros) R -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05* -0.03
Vote Left (%) R 0.09** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07* 0.06* 0.07** 0.07** 0.08**
Vote Neo-National (%) R -0.1 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06
Foreign-Born (%) R -0.13** -0.13** -0.13** -0.13** -0.13** -0.11* omitted -0.09
Anti-Immigrant I -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04***
Alternative Variables:
Occupational Statusa I 0.00 0.00
Household Incomeb I -0.01* 0.00
Subjective Left-Rightc I -0.06*** -0.06***
Foreign-Born C -0.37* -0.50**
Population R 0.00
Population Density R -0.00*
Individual N 23,005 21,429 21,429 21,429 21,429 21,429 21,429 21,429
AIC n/a 0.0 -1.4 -149.9 -147.6 -1.6 1.8 -1.8
 Table 42. Public Support of Old-Age Welfare, Sensitivity Analyses with Alternative Variables 
 
aLinear score from ISCO (Kelley 1990), missing imputed; bIn deciles based on respondents country, missing imputed; cSelf-placement on left to right political scale, 
higher score=more right, missing imputed.  
Note: I = individual, R = region, C = country; AIC value calculated as the change from Model (S1) which has an AIC of 176,066; restricted sample AIC is not directly 
comparable to the original sample; sources: ESS, Eurostat, and national statistical bureaus. 
Original Variables: Level (main model) (S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5) (S6) (S6)
Intercept I 79.53*** 79.69*** 80.14*** 82.79*** 83.02*** 81.47*** 84.55*** 78.50***
Education (years) I -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.10** -0.23*** -0.11** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23***
Age (years) I 0.01* 0.01 0.02* 0.02** 0.03*** 0.01 0.01 0.01
Female I 1.57*** 1.53*** 1.39*** 1.36*** 1.25*** 1.53*** 1.53*** 1.52***
At Risk I 0.16 0.23 -0.25 0.11 -0.29 0.23 0.23 0.23
Union I 2.15*** 2.29*** 2.39*** 1.92*** 2.02*** 2.29*** 2.30*** 2.29***
Suburban I -0.84** -0.81* -0.72* -0.82** -0.73* -0.81* -0.82** -0.79*
Tertiary Degrees (%) R 0.19** 0.19** 0.20** 0.18* 0.19** 0.19** 0.14* 0.22**
GDP (Euros) R -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.07* -0.04
Vote Left (%) R 0.07* 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07
Vote Neo-National (%) R -0.20* -0.19* -0.19* -0.18* -0.18* -0.17* -0.14 -0.19*
Foreign-Born (%) R -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.20** omitted -0.17*
Anti-Immigrant I 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Alternative Variables:
Occupational Statusa I -0.03*** -0.03***
Household Incomeb I -0.02*** -0.02***
Subjective Left-Rightc I -0.07*** -0.07***
Foreign-Born C -0.15 -0.39
Population R 0.00
Population Density R 0.00
Individual N 23,003 21,426 21,426 21,426 21,426 21,426 21,426 21,426
AIC n/a 0.0 -63.3 -165.8 -214.0 1.6 8.3 1.5
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10.2 Stata Syntax 
10.2.1 *Data Prep and Recodes 
 
 
version 10 
clear 
*set mem 500m 
 
 
*The data utilized for this study come from the ESS fourth wave, available at 
www.europeansocialsurvey.org, downloaded in April, 2010. The file utilized for this work 
was downloaded with the title "ess4e04.dta". 
 
*Convert ESS country string labels to ISO (International Standards Organization) 
3-digit coding. Make variable countryx for merging the data in the 3 
datafiles. 
 
tab cntry  
gen countryx = . 
replace countryx=56 if cntry=="BE" 
replace countryx=100 if cntry=="BG" 
replace countryx=756 if cntry=="CH" 
replace countryx=196 if cntry=="CY" 
replace countryx=203 if cntry=="CZ" 
replace countryx=276 if cntry=="DE" 
replace countryx=208 if cntry=="DK" 
replace countryx=233 if cntry=="EE" 
replace countryx=724 if cntry=="ES" 
replace countryx=246 if cntry=="FI" 
replace countryx=250 if cntry=="FR" 
replace countryx=826 if cntry=="GB" 
replace countryx=300 if cntry=="GR" 
replace countryx=191 if cntry=="HR" 
replace countryx=348 if cntry=="HU" 
replace countryx=372 if cntry=="IE" 
replace countryx=376 if cntry=="IL" 
replace countryx=428 if cntry=="LV" 
replace countryx=528 if cntry=="NL" 
replace countryx=578 if cntry=="NO" 
replace countryx=616 if cntry=="PL" 
replace countryx=620 if cntry=="PT" 
replace countryx=642 if cntry=="RO" 
replace countryx=643 if cntry=="RU" 
replace countryx=752 if cntry=="SE" 
replace countryx=705 if cntry=="SI" 
replace countryx=703 if cntry=="SK" 
replace countryx=792 if cntry=="TR" 
replace countryx=804 if cntry=="UA" 
sort countryx 
 
*E and W Germany 
replace countryx=278 if intewde==1 
replace countryx=280 if intewde==0 
label define c 56 "Belgium" 100 "Bulgaria" 756 "Switzerland" 372 "Ireland" 203  
"Czech Rep" 275 "E.Germany" 276 "W.Germany" 208 "Denmark" 233 "Estonia" 
300 "Greece" 191 "Croatia" 348 "Hungary" 428 "Latvia" 578 "Norway" 620 
"Portugal" 703 "Slovakia" 250 "France" 826 "Britain" 376 "Israel" 528 
"Netherlands" 752 "Sweden" 246 "Finland" 616 "Poland" 705 "Slovenia" 642 
"Romania" 792 "Turkey" 804 "Ukraine" 643 "Russia" 196 "Cyprus" 724 
"Spain" 
label values countryx c 
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numlabel c, add mask ("#.") 
 
 
*Region Codes 
 
*Cyprus is an outlier, it is Turkish, lacks OECD data, has conflict, data 
limitations, etc. 
drop if countryx == 196 
gen regionx = (countryx*100)+ regionbe  
replace regionx = (countryx*100)+ regioach if countryx==756 
replace regionx = (countryx*100)+ regionde if countryx==276 
replace regionx = (countryx*100)+ regionde if countryx==275 
replace regionx = (countryx*100)+ regioadk if countryx==208 
replace regionx = (countryx*100)+ regioaes if countryx==724 
replace regionx = (countryx*100)+ regioafi if countryx==246 
replace regionx = (countryx*100)+ regionfr if countryx==250 
replace regionx = (countryx*100)+ regiongb if countryx==826 
replace regionx = (countryx*100)+ regioagr if countryx==300 
replace regionx = (countryx*100)+ regiobie if countryx==372 
replace regionx = (countryx*1000)+ regionnl if countryx==528 
replace regionx = (countryx*100)+ regionno if countryx==578 
replace regionx = (countryx*100)+ regionse if countryx==752 
*France regions 2 and 3 are the same in the NUTS data. Save the following 
regional label syntax for later use when we study E. Europe. 
recode regionx (25003=25002) 
*Netherlands individual data in the ESS measured at NUTS 3, collapse to NUTS 2 
for consistency and larger N by region. 
recode regionx (528111 528112 528113 = 52801)(528121 528122 528123 = 
52802)(528131 528132 528133 = 52803)(528211 528212 528213 = 52804)(528221 
528222 528223 528224 = 52805)(528230 = 52806)(528310 = 52807)(528321 
528322 528323 528324 528325 528326 528327 = 52808)(528331 528332 528333 
528334 528335 528336 = 52809)(528341 528342 = 52810)(528411 528412 528413 
528414 = 52811)(528421 528422 528423 = 52812) 
 
label var regionx "Unique Region ID = (countryx*100)+ESSregionID" 
 
label define regionx 5601 "Flemish Region" 5602 "Brussels Region" 5603 "Walloon 
Region" 20801 "Hovedstaden" 20802  "Sjælland" 20803 "Syddanmark" 20804 
"Midjylland" 20805 "Nordjylland" 27601 "Schleswig-Holstein" 27602 
"Hamburg" 27603 "Niedersachsen" 27604 "Bremen" 27605 "Nordrhein-
Westfalen" 27606 "Hessen" 27607 "Rheinland-Pfalz" 27608 "Baden-
Württemberg" 27609 "Bayern" 27610 "Saarland" 27511 "Berlin EAST" 27611 
"Berlin WEST" 27512 "Brandenburg" 27513 "Mecklenburg-Vorpommern" 27514 
"Sachsen" 27515 "Sachsen-Anhalt" 27516 "Thüringen" 37201 "Connaught" 
37202 "Dublin" 37203 "Munster" 37204 "Rest of Leinster" 37205 "Ulster" 
37201 "[NUTS] Border, Midlands & Western" 37202 "[NUTS] Southern & 
Eastern" 30001 "East Macedonia & Thrace" 30002 "Central 
Macedonia/Thessaloniki" 30003 "West Macedonia & Epirus" 30004 "Thessalia" 
30005 "West Greece & Ionian Islands" 30006 "Central Greece" 30007 
"Peloponnese" 30008 "Attica/Athens" 30009 "Aegean Islands" 30010 "Crete" 
72411 "Galicia" 72412 "Principado de Asturias" 72413 "Cantabria" 72421 
"País Vasco" 72422 "Comunidad Floral de Navarra" 72423 "La Rioja" 72424 
"Aragón" 72430 "Comunidad de Madrid" 72441 "Catilla y Leon" 72442 
"Castilla-La Mancha" 72443 "Extremadura" 72451 "Cataluña" 72452 
"Comunidad Valenciana" 72453 "Illes Balears" 72461 "Andalucía" 72462 
"Región de Murcia" 72464 "Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla" 72470 "Canarias" 
25001 "Région Parisienne" 25002 "Bassin Parisien Est and Ouest" 25004 
"Nord " 25005 "Est" 25006 "Ouest" 25007 "Sud Ouest" 25008 "Sud Est" 25009 
"Méditerranée" 52801 "Groningen" 52802 "Friesland" 52803 "Drenthe" 52804 
"Overijssel" 52805 "Gelderland" 52806 "Flevoland" 52807 "Utrecht" 52808 
"N.Holland" 52809 "S.Holland" 52810 "Zeeland" 52811 "N.Brabant" 52812 
"Limburg" 24603 "Eastern (fi13)" 24601 "Southern (fi18) and Åland(fi20)" 
24602 "Western (fi19)" 24604 "Northern (fi1a)" 75201 "Stockholm" 75202 
"Östra mellansverige" 75203 "Sydsverige" 75204 "Norra mellansverige" 
75205 "Mellersta norrland" 75206 "Övre norrland" 75207 "Småland med 
Öarna" 75208 "Västsverige" 82601 "North East" 82602 "North West" 82603 
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"Yorkshire and the Humber" 82604 "East Midlands" 82605 "West Midlands" 
82606 "South West" 82607 "East of England" 82608 "London" 82609 "South 
East" 82610 "Wales" 82611 "Scotland" 82612 "Northern Ireland" 57801 "Oslo 
and Akershus" 57802 "Hedmark and Oppland" 57803 "South Eastern Norway" 
57804 "Agder and Rogaland" 57805 "Western Norway" 57806 "Trøndelag" 57807 
"Northern Norway" 75601 "Région Lémanique" 75602 "Espace Mittelland" 
75603 "Nordwestschweiz" 75604 "Zürich" 75605 "Ostschweiz" 75606 
"Zentralschweiz" 75607 "Ticino" 
 
*There are a handful of cases in E.Germany that seem to be miscoded. The 
possibility is that they were interviewed in former E Ger. but they 
actually live in former W Ger. Recode countryx to match their stated 
region of residence 
replace regionx=27603 if regionx==27503 
replace regionx=27605 if regionx==27505 
replace regionx=27606 if regionx==27506 
replace regionx=27608 if regionx==27508 
replace regionx=27609 if regionx==27509 
replace countryx = 276 if regionx==27603 
replace countryx = 276 if regionx==27605 
replace countryx = 276 if regionx==27606 
replace countryx = 276 if regionx==27608 
replace countryx = 276 if regionx==27609 
 
label val regionx regionx 
sort regionx 
 
*Merge Regional Database 
 
*Collaborating with Maureen A. Eger, we compiled a regional database with percent 
foreign-born by region to match the regional sampling framework of the ESS. We do not 
share the data here as the database took six-months and considerable funding to 
construct, researchers interested in obtaining the data must wait until our first results are 
published and then would be required to share the data costs consistent with the 
American Sociological Association's Code of Ethics (ASA 1999). All sources of the data 
are public and are listed in Table 36 and Table 37. 
 
 
*Independent Variables 
 
*Occupational Status 
 
*Kelley’s world-wide status scoring for occupation recode of ISCO88 scores in 
the ESS. See Kelley (1990). 
recode iscoco (2000/2229=100)(2300 2310 2320=100)(2340/2352=100)(2411 2420 2421 
2422 2429=100)(2440/ 445=100)( 2460 3140 3141 3142 3143 2321 =100)( 1000 
1110  1120 1130 1140 1210=75)(1220 / 1229=75)(1230 / 1239=75)(1310 1312 
1313 1316 1317 1319 1142 1240 1250 2322 1143 1100 1200 =75)( 2230 2330 
2331 2332 2359 2400 2410 2412 2419 2430 2431 2432 2446=70)(2450 / 
2455=70)(3000 3100=70)( 3110 / 3119=70)(3120 3121 3123=70)(3130 / 
3139=70)(3144 3145=70)( 3200 / 3229=70)(3300 / 3340=70)(3460=70) (3470 / 
3475=70)(3480 =70)( 3150 / 3152=60)(3432=60)(3440 / 3449=60)(4000 / 
4122=60)(4132 4190 4212 = 60)( 1314=51)(3400 / 3413=51)(3415 / 
3419=51)(3420 / 3429=51)(3430 3431=51)(3433 / 3439 = 51)(3414 4130 4131 
4133=38)(4140 / 4144=38)(4200 / 4211=38)(4215=38)(   4220 / 4223 = 38)( 
110=37)(7200 / 7213=37)(7216=37)(7220 / 7243=37)(7310 / 7313=37)(7340 / 
7344=37)(7346 7433 7435=37)(8120 / 8124=37)(8160 8161=37)(8170 / 
8172=37)(8210 / 8212=37)(8220 / 8229=37)(8251=37)(8310 / 8312=37)(8333 
7510 7520 = 37)( 1315 1318=33)(3230 / 3242=33)(3450 4213 4214 5122=33)( 
5130 / 5139=33)(5141 5143=33)(5160 / 5163=33)(5164 3451 3452 =33)( 
5000=32)(5200 / 5230=32)(9110 / 9113=32)(9150 9151=32)(9153 = 32)( 
7000=24)(7100 / 7143=24)(7214 7215 7244 7245 7300 7320 7322 7323 7324 
7345=24)( 7400 / 7416=24)(7420 / 7424=24)(7430 7431 7432 7434=24)( 7436 / 
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7442=24)(8000 8100=24)(8110 / 8113=24)(8130 / 8143=24)(8150 / 
8159=24)(8162 8163 8200=24)(8230 / 8232=24)(8240 8250 8252 8253=24)(8260 
/ 8269=24)(8270 / 8279=24)(8280 / 8286=24)(8290 8300 8320 8322=24)(8320 / 
8324=24)(8330 8332 8334 8340 9300 9312 9313 9321 =24)( 5100  5111 5112 
5113 5120 5121 5123 5140  5142 5149=18)(5150 / 5152=18)(5169=18)(9120 / 
9142=18)(9152 =18)(7321=18)(7330 / 7332=14)(9000 9100=14)(9160 / 
9162=14)(9310 9311 9320 9322=14)(9330 / 9333 =14)(1311=14)(6000 / 6999 
=10)(  8331=0)( 9200 / 9213 =0)(*=.), gen(occstat) 
 
tab occstat,m 
 
  
label var occstat "Kelley (1990) Linear Occupational Status 0 to 100" 
 
*Education & Income 
 
recode eduyrs (23/50=23), gen(edyr) 
label var edyr “Education in years; clipped at 23” 
recode edulvla (5=1)(*=0), gen(ed3) 
label var ed3 “Tertiary education completed” 
 
*Income is not given as a quantity. A show card is given and it is by country 
deciles and only the decile is recorded. 
 
gen hinc=(hinctnta-1)*11.11 
label var hinc "Household income in deciles, 100 is highest level" 
 
*Demographics 
 
recode agea (86/123=85), gen(ageyr) 
recode ageyr (15/25=1)(26/30=2)(31/35=3)(36/40=4)(41/45=5) 
(46/50=6)(51/55=7)(56/60=8)(61/65=9)(66/85=10), gen(ageco5) 
recode gndr (2=1)(1=0), gen(female) 
recode partner (2=0)(1=1), gen(cohabit) 
 
*Left-Right Scale 
 
tab lrscale 
*impute missing values later 
 
*Born Abroad 
 
  RECODE of | 
     iscoco | 
(occupation | 
   , isco88 | 
     (com)) |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |        168        0.62        0.62 
         10 |        876        3.21        3.82 
         14 |        617        2.26        6.08 
         18 |      2,084        7.63       13.71 
         24 |      3,380       12.38       26.09 
         32 |      1,533        5.61       31.70 
         33 |      2,480        9.08       40.79 
         37 |      1,318        4.83       45.61 
         38 |        949        3.48       49.09 
         51 |      1,896        6.94       56.03 
         60 |      2,046        7.49       63.52 
         70 |      3,143       11.51       75.03 
         75 |      1,795        6.57       81.61 
        100 |      2,093        7.66       89.27 
          . |      2,930       10.73      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |     27,308      100.00 
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recode brncntr (2=1)(1=0), gen(immigrant) 
label var immigrant "Foreign born" 
*The ESS did a surprisingly good job of sampling the actual level of foreign-
born by region as evidenced in the following correlation. 
 
 
*At Risk (Welfare Need) 
 
recode mnactic (3 4 5 6=1)(1 2 7 8 9=0), gen(vulnerable) 
label var vulnerable "Retired, sick/disabled, unemployed past 7-days" 
 
*Union Membership 
 
*Recode yes so that current and previous = 1 
recode mbtru (1 2 = 1)(3=0), gen(union) 
label var union "Currently or formerly in a union" 
 
*Anti-Immigrant Sentiment 
 
sum imsmetn imdfetn impcntr imbgeco imueclt imwbcnt 
factor  imsmetn imdfetn impcntr imbgeco imueclt imwbcnt 
rotate 
alpha imsmetn imdfetn impcntr imbgeco imueclt imwbcnt 
 
*Although there is a detectable 2nd factor with heavy cross-loadings, these 6 also go as a 
latent factor, alpha=0.84. But all 6 together lack face validity. One is immigration and 
one is immigrants. Running a SEM in MPlus favors the 2-factor solution. 
 
     pfb_ctx     0.8846   1.0000 
   immigrant     1.0000 
                                
               immigr~t  pfb_ctx
. pwcorr immigrant pfb_ctx
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egen antiE = rowmean(imbgeco imueclt imwbcnt) 
label var antiE "Anti-immigrants in principle scale, 3-item" 
 
*Country-dummies 
recode countryx (56=1)(*=0), gen (belgium) 
recode countryx (208=1)(*=0), gen (denmark) 
recode countryx (246=1)(*=0), gen (finland) 
recode countryx (250=1)(*=0), gen (france) 
recode countryx (275=1)(*=0), gen (germanye) 
recode countryx (276=1)(*=0), gen (germanyw) 
recode countryx (300=1)(*=0), gen (greece) 
recode countryx (372=1)(*=0), gen (ireland) 
recode countryx (528=1)(*=0), gen (netherlands) 
recode countryx (578=1)(*=0), gen (norway) 
recode countryx (724=1)(*=0), gen (spain) 
recode countryx (752=1)(*=0), gen (sweden) 
recode countryx (756=1)(*=0), gen (switzerland) 
recode countryx (826=1)(*=0), gen (britain) 
 
*Dependent Variables – Public Opinion in Three Social Policy Areas 
 
*Government Reduce Income Differences 
 
recode gincdif (1=100)(2=75)(3=50)(4=25)(5=0), gen(dvincdif) 
label var dvincdif "Gov. Reduce Income Diff (100=strongly agree)" 
 
 
*Government Provide Health Care 
 
gen dvhlthc = gvhlthc*10 
label var dvhlthc "Gov Health Care (100=entirely responsilbe)" 
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*Government Provision of Old-Aged Welfare 
 
gen dvslvol = gvslvol*10 
label var dvslvol "Gov Standard of Living for Old (100=entirely responsible)" 
 
10.2.2 *The Latent Factor Myth 
*These three DVs do not make a satisfactory latent factor. The first point is that they do 
not have similar correlations with criterion variables. In some cases the different DVs 
have different signs on the same criterion variables, see Table 38. Also, in the following I 
run correlations by country and find dramatically different correlational patterns. 
Together these are confirmatory evidence that the three dependent variables should be 
treated separately.  
236 Technical Appendix Two: Second Study 
 
 
sort countryx 
by countryx: pwcorr gincdif gvhlthc gvslvol edyr hinc occstat union  
                                                                                    
       union    -0.0645   0.0685   0.0449   0.0665   0.1325   0.1599   1.0000 
     occstat     0.1386  -0.0029  -0.1070   0.5161   0.4234   1.0000 
        hinc     0.1415  -0.0381  -0.1289   0.3815   1.0000 
        edyr     0.1291   0.0157  -0.1296   1.0000 
     gvslvol    -0.2257   0.6376   1.0000 
     gvhlthc    -0.1608   1.0000 
     gincdif     1.0000 
                                                                             
                gincdif  gvhlthc  gvslvol     edyr     hinc  occstat    union
-> countryx = 250.France
                                                                                   
       union    -0.1246   0.0889   0.0878   0.1892   0.1604   0.1454   1.0000 
     occstat     0.1345   0.0159  -0.0707   0.5368   0.3705   1.0000 
        hinc     0.1661   0.0194  -0.0430   0.3801   1.0000 
        edyr     0.1353   0.0778  -0.0279   1.0000 
     gvslvol    -0.1988   0.6393   1.0000 
     gvhlthc    -0.1364   1.0000 
     gincdif     1.0000 
                                                                             
                gincdif  gvhlthc  gvslvol     edyr     hinc  occstat    union
-> countryx = 246.Finland
                                                                                   
       union    -0.0928   0.1722   0.0924   0.1614   0.0711   0.1386   1.0000 
     occstat     0.0751   0.0697  -0.0672   0.4434   0.3177   1.0000 
        hinc     0.1086   0.0396  -0.0473   0.3223   1.0000 
        edyr     0.0295   0.0868  -0.0130   1.0000 
     gvslvol    -0.2446   0.5251   1.0000 
     gvhlthc    -0.1378   1.0000 
     gincdif     1.0000 
                                                                             
                gincdif  gvhlthc  gvslvol     edyr     hinc  occstat    union
-> countryx = 208.Denmark
                                                                                   
       union    -0.1081   0.0500   0.0835  -0.0177  -0.0277  -0.1098   1.0000 
     occstat     0.1238   0.0332  -0.0532   0.5295   0.3645   1.0000 
        hinc     0.1298   0.0134  -0.0410   0.3982   1.0000 
        edyr     0.1238   0.0737  -0.0368   1.0000 
     gvslvol    -0.1394   0.6203   1.0000 
     gvhlthc    -0.0847   1.0000 
     gincdif     1.0000 
                                                                             
                gincdif  gvhlthc  gvslvol     edyr     hinc  occstat    union
-> countryx = 56.Belgium
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       union    -0.0159   0.0804   0.0920   0.0859   0.1116   0.1041   1.0000 
     occstat     0.0768   0.0591   0.0433   0.5275   0.3737   1.0000 
        hinc     0.1632   0.0430  -0.0150   0.3979   1.0000 
        edyr     0.1330   0.0473   0.0097   1.0000 
     gvslvol    -0.1039   0.7598   1.0000 
     gvhlthc    -0.0898   1.0000 
     gincdif     1.0000 
                                                                             
                gincdif  gvhlthc  gvslvol     edyr     hinc  occstat    union
-> countryx = 372.Ireland
                                                                                   
       union    -0.0186   0.0132  -0.0141   0.0070   0.1371   0.0801   1.0000 
     occstat     0.0977   0.0659   0.0402   0.5748   0.3394   1.0000 
        hinc     0.0497   0.0185  -0.0242   0.3722   1.0000 
        edyr     0.0537   0.0432   0.0145   1.0000 
     gvslvol    -0.1720   0.7721   1.0000 
     gvhlthc    -0.1348   1.0000 
     gincdif     1.0000 
                                                                             
                gincdif  gvhlthc  gvslvol     edyr     hinc  occstat    union
-> countryx = 300.Greece
                                                                                   
       union    -0.0733   0.0290   0.0481  -0.0006   0.0215  -0.0002   1.0000 
     occstat     0.1663  -0.0551  -0.1348   0.5287   0.3924   1.0000 
        hinc     0.2127  -0.0305  -0.1300   0.3191   1.0000 
        edyr     0.1265  -0.0136  -0.1079   1.0000 
     gvslvol    -0.2654   0.4983   1.0000 
     gvhlthc    -0.1823   1.0000 
     gincdif     1.0000 
                                                                             
                gincdif  gvhlthc  gvslvol     edyr     hinc  occstat    union
-> countryx = 276.W.Germany
                                                                                   
       union    -0.0597   0.0375   0.0278   0.0090   0.0038   0.1022   1.0000 
     occstat     0.1658  -0.0839  -0.1659   0.5747   0.3762   1.0000 
        hinc     0.1760  -0.0639  -0.0860   0.3306   1.0000 
        edyr     0.1119  -0.0754  -0.1861   1.0000 
     gvslvol    -0.2215   0.5304   1.0000 
     gvhlthc    -0.1384   1.0000 
     gincdif     1.0000 
                                                                             
                gincdif  gvhlthc  gvslvol     edyr     hinc  occstat    union
-> countryx = 275.E.Germany
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       union    -0.1621   0.0830   0.1457   0.0922   0.0950   0.1182   1.0000 
     occstat     0.1188   0.0731   0.0023   0.5506   0.3234   1.0000 
        hinc     0.1328   0.0071  -0.0259   0.3372   1.0000 
        edyr     0.1395   0.0217  -0.0345   1.0000 
     gvslvol    -0.1929   0.6503   1.0000 
     gvhlthc    -0.1159   1.0000 
     gincdif     1.0000 
                                                                             
                gincdif  gvhlthc  gvslvol     edyr     hinc  occstat    union
-> countryx = 752.Sweden
                                                                                   
       union     0.0253   0.0704   0.0695   0.1115   0.0830   0.0723   1.0000 
     occstat     0.1034   0.0072  -0.0144   0.5808   0.3940   1.0000 
        hinc     0.1180  -0.0383  -0.0884   0.4728   1.0000 
        edyr     0.0944  -0.0153  -0.0626   1.0000 
     gvslvol    -0.1941   0.7262   1.0000 
     gvhlthc    -0.1535   1.0000 
     gincdif     1.0000 
                                                                             
                gincdif  gvhlthc  gvslvol     edyr     hinc  occstat    union
-> countryx = 724.Spain
                                                                                   
       union    -0.0963   0.1236   0.0974   0.1527   0.0806   0.1641   1.0000 
     occstat     0.1085  -0.0249  -0.0913   0.5122   0.2910   1.0000 
        hinc     0.1850  -0.0191  -0.0704   0.2854   1.0000 
        edyr     0.1243   0.0167  -0.0795   1.0000 
     gvslvol    -0.1641   0.5582   1.0000 
     gvhlthc    -0.1584   1.0000 
     gincdif     1.0000 
                                                                             
                gincdif  gvhlthc  gvslvol     edyr     hinc  occstat    union
-> countryx = 578.Norway
                                                                                   
       union    -0.0821   0.0115   0.0096   0.1005   0.0541   0.0921   1.0000 
     occstat     0.1381  -0.0072  -0.0907   0.4668   0.3667   1.0000 
        hinc     0.2625  -0.0254  -0.1116   0.3705   1.0000 
        edyr     0.1283  -0.0161  -0.1087   1.0000 
     gvslvol    -0.1464   0.5183   1.0000 
     gvhlthc    -0.0205   1.0000 
     gincdif     1.0000 
                                                                             
                gincdif  gvhlthc  gvslvol     edyr     hinc  occstat    union
-> countryx = 528.Netherlands
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*Suburban 
 
tab domicil 
table domicil, c(m dvincdif m dvhlthc m gvslvol) 
 
 *The linear pattern is not so clear, but it looks like there is lowest support 
in the suburbs or outskirts of a big city. 
gen urban = domicil 
gen suburban = domicil 
gen rural = domicil 
gen town = domicil 
recode urban (2 3 4 5 = 0) 
recode suburban (2=1)(1 3 4 5=0) 
recode rural (4 5=1)(1 2 3=0) 
recode town (3=1)(1 2 4 5=0) 
10.2.3 *Regional Imputation 
 
*Foreign-Born in Greece 
*We do not have pfb_ctx for Greece so we can impute it relying on the ESS sampling of 
foreign-born at NUTS 2 level which is very accurate as shown above. Stepwise 
regressions at the regional level to eliminate variables that are not significant in 
predicting percent foreign-born. Note that immigrant measured in the ESS has by far the 
greatest t statistic, so the imputation is mostly based on that. 
 
       union    -0.0952   0.0960   0.0624   0.0594   0.0620   0.0622   1.0000 
     occstat     0.1558   0.0073  -0.0840   0.4471   0.3832   1.0000 
        hinc     0.2388  -0.0042  -0.0938   0.3802   1.0000 
        edyr     0.1287  -0.0023  -0.1084   1.0000 
     gvslvol    -0.1674   0.5631   1.0000 
     gvhlthc    -0.1180   1.0000 
     gincdif     1.0000 
                                                                             
                gincdif  gvhlthc  gvslvol     edyr     hinc  occstat    union
-> countryx = 826.Britain
                                                                                   
       union    -0.0389  -0.0312   0.0159   0.0482   0.0535   0.0746   1.0000 
     occstat     0.1896   0.0416  -0.0671   0.5485   0.3728   1.0000 
        hinc     0.2637  -0.0081  -0.1278   0.2487   1.0000 
        edyr     0.1694   0.0187  -0.0228   1.0000 
     gvslvol    -0.2500   0.5536   1.0000 
     gvhlthc    -0.1617   1.0000 
     gincdif     1.0000 
                                                                             
                gincdif  gvhlthc  gvslvol     edyr     hinc  occstat    union
-> countryx = 756.Switzerland
description  mean(dvincdif) mean(dvhlthc) m(gvslvol) 
    
a big city  72.14558  87.70333  8.34577 
suburbs or o  65.5789  84.88718  8.14781 
town or sm city 68.2028  85.35133  8.2215 
country village 69.68831  84.62968  8.16817 
farm or home in co 69.01007  85.75402  8.40749 
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regress pfb_ctx dvhlthc dvslvol dvincdif lrscale p3d_ctx immigrant_ctx edyr_ctx 
gdp_ctx female hinc occstat ageyr urban suburban  
regress pfb_ctx dvhlthc lrscale immigrant_ctx female hinc ageyr urban suburban  
regress pfb_ctx dvhlthc immigrant_ctx female ageyr urban suburban  
 
*Greece measures percent foreign-citizen, which is not the same measure as 
foreign-born. A comparison between the imputed measure of foreign-born 
and actual foreign-citizen reveals an ok fit with some deviations. As we 
do not have a better measure, we must take this one for now. 
 
replace pfb_ctx = 9.57 if regionx==5601 
replace pfb_ctx = 35 if regionx==5602 
replace pfb_ctx = 12.79 if regionx==5603 
replace pfb_ctx = 2.71 if regionx==30001 
replace pfb_ctx = 5.98 if regionx==30002 
replace pfb_ctx = 10.99 if regionx==30003 
replace pfb_ctx = 7.90 if regionx==30004 
replace pfb_ctx = 7.06 if regionx==30005 
replace pfb_ctx = 13.06 if regionx==30006 
replace pfb_ctx = 8.06 if regionx==30007 
replace pfb_ctx = 10.62 if regionx==30008 
replace pfb_ctx = 10.68 if regionx==30009 
replace pfb_ctx = 5.27 if regionx==30010 
 
*GDP in Ireland 
 
*GDP for the sampled regions in Ireland was unavailable in any of our statistical 
sources. Therefore we impute it here. 
 
preserve 
collapse dvhlthc dvslvol dvincdif lrscale pfb_ctx p3d_ctx gdp_ctx gdp08 
immigrant_ctx edyr_ctx female hinc occstat ageyr urban suburban countryx, 
by(regionx) 
xtreg gdp_ctx dvhlthc dvslvol dvincdif lrscale pfb_ctx p3d_ctx gdp08 
immigrant_ctx edyr_ctx female hinc occstat ageyr urban suburban, 
i(countryx) 
xtreg gdp_ctx lrscale pfb_ctx p3d_ctx gdp08 edyr_ctx female hinc occstat ageyr 
urban suburban, i(countryx) 
xtreg gdp_ctx lrscale pfb_ctx p3d_ctx gdp08 female occstat ageyr, i(countryx) 
xtreg gdp_ctx lrscale pfb_ctx p3d_ctx gdp08, i(countryx) 
predict gdp_imp 
numlabel regionx, add mask("#.") 
                                                                              
       _cons     47.04737   11.00579     4.27   0.000     25.19205    68.90268
    suburban     6.221762   2.336974     2.66   0.009     1.580995    10.86253
       urban     5.917731   2.056209     2.88   0.005     1.834508    10.00096
       ageyr    -.2605824   .1363416    -1.91   0.059    -.5313298     .010165
      female    -9.056634   5.184827    -1.75   0.084    -19.35267    1.239406
immigrant_~x     .6405886   .0453996    14.11   0.000     .5504341    .7307432
     dvhlthc    -.3185588   .0718684    -4.43   0.000    -.4612752   -.1758423
                                                                              
     pfb_ctx        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    3922.31954    99  39.6193893           Root MSE      =  2.7218
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8130
    Residual    688.975971    93  7.40834377           R-squared     =  0.8243
       Model    3233.34357     6  538.890595           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,    93) =   72.74
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     100
     IMPUTED  %FORCIT 
30001.East Macedonia & Thrace    2.705673  2.56 
30002.Central Macedonia/Thess 5.982453  5.64 
30003.West Macedonia & Epirus 10.99181  4.05 
30004.Thessalia   7.89647  4.51 
30005.West Greece & Ionian Isl. 7.063745  6.23 
30006.Central Greece  13.05693  7.59 
30007.Peloponnese   8.059787  8.71 
30008.Attica/Athens   10.62179  10.50 
30009.Aegean Islands  10.67716  8.12 
30010.Crete    5.267737  7.30 
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table regionx if countryx==372, c(m gdp_imp) 
  
replace gdp_ctx = 49677.5 if regionx ==37201 
replace gdp_ctx = 59493.59 if regionx ==37202 
replace gdp_ctx = 48819.63 if regionx ==37203 
replace gdp_ctx = 47791.59 if regionx ==37204 
replace gdp_ctx = 46191.05 if regionx ==37205 
 
10.2.4 *Save Point/Variable Selection 
 
save "/Data/ESS_t.dta", replace 
 
use "/Data/ESS_t.dta", replace 
 
*Fix direction of coding so that anti-immigrant has higher scores for those who 
are more opposed to immigrants and think they are bad, etc 
*tab1 imbgeco imueclt imwbcnt 
clonevar antiO = antiE 
replace antiO=antiO*-1 
replace antiO=(antiO+10)*10 
 
keep belgium denmark finland france germanye germanyw greece ireland netherlands 
norway spain sweden switzerland britain idno occstat occstat_imp edyr 
hinc ageyr urban suburban female cohabit union vulnerable sfborn 
immigrant gvjbevn gvhlthc gvslvol gvslvue gvcldcr gvpdlwk gincdif imsmetn 
imdfetn impcntr imbgeco imueclt imwbcnt antiE antiO sfborn dvincdif 
dvhlthc dvslvol lrscale countryx socprot gdp08 regionx pfb_ctx gdp_ctx 
p3d_ctx p65_ctx pop08_ctx popd_ctx pvote_l pvote_nn pweight dweight 
 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .55654414   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    6793.9729
     sigma_u    7611.1172
                                                                              
       _cons    -94404.84   18771.27    -5.03   0.000    -131195.9   -57613.82
       gdp08     2551.995   565.7272     4.51   0.000      1443.19      3660.8
     p3d_ctx      955.036   154.4183     6.18   0.000     652.3818     1257.69
     pfb_ctx     656.5572   154.0703     4.26   0.000     354.5848    958.5295
     lrscale     3729.124   2169.254     1.72   0.086    -522.5364    7980.784
                                                                              
     gdp_ctx        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(4)       =    137.48
       overall = 0.7014                                        max =        15
       between = 0.7905                                        avg =       8.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.5428                         Obs per group: min =         3
Group variable: countryx                        Number of groups   =        12
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       101
37201.[NUTS] Border, Midlands & Western |       49677.5 
        37202.[NUTS] Southern & Eastern |      59493.59 
                          37203.Munster |      48819.63 
                 37204.Rest of Leinster |      47791.59 
                           37205.Ulster |      46191.05 
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10.2.5 *Individual Imputation 
 
*Education Imputation 
 
xtmixed edyr dvhlthc dvslvol dvincdif occstat_imp female vulnerable ageyr antiE 
suburban gdp_ctx p3d_ctx pvote_l || regionx:, var cov(un) 
*Use these coefficients to chose variables that BEST predict edyrs (marked with 
blue highlights) and then drop the others in order to preserve missing 
cases. 
 
  
predict edyrs_imp 
 
*Generate a random variable that has a mean near zero but a standard deviation 
roughly equal to the original edyrs variable. Then add this to the 
imputed variable to generate 'random noise'. 
gen rnd1 = (((runiform()-.5)*2)*5.26) 
sum rnd1 
replace edyrs_imp = edyrs_imp+rnd1 
replace edyrs_imp = edyr if edyr!=. 
 
     Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
 
*Income Imputation 
 
xtmixed hinc edyrs_imp dvhlthc dvslvol dvincdif occstat_imp female vulnerable 
ageyr antiE suburban gdp_ctx p3d_ctx pvote_l || regionx:, var cov(un) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        edyr |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     dvhlthc |   .0084442   .0016291     5.18   0.000     .0052511    .0116372 
     dvslvol |  -.0073291   .0015764    -4.65   0.000    -.0104188   -.0042394 
    dvincdif |  -.0042231   .0008007    -5.27   0.000    -.0057924   -.0026539 
 occstat_imp |   .0777035   .0008234    94.36   0.000     .0760896    .0793174 
      female |   .0018747   .0387085     0.05   0.961    -.0739926     .077742 
  vulnerable |  -.7087354   .0533301   -13.29   0.000    -.8132605   -.6042103 
       ageyr |  -.0476588   .0013267   -35.92   0.000    -.0502591   -.0450585 
       antiE |    .237471   .0103104    23.03   0.000      .217263     .257679 
    suburban |   .1423419   .0588489     2.42   0.016     .0270001    .2576836 
     gdp_ctx |   .0000144   6.40e-06     2.25   0.024     1.87e-06     .000027 
     p3d_ctx |  -.0045103   .0176717    -0.26   0.799    -.0391461    .0301255 
     pvote_l |   .0008346   .0079969     0.10   0.917     -.014839    .0165082 
       _cons |   10.07493   .6347747    15.87   0.000     8.830792    11.31906 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        edyr |     25896    12.64427     4.05003          0         23 
   edyrs_imp |     26010    12.64083    4.050056          0         23 
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xtmixed hinc edyrs_imp dvincdif occstat_imp female vulnerable ageyr || regionx:, 
var cov(un) 
predict hinc_imp, fit 
set seed 2222 
gen rnd2 = (((runiform()-.5)*2)*54) 
replace hinc_imp = hinc_imp + rnd2 
replace hinc_imp = hinc if hinc!=. 
sum hinc hinc_imp 
recode hinc_imp (-60/0=0)(100/160=0) 
sum hinc hinc_imp 
 
  
 
*One region in Spain is missing data: Castilla y Leon 
 
*Occupational Status Imputation 
 
xtmixed occstat dvincdif edyr ageyr female immigrant vulnerable union urban 
suburban lr_imp antiE || countryx: || regionx:, var cov(un) 
predict occstat_imp 
replace occstat_imp = occstat if occstat !=. 
recode occstat_imp (-20/0=0)(100/120=100) 
label var occstat_imp "Imputed single" 
 
drop if female==. 
drop if vulnerable==. 
drop if immigrant==. 
drop if ageyr==. 
drop if antiE==. 
drop if suburban==. 
drop if immigrant==1 
drop if union==. 
drop if pvote_l==. 
drop if dvhlthc==. & dvslvol==. & dvincdif==. 
replace gdp_ctx = gdp_ctx/1000 
 
*Left-Right Scale 
 
xtmixed lrscale dvincdif edyrs_imp occstat_imp hinc_imp ageyr female vulnerable 
antiE suburban union gdp_ctx p3d_ctx pvote_l || regionx:, var cov(un) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        hinc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   edyrs_imp |    .896585   .0508163    17.64   0.000     .7969869    .9961831 
     dvhlthc |   .0330416   .0131313     2.52   0.012     .0073048    .0587784 
     dvslvol |  -.0458235   .0127089    -3.61   0.000    -.0707326   -.0209145 
    dvincdif |  -.0950512   .0063679   -14.93   0.000     -.107532   -.0825704 
 occstat_imp |   .2379789   .0075632    31.47   0.000     .2231552    .2528026 
      female |  -4.778183   .3099824   -15.41   0.000    -5.385738   -4.170629 
  vulnerable |  -16.91156   .4306254   -39.27   0.000    -17.75557   -16.06755 
       ageyr |   .0482032   .0112844     4.27   0.000     .0260862    .0703202 
       antiE |    .362423   .0844632     4.29   0.000     .1968782    .5279678 
    suburban |   2.102737   .4670542     4.50   0.000     1.187327    3.018146 
     gdp_ctx |   .0000903   .0000557     1.62   0.105    -.0000188    .0001994 
     p3d_ctx |  -.0747763   .1549724    -0.48   0.629    -.3785167     .228964 
     pvote_l |  -.0397163   .0695326    -0.57   0.568    -.1759977     .096565 
       _cons |   44.26699   5.573016     7.94   0.000     33.34408     55.1899 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
*That's 4000 cases 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        hinc |     21694    52.50082    30.71619          0      99.99 
    hinc_imp |     25829    50.73735    31.00005          0   99.99179 
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xtmixed lrscale dvincdif hinc_imp ageyr female antiE union gdp_ctx pvote_l || 
regionx:, var cov(un) 
predict lr_imp, fit 
sum lr_imp if lrscale==. 
set seed 2223 
gen rnd3 = (((runiform()-.5)*2)*.699) 
replace lr_imp = lr_imp + rnd3 
replace lr_imp = lrscale if lrscale!=. 
sum lr_imp lrscale 
 
 
 
*This number is still really low, our sensitivity analysis will have to 'bite 
the bullet' in case numbers for this one 
replace lr_imp = lr_imp*10 
 
 
save "/Data/ESS_recode.dta", replace 
10.2.6 *Analyses 
use "/Data/ESS_recode.dta", clear 
*Non-immigrants only 
 
*If not already installed use this .ado to output rho for multilevel models. 
*ssc install xtmrho 
 
drop if edyr==. 
numlabel regionx c, add mask("#.") 
 
*Don’t use weights, they are not available for all countries 
 
*Summary Statistics 
 
sum dvincdif dvhlthc dvslvol edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban antiO 
p3d_ctx gdp_ctx pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx 
 
*Regional 
preserve 
collapse p3d_ctx gdp_ctx pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx, by(regionx) 
sum p3d_ctx gdp_ctx pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx 
restore 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     lrscale |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    dvincdif |  -.0184566   .0005335   -34.59   0.000    -.0195023   -.0174109 
   edyrs_imp |  -.0136242   .0043448    -3.14   0.002      -.02214   -.0051085 
 occstat_imp |   .0012394   .0006556     1.89   0.059    -.0000457    .0025244 
    hinc_imp |   .0037023   .0004987     7.42   0.000     .0027248    .0046797 
       ageyr |   .0132634   .0009481    13.99   0.000     .0114052    .0151217 
      female |  -.1296131   .0263722    -4.91   0.000    -.1813017   -.0779246 
  vulnerable |  -.0249069   .0375019    -0.66   0.507    -.0984092    .0485954 
       antiE |  -.1665853   .0071872   -23.18   0.000    -.1806719   -.1524988 
    suburban |  -.0566269   .0395953    -1.43   0.153    -.1342323    .0209785 
       union |  -.4236638   .0304396   -13.92   0.000    -.4833243   -.3640034 
     gdp_ctx |    .013172   .0026484     4.97   0.000     .0079812    .0183628 
     p3d_ctx |  -.0238322   .0074709    -3.19   0.001    -.0384749   -.0091895 
     pvote_l |  -.0102356    .003355    -3.05   0.002    -.0168114   -.0036598 
       _cons |    7.34079   .2723129    26.96   0.000     6.807067    7.874514 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      lr_imp |     23084    5.050839     1.98811          0         10 
     lrscale |     21525    5.054681    2.047029          0         10 
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*Variance by Level (all vars) 
xtmixed dvincdif || countryx: || regionx: 
xtmixed dvhlthc || countryx: || regionx: 
xtmixed dvslvol || countryx: || regionx: 
xtmixed edyr || countryx: || regionx: 
xtmixed ageyr || countryx: || regionx: 
xtmixed female || countryx: || regionx: 
xtmixed vulnerable || countryx: || regionx: 
xtmixed union || countryx: || regionx: 
xtmixed suburban || countryx: || regionx: 
xtmixed antiO || countryx: || regionx: 
*Collapse to report these 
preserve 
collapse p3d_ctx gdp_ctx pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx countryx, by(regionx) 
xtmixed p3d_ctx || countryx:  
xtmixed gdp_ctx || countryx:  
xtmixed pvote_l || countryx:  
xtmixed pvote_nn || countryx:  
xtmixed pfb_ctx || countryx:  
restore 
 
*Generate Figures 
 
restore, not 
preserve 
collapse pfb_ctx sfborn dvincdif dvhlthc dvslvol countryx, by(regionx) 
corr gincdif gvhlthc gvslvol pfb_ctx 
  
recode countryx (56=1)(*=.), gen (belgiumDV1) 
recode countryx (208=1)(*=.), gen (denmarkDV1) 
recode countryx (246=1)(*=.), gen (finlandDV1) 
recode countryx (250=1)(*=.), gen (franceDV1) 
recode countryx (275=1)(*=.), gen (germanyeDV1) 
recode countryx (276=1)(*=.), gen (germanywDV1) 
recode countryx (300=1)(*=.), gen (greeceDV1) 
recode countryx (372=1)(*=.), gen (irelandDV1) 
recode countryx (528=1)(*=.), gen (netherlandsDV1) 
recode countryx (578=1)(*=.), gen (norwayDV1) 
recode countryx (724=1)(*=.), gen (spainDV1) 
recode countryx (752=1)(*=.), gen (swedenDV1) 
recode countryx (756=1)(*=.), gen (switzerlandDV1) 
recode countryx (826=1)(*=.), gen (britainDV1) 
 
gen belgiumDV2 = belgiumDV1*dvhlthc 
gen denmarkDV2 = denmarkDV1*dvhlthc 
gen finlandDV2 = finlandDV1*dvhlthc 
gen franceDV2 = franceDV1*dvhlthc 
gen germanyeDV2= germanyeDV1*dvhlthc 
gen germanywDV2 = germanywDV1*dvhlthc 
gen greeceDV2 = greeceDV1*dvhlthc 
gen irelandDV2 = irelandDV1*dvhlthc 
gen netherlandsDV2 = netherlandsDV1*dvhlthc 
gen norwayDV2 = norwayDV1*dvhlthc 
gen spainDV2 = spainDV1*dvhlthc 
gen swedenDV2 = swedenDV1*dvhlthc 
gen switzerlandDV2 = switzerlandDV1*dvhlthc 
gen britainDV2 = britainDV1*dvhlthc 
 
gen belgiumDV3 = belgiumDV1*dvslvol 
gen denmarkDV3 = denmarkDV1*dvslvol 
     pfb_ctx     0.1747  -0.5046  -0.4968   1.0000
     gvslvol    -0.4869   0.8440   1.0000
     gvhlthc    -0.3536   1.0000
     gincdif     1.0000
                                                  
                gincdif  gvhlthc  gvslvol  pfb_ctx
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gen finlandDV3 = finlandDV1*dvslvol 
gen franceDV3 = franceDV1*dvslvol 
gen germanyeDV3= germanyeDV1*dvslvol 
gen germanywDV3 = germanywDV1*dvslvol 
gen greeceDV3 = greeceDV1*dvslvol 
gen irelandDV3 = irelandDV1*dvslvol 
gen netherlandsDV3 = netherlandsDV1*dvslvol 
gen norwayDV3 = norwayDV1*dvslvol 
gen spainDV3 = spainDV1*dvslvol 
gen swedenDV3 = swedenDV1*dvslvol 
gen switzerlandDV3 = switzerlandDV1*dvslvol 
gen britainDV3 = britainDV1*dvslvol 
 
replace belgiumDV1 = belgiumDV1*dvincdif 
replace denmarkDV1 = denmarkDV1*dvincdif 
replace finlandDV1 = finlandDV1*dvincdif 
replace franceDV1 = franceDV1*dvincdif 
replace germanyeDV1= germanyeDV1*dvincdif 
replace germanywDV1 = germanywDV1*dvincdif 
replace greeceDV1 = greeceDV1*dvincdif 
replace irelandDV1 = irelandDV1*dvincdif 
replace netherlandsDV1 = netherlandsDV1*dvincdif 
replace norwayDV1 = norwayDV1*dvincdif 
replace spainDV1 = spainDV1*dvincdif 
replace swedenDV1 = swedenDV1*dvincdif 
replace switzerlandDV1 = switzerlandDV1*dvincdif 
replace britainDV1 = britainDV1*dvincdif 
 
label var pfb_ctx "% Foreign Born"  
label var sfborn "Subjective % Foreign Born" 
label var belgiumDV1 "Belgium" 
label var denmarkDV1 "Denmark" 
label var finlandDV1 "Finland" 
label var franceDV1 "France" 
label var germanyeDV1 "Germany (E)" 
label var germanywDV1 "Germany (W)" 
label var greeceDV1 "Greece" 
label var irelandDV1   "Ireland" 
label var netherlandsDV1 "Netherlands" 
label var norwayDV1   "Norway" 
label var spainDV1   "Spain" 
label var swedenDV1   "Sweden" 
label var switzerlandDV1   "Switzerland" 
label var britainDV1   "Great Britain" 
 
label var belgiumDV2 "Belgium" 
label var denmarkDV2 "Denmark" 
label var finlandDV2 "Finland" 
label var franceDV2 "France" 
label var germanyeDV2 "Germany (E)" 
label var germanywDV2 "Germany (W)" 
label var greeceDV2 "Greece" 
label var irelandDV2   "Ireland" 
label var netherlandsDV2 "Netherlands" 
label var norwayDV2   "Norway" 
label var spainDV2   "Spain" 
label var swedenDV2   "Sweden" 
label var switzerlandDV2   "Switzerland" 
label var britainDV2   "Great Britain" 
 
label var belgiumDV3 "Belgium" 
label var denmarkDV3 "Denmark" 
label var finlandDV3 "Finland" 
label var franceDV3 "France" 
label var germanyeDV3 "Germany (E)" 
label var germanywDV3 "Germany (W)" 
label var greeceDV3 "Greece" 
label var irelandDV3   "Ireland" 
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label var netherlandsDV3 "Netherlands" 
label var norwayDV3   "Norway" 
label var spainDV3   "Spain" 
label var swedenDV3   "Sweden" 
label var switzerlandDV3   "Switzerland" 
label var britainDV3   "Great Britain" 
 
graph twoway (scatter  belgiumDV1 pfb_ctx, msymbol(circle)) (scatter  denmarkDV1 
pfb_ctx, msymbol(diamond)) (scatter  finlandDV1 pfb_ctx, msymbol(smx)) 
(scatter  franceDV1 pfb_ctx, msymbol(triangle)) (scatter  germanyeDV1 
pfb_ctx, msymbol(lgx)) (scatter  germanywDV1 pfb_ctx, msymbol(square)) 
(scatter  greeceDV1 pfb_ctx, msymbol(smsquare)) (scatter  irelandDV1 
pfb_ctx, msymbol(plus)) (scatter  netherlandsDV1 pfb_ctx, 
msymbol(smdiamond_hollow)) (scatter  norwayDV1 pfb_ctx, 
msymbol(circle_hollow)) (scatter  spainDV1 pfb_ctx, msymbol(plus)) 
(scatter  swedenDV1 pfb_ctx, msymbol(diamond_hollow)) (scatter  
switzerlandDV1 pfb_ctx, msymbol(triangle_hollow)) (scatter  britainDV1 
pfb_ctx, msymbol(square_hollow)) (lfit dvincdif pfb_ctx if pfb_ctx < 35, 
color(black)), ytitle("Average Public Support, 100=Strongly agree", 
size(small)) legend(size(small) cols(1) pos(3))  
 
graph twoway (scatter  belgiumDV2 pfb_ctx, msymbol(circle)) (scatter  denmarkDV2 
pfb_ctx, msymbol(diamond)) (scatter  finlandDV2 pfb_ctx, msymbol(smx)) 
(scatter  franceDV2 pfb_ctx, msymbol(triangle)) (scatter  germanyeDV2 
pfb_ctx, msymbol(lgx)) (scatter  germanywDV2 pfb_ctx, msymbol(square)) 
(scatter  greeceDV2 pfb_ctx, msymbol(smsquare)) (scatter  irelandDV2 
pfb_ctx, msymbol(plus)) (scatter  netherlandsDV2 pfb_ctx, 
msymbol(smdiamond_hollow)) (scatter  norwayDV2 pfb_ctx, 
msymbol(circle_hollow)) (scatter  spainDV2 pfb_ctx, msymbol(plus)) 
(scatter  swedenDV2 pfb_ctx, msymbol(diamond_hollow)) (scatter  
switzerlandDV2 pfb_ctx, msymbol(triangle_hollow)) (scatter  britainDV2 
pfb_ctx, msymbol(square_hollow)) (lfit dvhlthc pfb_ctx if pfb_ctx < 35, 
color(black)), ytitle("Average Public Support, 100=Strongly agree", 
size(small)) legend(size(small) cols(1) pos(3))  
 
graph twoway (scatter  belgiumDV3 pfb_ctx, msymbol(circle)) (scatter  denmarkDV3 
pfb_ctx, msymbol(diamond)) (scatter  finlandDV3 pfb_ctx, msymbol(smx)) 
(scatter  franceDV3 pfb_ctx, msymbol(triangle)) (scatter  germanyeDV3 
pfb_ctx, msymbol(lgx)) (scatter  germanywDV3 pfb_ctx, msymbol(square)) 
(scatter  greeceDV3 pfb_ctx, msymbol(smsquare)) (scatter  irelandDV3 
pfb_ctx, msymbol(plus)) (scatter  netherlandsDV3 pfb_ctx, 
msymbol(smdiamond_hollow)) (scatter  norwayDV3 pfb_ctx, 
msymbol(circle_hollow)) (scatter  spainDV3 pfb_ctx, msymbol(plus)) 
(scatter  swedenDV3 pfb_ctx, msymbol(diamond_hollow)) (scatter  
switzerlandDV3 pfb_ctx, msymbol(triangle_hollow)) (scatter  britainDV3 
pfb_ctx, msymbol(square_hollow)) (lfit dvslvol pfb_ctx if pfb_ctx < 35, 
color(black)), ytitle("Average Public Support, 100=Strongly agree", 
size(small)) legend(size(small) cols(1) pos(3))  
restore 
 
*Variance 
 
*A majority of the higher level variance occurs at the country-level. This makes a lot of 
sense as welfare is a national legislation for the most part (especially pensions and health 
care). We are not really interested in what takes place at the country-level, but we do not 
want it to bias our findings at the regional-level. Three-level xtmixed does not use up the 
degrees of freedom and it controls for unobserved heterogeneity of country-level 
characteristics (i.e. the qualitative differences in social policies).  
 
use "/Data/ESS_recode.dta", clear 
drop if edyr==. 
 
*also test for an interaction of anti-immigrant with percetn foreign-born. The 
results below show that this is not of interest for our present analysis 
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gen antiXpfb = antiO*pfb_ctx 
numlabel regionx c, add mask("#.") 
 
*Variance, Pooled Data 
xtmixed dvincdif || countryx: || regionx: || , var mle 
xtmrho 
 xtmixed dvhlthc || countryx: || regionx: ||, var mle 
xtmrho 
 
xtmixed dvslvol || countryx: || regionx: ||, var mle 
xtmrho 
 
 
*Redistribution  
 
xtmixed dvincdif || countryx: || regionx: , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv11 
 
xtmixed dvincdif edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban || countryx: || 
regionx: if immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv12 
 
xtmixed dvincdif edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 , var 
cov(un) 
estimates store dv13 
 
xtmixed dvincdif edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv13a 
 
*preferred model 
xtmixed dvincdif edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 , 
var cov(un) 
estimates store dv14 
 
xtmixed dvincdif edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO || countryx: || regionx: antiO if 
immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv15 
 
predict anti1 anti2 anti3, reffects 
table regionx, c(m anti1 m anti2 m anti3) 
Intraclass correlation  (ICC):  rho2 = 0.01159
level 2
Intraclass correlation  (ICC):  rho1 = 0.09534
level 1
Intraclass correlation  (ICC):  rho2 = 0.01047
level 2
Intraclass correlation  (ICC):  rho1 = 0.08319
level 1
Intraclass correlation  (ICC):  rho2 = 0.02388
level 2
Intraclass correlation  (ICC):  rho1 = 0.09722
level 1
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gen reantiN = anti2+.00891 
label var reantiN "DV1: Random effects of anti by region(antiB+fixed effect" 
table regionx, c(m reantiN) 
 
xtmixed dvincdif edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO antiXpfb|| countryx: || regionx: if 
immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv16 
 
est table dv11 dv12 dv13a dv13 dv14 dv15 dv16, star(.05 .01 .001) b(%9.2f) 
stats(aic) 
 
*Health Care 
 
xtmixed dvhlthc || countryx: || regionx: , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv21 
 
xtmixed dvhlthc edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban || countryx: || 
regionx: if immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv22 
 
xtmixed dvhlthc edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 , var 
cov(un) 
estimates store dv23 
 
xtmixed dvhlthc edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv23a 
 
*Preferred model 
xtmixed dvhlthc edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 , 
var cov(un) 
estimates store dv24 
 
xtmixed dvhlthc edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO || countryx: || regionx: antiO if 
immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv25 
 
predict antiA antiB antiC, reffects 
table regionx, c(m antiA m antiB m antiC) 
gen reantiO = antiB-.12 
label var reantiO "DV2: Random effects of anti by region anti+fixed effect" 
table regionx, c(m reantiO) 
sum reantiO 
 
xtmixed dvhlthc edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO antiXpfb || countryx: || regionx: if 
immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv26 
est table dv21 dv22 dv23a dv23 dv24 dv25 dv26, star(.05 .01 .001) b(%9.2f) 
stats(aic) 
 
*Old-Age Welfare 
 
xtmixed dvslvol || countryx: || regionx: , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv31 
 
xtmixed dvslvol edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban || countryx: || 
regionx: if immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
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estimates store dv32 
 
xtmixed dvslvol edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 , var 
cov(un) 
estimates store dv33 
 
xtmixed dvslvol edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv33a 
 
xtmixed dvslvol edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 , 
var cov(un) 
estimates store dv34 
 
xtmixed dvslvol edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO || countryx: || regionx: antiO if 
immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv35 
 
predict antiX antiY antiZ, reffects 
table regionx, c(m antiX m antiY m antiZ) 
gen reantiP = antiY-.182 
label var reantiP "DV3: Random effects of anti by region anti+fixed effect" 
table regionx, c(m reantiP) 
sum reantiP 
 
xtmixed dvslvol edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO antiXpfb|| countryx: || regionx: if 
immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv36 
 
xtmixed dvslvol edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx || countryx: || regionx: antiO if immigrant==0 , 
var cov(un) 
estimates store dv37 
 
est table dv31 dv32 dv33a dv33 dv34 dv35 dv36 dv37, star(.05 .01 .001) b(%9.2f) 
stats(aic) 
10.2.7 *Results 
*Coefficients 
 
est table dv11 dv12 dv13a dv13 dv14, star(.05 .01 .001) b(%9.2f) stats(aic) 
 
est table dv21 dv22 dv23a dv23 dv24, star(.05 .01 .001) b(%9.2f) stats(aic) 
 
est table dv31 dv32 dv33a dv33 dv34, star(.05 .01 .001) b(%9.2f) stats(aic) 
 
*Margins 
 
*These were the preferred models from above. We also run an empty model in order 
to parse out the variance at each level. By comparing coefficients to the 
variance at each level we can get standardized predicted margins which 
are comprable to standardized coefficients but in a multilevel context. 
xtmixed dvincdif edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0  
estimates store dv14 
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xtmixed dvhlthc edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 , 
var cov(un) 
estimates store dv24 
xtmixed dvslvol edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 , 
var cov(un) 
estimates store dv34 
 
xtmixed dvincdif || countryx: || regionx:  
 
 
xtmixed dvhlthc || countryx: || regionx:  
 
 
xtmixed dvslvol || countryx: || regionx:  
 
 
 
est restore dv14 
sum dvincdif dvhlthc dvslvol edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx 
gdp_ctx pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx 
*Reminder, use summary statistics to find first differences or standard margins. 
 
 
margins, at(edyr =(10.7 14.5)) 
margins, at(ageyr =(39 57.2)) 
  Random-effects Parameters  |   Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
countryx: Identity           | 
                   sd(_cons) |   8.036144   1.555791      5.498646    11.74464 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
regionx: Identity            | 
                   sd(_cons) |   2.788662   .3135653      2.237094    3.476221 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
                sd(Residual) |   24.66369   .1156962      24.43797    24.89149 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Random-effects Parameters  |   Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
countryx: Identity           | 
                   sd(_cons) |   4.495459    .872594      3.072918    6.576534 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
regionx: Identity            | 
                   sd(_cons) |   1.559772   .1983377      1.215693    2.001236 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
                sd(Residual) |   14.78116   .0691054      14.64633    14.91723 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Random-effects Parameters  |   Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
countryx: Identity           | 
                   sd(_cons) |   5.122324   1.005694      3.486149    7.526416 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
regionx: Identity            | 
                   sd(_cons) |   2.530685   .2442211      2.094564    3.057612 
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
                sd(Residual) |   15.35543   .0717803      15.21539    15.49676 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    dvincdif |     22835     69.0497    26.05476          0        100 
     dvhlthc |     23005     85.7757    15.49856          0        100 
     dvslvol |     23003    82.51489    16.36337          0        100 
        edyr |     23049    12.61916     4.01087          0         23 
       ageyr |     23049    48.13506    18.31796         15         85 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      female |     23049    .5215411    .4995466          0          1 
  vulnerable |     23049    .2949803    .4560438          0          1 
       union |     23049    .4390212    .4962784          0          1 
    suburban |     23049     .139095    .3460531          0          1 
     p3d_ctx |     23049    30.13403    6.006125       14.5       48.3 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     gdp_ctx |     23049    36.98999    19.46617       14.9   120.5983 
     pvote_l |     23049    41.37262    11.27942      12.27      67.51 
    pvote_nn |     23049    7.683917    9.017221          0      37.92 
     pfb_ctx |     23049    10.76446    6.489633       1.98      37.16 
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margins, at(female = (0 1)) 
margins, at(vulnerable = (0 1)) 
margins, at(union = (0 1)) 
margins, at(suburban = (0 1)) 
margins, at(p3d_ctx = (26.2 31.5)) 
margins, at(gdp_ctx = (29.1 38.7)) 
margins, at(pvote_l = (39.9 47.2)) 
margins, at(pvote_nn = (5.4 7.9)) 
margins, at(pfb_ctx = (8.5 13.6)) 
margins, at(antiO = (38.3 57.4)) 
 
est restore dv24 
margins, at(edyr =(10.7 14.5)) 
margins, at(ageyr =(39 57.2)) 
margins, at(female = (0 1)) 
margins, at(vulnerable = (0 1)) 
margins, at(union = (0 1)) 
margins, at(suburban = (0 1)) 
margins, at(p3d_ctx = (26.2 31.5)) 
margins, at(gdp_ctx = (29.1 38.7)) 
margins, at(pvote_l = (39.9 47.2)) 
margins, at(pvote_nn = (5.4 7.9)) 
margins, at(pfb_ctx = (8.5 13.6)) 
margins, at(antiO = (38.3 57.4)) 
 
est restore dv34 
margins, at(edyr =(10.7 14.5)) 
margins, at(ageyr =(39 57.2)) 
margins, at(female = (0 1)) 
margins, at(vulnerable = (0 1)) 
margins, at(union = (0 1)) 
margins, at(suburban = (0 1)) 
margins, at(p3d_ctx = (26.2 31.5)) 
margins, at(gdp_ctx = (29.1 38.7)) 
margins, at(pvote_l = (39.9 47.2)) 
margins, at(pvote_nn = (5.4 7.9)) 
margins, at(pfb_ctx = (8.5 13.6)) 
margins, at(antiO = (38.3 57.4)) 
 
10.2.8 *Sensitivity Analyses 
*We need to run the sensitivity analyses on a smaller sample to make the model fit 
statistics comparable. There is some missing data on the alternative variables after 
imputation, and without imputation we lose something over 5,000 cases. 
 
 
*restrict sample 
drop if sfborn==. 
drop if occstat_imp==. 
drop if hinc_imp==. 
drop if lr_imp==. 
 
*Main Models 
 
*Rerun preferred models with the restricted sample 
xtmixed dvincdif edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 , 
var cov(un) 
estimates store dv14str 
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xtmixed dvhlthc edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 , 
var cov(un) 
estimates store dv24str 
xtmixed dvslvol edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 , 
var cov(un) 
estimates store dv34str 
 
*Alternative SES 
 
xtmixed dvincdif edyr occstat_imp hinc_imp ageyr female vulnerable union 
suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO || countryx: || 
regionx: if immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv1ses 
 
xtmixed dvhlthc edyr occstat_imp hinc_imp ageyr female vulnerable union suburban 
p3d_ctx gdp_ctx pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO || countryx: || regionx: 
if immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv2ses 
 
xtmixed dvslvol edyr occstat_imp hinc_imp ageyr female vulnerable union suburban 
p3d_ctx gdp_ctx pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO || countryx: || regionx: 
if immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv3ses 
 
*Subjective Left-Right 
 
xtmixed dvincdif edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO lr_imp || countryx: || regionx: if 
immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv1lr 
 
xtmixed dvhlthc edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO lr_imp || countryx: || regionx: if 
immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv2lr 
 
xtmixed dvslvol edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO lr_imp || countryx: || regionx: if 
immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv3lr 
 
*Mixed model SES and lr, as these have significant effects 
xtmixed dvincdif edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO occstat_imp hinc_imp lr_imp || countryx: 
|| regionx: if immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv1lrm 
 
xtmixed dvhlthc edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO occstat_imp hinc_imp lr_imp || countryx: 
|| regionx: if immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv2lrm 
 
xtmixed dvslvol edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO occstat_imp hinc_imp lr_imp || countryx: 
|| regionx: if immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv3lrm 
 
*Country-Level Foreign-Born 
 
*with regional level control 
xtmixed dvincdif edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO pfb_cntry || countryx: || regionx: if 
immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
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estimates store dv1fc 
 
xtmixed dvhlthc edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO pfb_cntry || countryx: || regionx: if 
immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv2fc 
 
xtmixed dvslvol edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO pfb_cntry || countryx: || regionx: if 
immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv3fc 
 
*without regional level control 
xtmixed dvincdif edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn antiO pfb_cntry || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 
, var cov(un) 
estimates store dv1fco 
 
xtmixed dvhlthc edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn antiO pfb_cntry || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 
, var cov(un) 
estimates store dv2fco 
 
xtmixed dvslvol edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn antiO pfb_cntry || countryx: || regionx: if immigrant==0 
, var cov(un) 
estimates store dv3fco 
 
*Population 
 
xtmixed dvincdif edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO pop08_ctx popd_ctx || countryx: || 
regionx: if immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv1pop 
 
xtmixed dvhlthc edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO pop08_ctx popd_ctx || countryx: || 
regionx: if immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv2pop 
 
xtmixed dvslvol edyr ageyr female vulnerable union suburban p3d_ctx gdp_ctx 
pvote_l pvote_nn pfb_ctx antiO pop08_ctx popd_ctx || countryx: || 
regionx: if immigrant==0 , var cov(un) 
estimates store dv3fpop 
 
*Results 
 
 
est table dv14 dv14str dv1ses dv1lr dv1lrm dv1fc dv1fco dv1pop, star(.05 .01 
.001) b(%9.2f) stats(aic N) 
est table dv24 dv24str dv2ses dv2lr dv2lrm dv2fc dv2fco dv2pop, star(.05 .01 
.001) b(%9.2f) stats(aic N) 
est table dv34 dv34str dv3ses dv3lr dv3lrm dv3fc dv3fco dv3fpop, star(.05 .01 
.001) b(%9.2f) stats(aic N) 
 
*Correlations All Vars 
 
pwcorr dvincdif dvhlthc dvslvol edyr occstat_imp hinc_imp ageyr female 
vulnerable union suburban antiO lr_imp  p3d_ctx gdp_ctx pvote_l pvote_nn 
pfb_ctx pop08_ctx popd_ctx pfb_cntry 
 
collapse dvincdif dvhlthc dvslvol edyr occstat_imp hinc_imp ageyr female 
vulnerable union suburban antiO lr_imp  p3d_ctx gdp_ctx pvote_l pvote_nn 
pfb_ctx pop08_ctx popd_ctx pfb_cntry, by(regionx) 
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pwcorr dvincdif dvhlthc dvslvol edyr occstat_imp hinc_imp ageyr female 
vulnerable union suburban antiO lr_imp p3d_ctx gdp_ctx pvote_l pvote_nn 
pfb_ctx pop08_ctx popd_ctx pfb_cntry 
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11 TECHNICAL APPENDIX THREE: THIRD STUDY 
11.1 Tables 
Table 43. Full Dataset Utilized in Study Three 
 
aCountry-year measured as ISO 3-digit country code * 100 + 2-digit year 
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3606 -0.99 16.09 69.87 13.20 -1.02 90 77.74 29.43 1 10 13.99 32.40
3686 -0.99 11.99 56.64 10.69 -1.02 90 78.09 28.30 1 -10 10.63 21.74
3690 -1.30 13.13 62.10 11.29 -1.02 90 78.86 26.37 1 -6 10.83 21.92
3696 -1.12 16.24 63.60 12.14 -1.02 90 80.99 28.50 1 0 12.59 26.05
3698 -0.51 16.69 64.32 12.34 -1.02 90 76.49 29.69 1 2 11.77 27.84
4093 1.25 26.17 60.78 15.01 1.60 55 74.39 41.90 0 -3.5 10.56 24.45
4099 0.64 27.04 61.25 15.50 1.60 55 76.95 43.04 0 2.5 10.58 28.77
12406 -1.06 16.94 73.49 13.40 -1.34 80 75.57 32.97 1 5 13.88 31.70
12496 -1.75 18.06 66.80 12.20 -1.34 80 71.75 36.73 1 -5 15.52 25.28
20806 -0.68 26.59 76.75 16.30 0.52 74 78.49 48.09 0 0 20.67 29.40
24606 0.07 25.91 73.83 16.50 0.43 63 69.82 42.97 0 0 25.59 31.30
25006 0.31 28.59 65.35 16.50 -0.73 71 78.89 43.67 0 4.5 16.22 27.30
25097 0.42 28.62 61.42 15.80 -0.73 71 73.87 44.29 0 -4.5 13.35 23.81
25098 0.52 28.80 62.27 15.95 -0.73 71 69.81 45.16 0 -3.5 13.32 24.49
27606 0.30 26.15 69.01 19.90 0.48 67 79.22 36.05 0 10.5 14.79 28.20
27685 0.39 22.52 51.84 15.06 0.48 67 71.63 35.83 0 -10.5 10.14 19.39
27690 0.45 22.73 56.68 14.96 0.48 67 80.79 36.04 0 -5.5 11.28 22.76
27691 1.14 23.70 60.50 15.01 0.48 67 82.10 36.92 0 -4.5 10.80 23.10
27696 0.48 27.38 59.31 15.74 0.48 67 78.96 36.25 0 0.5 11.61 24.20
27698 1.34 26.56 60.55 16.09 0.48 67 75.02 37.33 0 2.5 13.23 25.18
37206 0.26 15.75 62.03 10.80 -0.53 70 67.20 30.96 1 7.5 15.49 36.40
37291 0.74 15.71 42.49 11.41 -0.53 70 66.77 34.01 1 -7.5 10.60 16.27
37296 0.34 14.78 48.74 11.38 -0.53 70 70.42 31.76 1 -2.5 12.28 22.67
37298 1.03 13.00 51.85 11.24 -0.53 70 68.68 31.54 1 -0.5 19.65 26.52
38091 0.79 19.95 46.40 15.27 -0.85 76 68.87 38.23 0 -3.5 17.63 22.27
38096 0.55 21.99 43.02 17.28 -0.85 76 69.38 43.30 0 1.5 10.66 24.02
38098 0.96 23.32 45.48 18.11 -0.85 76 70.41 42.24 0 3.5 19.21 25.60
39206 -0.60 18.44 66.25 21.50 0.05 46 75.45 28.33 1 5 17.56 28.40
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Table 44. Full Dataset Utilized in Study Three, Continued 
 
aCountry-year measured as ISO 3-digit country code * 100 + 2-digit year 
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39296 -0.49 14.53 62.12 15.66 0.05 46 77.55 27.16 1 -5 16.01 25.61
39298 -0.02 15.46 63.41 16.72 0.05 46 75.37 26.31 1 -3 17.33 24.95
52806 -0.28 20.30 70.99 14.60 1.01 80 81.97 38.72 0 7.5 13.78 32.70
52891 0.66 25.51 52.81 12.99 1.01 80 67.34 44.79 0 -7.5 12.29 23.53
52898 1.10 21.45 60.91 13.55 1.01 80 74.65 40.06 0 -0.5 18.82 28.50
55406 -1.66 18.39 72.11 12.80 -1.11 79 77.23 33.57 1 8 13.63 23.80
55491 -0.89 21.88 62.49 11.33 -1.11 79 80.11 35.51 1 -8 12.18 17.19
55497 -1.26 19.59 68.05 11.58 -1.11 79 72.19 32.91 1 -2 12.48 19.77
55498 -0.46 20.06 68.10 11.68 -1.11 79 79.51 32.92 1 -1 13.05 20.52
57806 0.79 20.44 76.04 14.60 1.53 69 74.66 43.59 0 8 13.67 40.40
57890 0.87 22.31 71.24 16.28 1.53 69 72.21 41.12 0 -8 11.17 27.28
57896 0.81 22.51 71.49 15.73 1.53 69 72.10 41.50 0 -2 24.47 34.05
57898 1.29 23.61 73.75 15.35 1.53 69 74.54 42.71 0 0 20.65 35.22
62006 1.65 22.90 71.70 17.20 -0.03 27 76.09 31.90 0 0 10.51 17.77
72406 1.13 21.58 61.54 17.00 0.48 51 73.04 33.32 0 5.5 15.80 24.00
72496 1.82 21.34 38.00 16.00 0.48 51 70.00 32.89 0 -5.5 19.00 18.87
72498 1.54 20.62 40.00 16.60 0.48 51 69.59 34.14 0 -3.5 19.24 20.47
75206 -0.12 28.41 76.06 17.40 1.40 71 74.33 47.36 0 5.5 12.34 32.70
75296 0.25 31.59 73.51 17.44 1.40 71 74.06 50.48 0 -5.5 11.89 24.56
75298 0.50 30.24 71.90 17.33 1.40 71 72.22 51.07 0 -3.5 12.34 26.63
75606 -0.56 18.52 80.19 16.60 0.50 68 67.48 29.09 0 4 14.84 34.30
75699 0.17 18.54 69.92 17.27 0.50 68 68.73 30.02 0 -4 18.83 31.62
82606 -0.47 20.36 70.04 16.00 -1.34 89 66.31 36.00 1 10 14.93 30.00
82685 0.51 19.44 61.65 15.17 -1.34 89 76.05 37.45 1 -11 12.14 18.63
82690 0.02 16.75 67.36 15.77 -1.34 89 79.03 34.30 1 -6 13.00 20.52
82691 0.02 18.18 65.55 15.81 -1.34 89 74.38 33.39 1 -5 12.58 20.50
82696 0.04 19.61 67.67 15.87 -1.34 89 72.67 34.25 1 0 12.73 23.64
82698 0.54 18.86 68.59 15.84 -1.34 89 72.26 35.77 1 2 12.77 25.18
84006 -1.36 15.99 70.04 12.60 -1.02 91 63.98 27.86 1 10 13.18 38.60
84085 -2.21 13.11 64.52 12.08 -1.02 91 66.91 25.49 1 -11 12.55 25.91
84090 -1.65 13.46 69.22 12.57 -1.02 91 64.67 27.10 1 -6 12.92 27.79
84091 -1.57 14.44 69.57 12.61 -1.02 91 63.65 26.91 1 -5 12.87 28.36
84096 -1.78 15.20 69.72 12.61 -1.02 91 57.81 28.66 1 0 13.34 31.80
84098 -1.93 14.77 69.41 12.47 -1.02 91 57.55 29.15 1 2 13.33 34.02
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Table 45. Regression Parameters 
Predicting Corporatism Utilized 
for Imputation 
 
  
Variables Coef. SE
Social Policy 0.07 * 0.03
Public Opinion 0.53 ** 0.15
Aged -0.02 0.05
GDP_PPP 0.06 * 0.02
FLP 0.02 0.02
intercept -4.03 0.84
N 58
r2 0.57
Predicted scores:
Portugal 0.477
Spain -0.030
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Table 46. Pairwise Correlations and Factor Loadings for Public Opinion Scale 
 
Note: Data are from ISSP Role of Government Module, 1996, N=29,802. All seven items loaded on one 
factor with the first eigenvalue of 2.79, followed by 0.27 and 0.04. Loadings rotated using varimax. 
 
 
Jobs Redist. Prices Health Old-Age Ind. Unemp.
Variable (government should provide ...):
Jobs 1.00
Redistribute Incomes 0.48 1.00
Price Controls 0.48 0.42 1.00
Health Care 0.39 0.33 0.38 1.00
Old-Age Welfare 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.62 1.00
Industry Support 0.37 0.30 0.34 0.34 0.38 1.00
Unemployment 0.42 0.45 0.32 0.34 0.40 0.37 1.00
Sex 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06
Age 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.03
Education -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01
Factor Loadings 0.67 0.62 0.62 0.66 0.69 0.54 0.60
 Table 47. Correlations for All Variables in Study Three excluding the United States, N=56 Country-Time Points 
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Public Opinion 1.00
Social Policy (spending) 0.39 1.00
FLP -0.41 0.17 1.00
Married (%) -0.29 0.04 0.30 1.00
Taxes Collected 0.34 0.84 0.14 -0.11 1.00
Military Spending per capita 0.10 0.23 0.26 0.11 0.38 1.00
Aged (% ≥65) 0.37 0.53 0.17 -0.05 0.33 0.20 1.00
Individualism (Hofstede) -0.49 -0.24 0.13 0.10 0.01 0.49 -0.46 1.00
Corporatism (Crepaz & Lijphart) 0.51 0.53 0.16 -0.02 0.49 -0.04 0.38 -0.52 1.00
English-speaking -0.62 -0.76 0.03 0.10 -0.65 -0.13 -0.53 0.42 -0.74 1.00
Year (centered) -0.13 0.05 0.38 0.05 -0.01 -0.12 0.22 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 1.00
Education (Years) 0.15 0.00 0.06 -0.28 0.07 -0.07 0.25 -0.21 0.17 -0.19 0.19 1.00
GDP at PPP -0.08 0.08 0.56 -0.08 0.20 0.12 0.17 0.03 0.40 -0.22 0.64 0.41 1.00
  
Table 48. Instrumental Variables Models with Taxes as an Alternative Instrument for Social Policy 
 
†p<.25 *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
Note: N=62, clustered in 19 countries. Data sources in Table 21. Non-recursive SEMs predicting simultaneous effects for both DVs. The 
variable public opinion estimated as a latent variable of itself with a reliability of 0.35 calculated from the individual level data. 
ß ß ß ß ß
Social Policy 0.40 0.08 0.49 *** 0.10 0.23 ** 0.05 0.33 † 0.06 0.08 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
FLP (instrument) – 0.52 *** – 0.05 – 0.41 *** – 0.04 – 0.50 *** – 0.05 – 0.43 *** – 0.04 – 0.50 *** – 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Aged 0.32 * 0.13 0.28 † 0.12
(0.07) (0.08)
Individualism – 0.37 *** – 0.03
(0.01)
Corporatism 0.49 *** 0.48 0.44 0.44
(0.18) (0.15)
English-Speaking – 0.40 † – 0.76
intercept – 0.16 2.54 2.43 1.84 1.37
-> Social Policy ß ß ß ß ß
Public Opinion – 0.06 – 0.33 – 0.11 – 0.58 0.18 0.89 – 0.16 – 0.82 0.20 0.97
(0.87) (1.36) (1.06) (0.85)
Taxes (as a % of GDP) 0.40 *** 0.72 0.55 *** 1.01 0.35 * 0.64 0.14 0.25 0.32 * 0.59
(0.28) (0.28) (0.38) (0.25) (0.36)
Aged 0.43 ** 0.90 0.34 * 0.70
(0.38) (0.48)
Individualism – 0.42 * – 0.15
(0.09)
Corporatism 0.28 1.37 0.14 0.69
(1.21) (0.97)
English-Speaking – 0.83 *** – 8.06
(2.19)
intercept 0.44 21.83 14.76 22.10 4.83
Demographic/Political
coeff.(se) coeff.(se) coeff.(se) coeff.(se) coeff.(se)-> Public Opinion
Demographics Social Institutions Political Institutions Historical Institutions
coeff.(se) coeff.(se) coeff.(se) coeff.(se) coeff.(se)
  
Table 49. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Instrumental Variables Models shown in Table 48 
 
 
 
  
GOF indicies
CFI 0.90 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00
r2 Public Opinion 0.59 *** 0.61 *** 0.63 *** 0.63*** 0.64 ***
r2 Social Policy     0.51 *** 0.37 † 0.47 ** 0.62*** 0.56 ***
AIC 1,489 1,712 1,359 1,242 1,609
free parameters 9 9 9 9 11
RMSEA 0.17 (0.00/0.35) 0.10 (0.00/0.29) 0.00 (0.00/0.15) 0.00 (0.00/0.19) 0.00 (0.00/0.14)
SRMR 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01
Demographics Social Institutions Political Institutions Historical Institutions Demographic/Political
  
Table 50. Instrumental Variables Models with Military Spending as an Alternative Instrument for Social Policy 
 
†p<.25 *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
Note: N=56, clustered in 18 countries. Data sources in Table 21. Non-recursive SEMs predicting simultaneous effects for both DVs. The 
variable public opinion estimated as a latent variable of itself with a reliability of 0.35 calculated from the individual level data. 
ß ß ß ß ß
Social Policy 0.43 *** 0.07 0.73 *** 0.12 0.37 *** 0.07 0.41 † 0.07 0.24 † 0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
FLP (instrument) – 0.54 *** – 0.05 – 0.52 *** – 0.04 – 0.54 *** – 0.05 – 0.48 *** – 0.04 – 0.53 *** – 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Aged 0.24 † 0.09 0.17 0.06
(0.07) (0.06)
Individualism – 0.29 * – 0.02
(0.01)
Corporatism 0.40 * 0.34 0.39 ** 0.34
(0.18) (0.16)
English-Speaking – 0.31 – 0.52
(0.49)
intercept 0.19 1.60 1.76 1.45 1.31
-> Social Policy ß ß ß ß ß
Public Opinion – 0.11 – 0.66 – 0.65 ** – 0.65 – 0.21 – 1.16 – 0.37 ** – 2.08 – 0.14 – 0.74
(0.88) (0.27) (1.15) (1.05) (0.99)
Military Spending 0.13 3.44 0.75 *** 0.75 0.27 † 7.40 0.14 3.68 0.19 5.03
(6.49) (0.17) (5.36) (3.12) (5.52)
Aged 0.55 ** 1.10 0.36 * 0.73
(0.47) (0.39)
Individualism – 0.95 ** – 0.95
(0.46)
Corporatism 0.64 *** 3.06 0.47 ** 2.21
(1.15) (0.98)
English-Speaking – 0.97 *** – 9.20
(2.04)
intercept 3.24 37.16 18.31 23.86 8.30
coeff.(se) coeff.(se) coeff.(se) coeff.(se) coeff.(se)
-> Public Opinion
Demographics Social Institutions Political Institutions Historical Institutions Demographic/Political
coeff.(se) coeff.(se) coeff.(se) coeff.(se) coeff.(se)
  
Table 51. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Instrumental Variables Models shown in Table 50 
 
 
GOF indicies
CFI 1.00 0.65 0.92 1.00 0.94
r2 Public Opinion 0.47 *** 0.44 *** 0.51 *** 0.50 *** 0.53 **
r2 Social Policy     0.24 † Undetermined 0.29 † 0.56 *** 0.42 ***
AIC 1,062 1,237 951 844 1,185
free parameters 9 9 9 9 11
RMSEA 0.00 (0.00/0.24) 0.30 (0.15/0.47) 0.15 (0.00/0.34) 0.00 (0.00/0.20) 0.15 (0.00/0.34)
SRMR 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.04
Demographics Social Institutions Political Institutions Historical Institutions Demographic/Political
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11.2 Stata Syntax 
11.2.1 *Data Prep 
 
*The data utilized for this study have been downloaded from the Leibniz-Institut für 
Sozialwissenschaften (at www.gesis.org). The ISSP data files have been renamed with the 
self evident titles: "ISSP_85_RoleGovI.dta"; "ISSP_90_RoleGovII.dta"; 
"ISSP_91_ReligionI.dta"; "ISSP_96_RoleGovIII.dta"; "ISSP_98_ReligionII.dta"; 
"ISSP_06_RoleGov.dta". 
 
clear 
 
*ISSP 1985 Role of Gov I 
 
use "C:\Data\ISSP_85_RoleGovI.dta", clear 
 
recode v3 (1=36)(2=278)(3=826)(4=840)(5=40)(8=380), gen(countryx) 
gen year=1986 
recode v101 (1=4)(2=3)(3=2)(4=1), gen(govjobs) 
recode v107 (1=4)(2=3)(3=2)(4=1), gen(govincdiff) 
recode  v102 v103 v104 v105 v106 (1=4) (2=3) (3=2) (4=1), gen(govprices 
govhealth govold govind govunemp) 
gen weight85 = v141 
label var weight85 "Weight85" 
gen isco = v110 
gen age = v117 
gen sex = v118 
gen mar = v120 
gen edyrs = v122 
tab v127 
tab v128 
gen hhinc = v128 
sort countryx 
recode v109 (2=0), gen(unemp_i) 
save "C:\Data\ISSP85merge.dta", replace 
 
*ISSP 1990 Role of Gov II 
 
use "C:\Data\ISSP_90_RoleGovII.dta", clear 
recode v3 
(1=36)(2=278)(3=280)(4=826)(5=828)(6=840)(7=348)(8=380)(9=372)(10=578)(11
=376), gen(countryx) 
gen year=1990 
recode v49 (1=4)(2=3)(3=2)(4=1), gen(govjobs) 
recode v55 (1=4)(2=3)(3=2)(4=1), gen(govincdiff) 
recode v50 v51 v52 v53 v54  (1=4) (2=3) (3=2) (4=1), gen(govprices govhealth 
govold govind govunemp) 
gen weight90 = v114 
label var weight90 "Weight 90" 
 
gen sex = v59 
gen age = v60 
gen mar = v61 
gen lifep = v62 
gen isco = v66 
gen edyrs = v80 
gen lr = v87 
gen hhinc = v100 
recode v63 (5=1)(1/4=0)(6/10=0), gen(unemp_i) 
sort countryx 
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save "C:\Data\ISSP90merge.dta", replace 
 
 
*ISSP 1991 Religion I 
 
use "C:\Data\ISSP_91_ReligionI.dta", clear 
 
recode v3 
(18=36)(1=278)(2=280)(3=826)(4=828)(5=840)(6=348)(7=528)(8=380)(9=372)(10
=578)(11=40)(12=705)(13=616)(14=376)(15=608)(16=554)(17=643), 
gen(countryx) 
gen year=1991 
recode v5 (1=4)(2=3)(3=2)(4=1), gen(govjobs) 
recode v6 (1=4)(2=3)(3=2)(4=1), gen(govincdiff) 
gen weight91 = v131 
label var weight91 "Weight 91" 
 
*NO WEIGHT specified for Australia or it is 0 (highly unlikely), so I will 
recode it to 1 so that Australia doesn’t get dropped after the collapse 
with weights 
replace weight91=1 if countryx==36 
gen sex = v77 
gen age = v78 
gen mar = v79 
gen lifep = v80 
gen isco = v84 
gen edyrs = v98 
gen lr = v105 
gen hhinc = v118 
recode v81 (5=1)(1/4=0)(6/10=0), gen(unemp_i) 
sort countryx 
 
save "C:\Data\ISSP91merge.dta", replace 
 
 
*ISSP 1996 Role of Gov III 
 
use "C:\Data\ISSP_96_RoleGovIII.dta", clear 
 
recode v3 
(1=36)(2=278)(3=280)(4=826)(5=828)(6=840)(7=40)(8=348)(9=380)(10=372)(11=
528)(12=578)(13=752)(14=203)(15=705)(16=616)(17=100)(18=643)(19=554)(20=1
24)(21=608)(22=376)(23=376)(24=392)(25=724)(26=428)(27=250)(28=196)(30=75
6), gen(countryx) 
gen year=1996 
recode v36 (1=4)(2=3)(3=2)(4=1), gen(govjobs) 
recode v42 (1=4)(2=3)(3=2)(4=1), gen(govincdiff) 
recode v37 v38 v39 v40 v41  (1=4) (2=3) (3=2) (4=1), gen(govprices govhealth 
govold govind govunemp) 
gen weight96 = v325 
label var weight96 "Weight 96" 
gen sex = v200 
gen age = v201 
gen mar = v202 
gen lifep = v203 
gen edyrs = v204 
gen isco = v208 
gen lrS = v223 
recode v206 (5=1)(1/4=0)(6/10=0), gen(unemp_i) 
sort countryx 
 
save "C:\Data\ISSP96merge.dta", replace 
 
*ISSP 1998 Religion II 
 
use "C:\Data\ISSP_98_ReligionII.dta", clear 
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recode v3 
(1=36)(2=278)(3=280)(4=826)(5=828)(6=840)(7=40)(8=348)(9=380)(10=372)(11=
528)(12=578)(13=752)(14=203)(15=705)(16=616)(17=100)(18=643)(19=554)(20=1
24)(21=608)(22=376)(23=376)(24=392)(25=724)(26=428)(27=703)(28=250)(29=19
6)(30=620)(31=152)(32=208)(33=756), gen(countryx) 
gen year=1998 
recode v5 (1=4)(2=3)(3=2)(4=1), gen(govjobs) 
recode v6 (1=4)(2=3)(3=2)(4=1), gen(govincdiff) 
gen weight98 = v316 
label var weight98 "Weight 98" 
gen sex = v200 
gen age = v201 
gen mar = v202 
gen lifep = v203 
gen edyrs = v204 
gen isco = v208 
gen lrS = v223 
recode v206 (5=1)(1/4=0)(6/10=0), gen(unemp_i) 
sort countryx 
 
save "C:\Data\ISSP98merge.dta", replace 
 
*ISSP 2006 RoG 
 
use "C:\Data\ISSP_06_RoleGov.dta", clear 
 
clonevar countryx = V3a 
gen year=2006 
recode V25 (1=4)(2=3)(3=2)(4=1), gen(govjobs) 
tab govjobs 
recode V31 (1=4)(2=3)(3=2)(4=1), gen(govincdiff) 
tab govincdiff 
gen weight06 = WEIGHT 
gen sex = SEX 
gen age = AGE 
gen mar = MARITAL 
gen lifep = COHAB 
gen edyrs = EDUCYRS 
gen isco = ISCO88 
gen lrS = PARTY_LR 
recode WRKST (5=1)(1/4=0)(6/10=0), gen(unemp_i) 
sort countryx 
 
save "C:\Data\ISSP06merge.dta", replace 
11.2.2 *Scale Validation (2-items/7-items) 
 
use "C:\Data\ISSP96merge.dta ", clear 
 
*Use the 1996 data to validate the two items as part of the larger scale 
 
pwcorr govjobs govincdiff govprices govhealth govold govind govunemp sex age 
edyrs 
factor govjobs govincdiff govprices govhealth govold govind govunemp 
factor govjobs govincdiff govprices govhealth govold govind govunemp, factor(1) 
rotate, varimax 
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11.2.3 *Merge 
 
use "C:\Data\ISSP98merge.dta", clear 
 
 
append using "C:\Data\ISSP85merge.dta", keep(countryx year govjobs govincdiff 
sex age mar edyrs isco unemp_i weight85) 
append using "C:\Data\ISSP90merge.dta", keep(countryx year govjobs govincdiff 
sex age mar lifep edyrs isco unemp_i lr weight90) 
append using "C:\Data\ISSP91merge.dta", keep(countryx year govjobs govincdiff 
sex age mar lifep edyrs isco unemp_i lr weight91) 
append using "C:\Data\ISSP96merge.dta", keep(countryx year govjobs govincdiff 
sex age mar lifep edyrs isco unemp_i lrS weight96) 
append using "C:\Data\ISSP06merge.dta", keep(countryx year govjobs govincdiff 
sex age mar lifep edyrs isco unemp_i lrS weight06) 
 
*Fix Weights 
*1985 has a very strange weight variable that it seems will fall within the 
apppropriate range if divided by 100k. I cannot find anything online that 
discusses this problem so I will use it as /100,000. 
 
gen weight85adj = weight85/100000 
egen weight=rowmean(weight85adj weight90 weight91 weight96 weight98 weight06) 
drop weight85 weight85adj weight90 weight91 weight96 weight98 weight06 
 
*Generate Unique Case ID  
*Last two digits are the year and the preceeding digits are the ISO country 
codes. 
 
recode countryx (278 280=276) 
 
gen id = . 
 
replace id = 62006 if year==2006 & countryx==620 
replace id = 3686 if year==1986 & countryx==36 
replace id = 4086 if year==1986 & countryx==40 
replace id = 27685 if year==1986 & countryx==276 
*Questions not asked in Italy in 85 
replace id = 38086 if year==1986 & countryx==380 
replace id = 82685 if year==1986 & countryx==826 
replace id = 84085 if year==1986 & countryx==840 
replace id = 3690 if year==1990 & countryx==36 
replace id = 3693 if year==1991 & countryx==36 
replace id = 3696 if year==1996 & countryx==36 
replace id = 3698 if year==1998 & countryx==36 
replace id = 4093 if year==1991 & countryx==40 
replace id = 4099 if year==1998 & countryx==40 
replace id = 12496 if year==1996 & countryx==124 
replace id = 12499 if year==1998 & countryx==124 
replace id = 25097 if year==1996 & countryx==250 
replace id = 25098 if year==1998 & countryx==250 
replace id = 27690 if year==1990 & countryx==276 
replace id = 27691 if year==1991 & countryx==276 
replace id = 27696 if year==1996 & countryx==276 
replace id = 27698 if year==1998 & countryx==276 
replace id = 37291 if year==1990 & countryx==372 
replace id = 37291 if year==1991 & countryx==372 
replace id = 37296 if year==1996 & countryx==372 
replace id = 37298 if year==1998 & countryx==372 
replace id = 38091 if year==1990 & countryx==380 
replace id = 38090 if year==1991 & countryx==380 
replace id = 38096 if year==1996 & countryx==380 
replace id = 38098 if year==1998 & countryx==380 
replace id = 39296 if year==1996 & countryx==392 
replace id = 39298 if year==1998 & countryx==392 
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replace id = 52891 if year==1991 & countryx==528 
replace id = 52898 if year==1998 & countryx==528 
replace id = 55491 if year==1991 & countryx==554 
replace id = 55497 if year==1996 & countryx==554 
replace id = 55498 if year==1998 & countryx==554 
replace id = 57890 if year==1990 & countryx==578 
replace id = 57891 if year==1991 & countryx==578 
replace id = 57896 if year==1996 & countryx==578 
replace id = 57898 if year==1998 & countryx==578 
replace id = 72496 if year==1996 & countryx==724 
replace id = 72498 if year==1998 & countryx==724 
replace id = 75296 if year==1996 & countryx==752 
replace id = 75298 if year==1998 & countryx==752 
replace id = 75698 if year==1996 & countryx==756 
replace id = 75699 if year==1998 & countryx==756 
replace id = 82690 if year==1990 & countryx==826 
replace id = 82691 if year==1991 & countryx==826 
replace id = 82696 if year==1996 & countryx==826 
replace id = 82698 if year==1998 & countryx==826 
replace id = 84090 if year==1990 & countryx==840 
replace id = 84091 if year==1991 & countryx==840 
replace id = 84096 if year==1996 & countryx==840 
replace id = 84098 if year==1998 & countryx==840 
replace id = 3606 if year==2006 & countryx==36 
replace id = 12406 if year==2006 & countryx==124 
replace id = 20806 if year==2006 & countryx==208 
replace id = 24606 if year==2006 & countryx==246 
replace id = 25006 if year==2006 & countryx==250 
replace id = 27606 if year==2006 & countryx==276 
replace id = 82606 if year==2006 & countryx==826 
replace id = 37206 if year==2006 & countryx==372 
replace id = 39206 if year==2006 & countryx==392 
replace id = 52806 if year==2006 & countryx==528 
replace id = 55406 if year==2006 & countryx==554 
replace id = 57806 if year==2006 & countryx==578 
replace id = 72406 if year==2006 & countryx==724 
replace id = 75206 if year==2006 & countryx==752 
replace id = 75606 if year==2006 & countryx==756 
replace id = 84006 if year==2006 & countryx==840 
 
*The country-level measures are merged in from various sources, see Table 21 for 
details. All data are available in Table 43 and Table 44. The variable names used in the 
syntax are as follows. 
 
 
 
 
Public Opinion  govsAT 
Social Policy   socprotS 
FLP    femlabor 
Married   married 
Taxes Collected  taxpct 
Military Spending  milexpc 
Aged    aged 
Corporatism   corpc 
Individualism   hofindiv 
English-speaking  english 
Year    yearm 
Education   edyrs 
GDP    gdp_ppp  
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*you must install stata2mplus to use this function 
*after all variables are merged in, this command converts data from .dta to .dat 
 
stata2mplus using OpPol 
11.2.4 *Figures 
 
label define idc 3606 "OZ'06" 3686 "OZ'86" 3690 "OZ'90" 3696 "OZ'96" 3698 
"OZ'98" 4093 "AT'93" 4099 "AT'99" 12406 "CA'06" 12496 "CA'96" 20806 
"DK'08" 24606 "FI'06"  25006 "FR'06" 25097 "FR'97" 25098 "FR'98" 27606 
"DE'06" 27685 "DE'85" 27690 "DE'90" 27691 "DE'91" 27696 "DE'96" 27698 
"DE'98" 37206 "IE'06" 37291 "IE'91" 37296 "IE'96" 37298 "IE'98" 38091 
"IT'91" 38096 "IT'96" 38098 "IT'98" 39206 "JP'06" 39296 "JP'96" 39298 
"JP'98" 52806 "NL'06" 52891 "NL'91" 52898 "NL'98" 55406 "NZ'08" 55491 
"NZ'91" 55497 "NZ'97" 55498 "NZ'98" 57806 "NO'06" 57890 "NO'90" 57896 
"NO'96"  57898 "NO'98" 62006 "PT'06" 72406 "ES'06" 72496 "ES'96" 72498 
"ES'98" 75206 "SE'06" 75296 "SE'96" 75298 "SE'98" 75606 "CH'07" 75699 
"CH'99" 82606 "GB'06" 82685 "GB'85" 82690 "GB'90" 82691 "GB'91" 82696 
"GB'96" 82698 "GB'98" 84006 "US'06" 84085 "US'85" 84090 "US'90" 84091 
"US'91" 84096 "US'96" 84098 "US'98" 
label val id idc 
 
*Figure. Public Opinion and Social Policy in 18 Countries 
 
gen labelp=3 
replace labelp = 9 if id==12496 | id==39206 | id==82696 | id==82606 | id==52896 
| id==27696 | id==25006 | id==75206 | id==27685 | id==4093 
replace labelp=6 if id==3606 | id==55498 | id==25097 | id==52898 | id==57890 | 
id==82691 
replace labelp=10 if id==3696 
replace labelp=12 if id==27691 | id==57896 
twoway (scatter socprotS govsAT if english==1, mlabel(id) msymbol(O) 
mlabvpos(labelp) mlabs(vsmall) mlabc(black) mcolor(black) mlabgap(.1)) 
(scatter socprotS govsAT  if english==0, mlabel(id) msymbol(O) 
mlabvpos(labelp) mlabs(vsmall) mlabc(black) mcolor(black) mlabgap(.1)), 
legend(off) xtitle("Public Opinion: Support of Social Policy") 
ytitle("Social Policy: Welfare Spending as a % of GDP") 
 
*Figure. Public Opinion and Social Policy in 18 Countries by Institution 
 
twoway (scatter socprotS govsAT if english==1, msymbol(X) mcolor(black)) 
(scatter socprotS govsAT if english==0, msymbol(Th) mcolor(black)), 
xtitle("Public Opinion: Support of Social Policy") ytitle("Social Policy: 
Welfare Spending as a % of GDP") legend(order(1 "English-speaking" 2 
"European")) 
 
 
 
*Figure. Individualistic Social Norms and Social Policy 
 
preserve 
collapse hofindiv govsAT corpc socprotS english, by(countryx) 
tab countryx 
label define countryx 36 "OZ" 40 "AT" 124 "CA" 208 "DK" 246 "FI" 250 "FR" 276 
"DE" 372 "IE" 380 "IT" 392 "JP" 528 "NT" 554 "NZ" 578 "NO" 620 "PT" 724 
"ES" 752 "SE" 756 "CH" 826 "GB" 840 "US" 
label val countryx countryx 
 
twoway (scatter govsAT hofindiv if english==1, msymbol(O) mcolor(black) 
mlabel(countryx) mlabc(black)) (scatter govsAT hofindiv if english==0, 
msymbol(O) mcolor(black) mlabel(countryx) mlabc(black)), xtitle("Social 
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Institutions: Degreee of Individualism") ytitle("Public Opinion: Support 
of Social Policy") legend(off) 
 
*It makes more sense to compare social policy spending in just one year. Take 
2006 social policy spending and plot all countries. Otherwise they are 
biased by time. 
gen socprotX =. 
replace socprotX = 16.1 if countryx==36 
replace socprotX = 27.0 if countryx==40 
replace socprotX = 16.9 if countryx==124 
replace socprotX = 26.6 if countryx==208 
replace socprotX = 25.9 if countryx==246 
replace socprotX = 28.6 if countryx==250 
replace socprotX = 26.1 if countryx==276 
replace socprotX = 15.8 if countryx==372 
replace socprotX = 25.1 if countryx==380 
replace socprotX = 18.4 if countryx==392 
replace socprotX = 20.3 if countryx==528 
replace socprotX = 19.0 if countryx==554 
replace socprotX = 20.4 if countryx==578 
replace socprotX = 22.9 if countryx==620 
replace socprotX = 21.4 if countryx==724 
replace socprotX = 28.4 if countryx==752 
replace socprotX = 19.2 if countryx==756 
replace socprotX = 20.4 if countryx==826 
replace socprotX = 16.0 if countryx==840 
 
gen labelX = 3 
replace labelX = 9 if countryx == 36 | countryx == 250 
twoway (scatter socprotX hofindiv if english==1, msymbol(O) mcolor(black) 
mlabel(countryx) mlabc(black) mlabvpos(labelX)) (scatter socprotX 
hofindiv if english==0, msymbol(O) mcolor(black) mlabel(countryx) 
mlabc(black) mlabvpos(labelX)), xtitle("Social Institutions: Degreee of 
Individualism") ytitle("Social Policy: Welfare Spending as a % of GDP") 
legend(off) 
 
*Figure. Corporatist Political Institutions, Public Opinion and Social Policy 
 
gen labelp=3 
replace labelp=9 if countryx==578 
 
twoway (scatter govsAT corpc if english==1, msymbol(O) mcolor(black) 
mlabel(countryx) mlabvpos(labelp) mlabc(black)) (scatter govsAT corpc if 
english==0, msymbol(O) mcolor(black) mlabel(countryx) mlabvpos(labelp) 
mlabc(black)), xtitle("Political Institutions: Degreee of Corporatism") 
ytitle("Public Opinion: Support of Social Policy") legend(off) 
 
gen labelXX=3 
replace labelXX=9 if countryx==840 | countryx==246 
twoway (scatter socprotX corpc if english==1, msymbol(O) mcolor(black) 
mlabel(countryx) mlabvpos(labelXX) mlabc(black)) (scatter socprotX corpc 
if english==0, msymbol(O) mcolor(black) mlabel(countryx) 
mlabvpos(labelXX) mlabc(black)), xtitle("Political Institutions: Degreee 
of Corporatism") ytitle("Social Policy: Welfare Spending as a % of GDP ") 
legend(off) 
 
restore 
 
*Descriptive Statistics for Public Opinion and Social Policy Dataset 
 
use "/Data/OpPol.dta", clear 
 
sum govsAT socprotS aged married taxpct femlabor hofindiv corpc english 
sum milexpc if countryx!=840 
*country level 
preserve 
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collapse govsAT socprotS aged married femlabor hofindiv corpc english taxpct 
milexpc, by(countryx) 
sum govsAT socprotS aged married femlabor hofindiv corpc english taxpct  
sum milexpc if countryx!=840 
restore 
 
*Correlations for All Variables 
 
pwcorr govsAT socprotS femlabor married taxpct milexpc aged hofindiv corpc 
english yearm edyrs gdp_ppp 
pwcorr govsAT socprotS femlabor married taxpct milexpc aged hofindiv corpc 
english yearm edyrs gdp_ppp if countryx!=840 
*alternative correlations w/out US for 2nd Sensitivity model because US is a 
massive outlier in military spending 
*output a second dataset for MPLus  
 
drop if countryx==840 
 
stata2mplus using OpPolw 
 
11.3 MPlus Syntax 
Uni-Directional Regressions 
 
!This is an example of the regression predicting Public Opinion. Variations on this were 
produced using different mixtures of variables as shown in Table 23. 
 
Data: 
  File is C:/Data/OpPol.dat ; 
Variable: 
Names are  
     id countryx edyrs  socprotS gdp_ppp  aged  femlabor 
     taxpct  hofindiv govsAT married corpc yearm english  
     milexpc; 
  Usevariables are govsAT aged edyrs femlabor;  
  Cluster is countryx; 
Analysis:  
  Type = COMPLEX ; 
Model: 
  govsAT ON aged edyrs femlabor; 
Output: 
RES STDYX; 
 
!This is an example of the regression predicting Social Policy. Variations on this were 
produced using different mixtures of variables as shown in Table 24. 
 
Data: 
  File is C:/Data/OpPol.dat ; 
Variable: 
Names are  
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     id countryx edyrs  socprotS gdp_ppp  aged  femlabor 
     taxpct  hofindiv govsAT married corpc yearm english  
     milexpc; 
  Usevariables are socprotS married aged  femlabor;  
  Cluster is countryx; 
Analysis:  
  Type = COMPLEX ; 
Model: 
  socprotS ON  married aged  femlabor; 
Output: 
RES STDYX; 
 
Reciprocal Model w/ Instrumental Variables 
 
!This model is one variation of the different models employed to test for reciprocal 
causation between Public Opinion and Social Policy, as shown in Table 25. The error 
specified for Public Opinion is calculated from the alpha reliability of the two-items used 
to measure public opinion at the individual level. Alternative instrumental variables are 
modeled similarly as shown in Table 48 and Table 50. The model using Military 
Spending as an instrument is run on a datafile with the US cases dropped. 
 
Data: 
  File is C:/Data/OpPol.dat ; 
Variable: 
Names are  
     id countryx edyrs  socprotS gdp_ppp  aged  femlabor 
     taxpct  hofindiv govsAT married corpc yearm english  
     milexpc; 
Usevariables are 
     countryx socprotS govsAT corpc married femlabor; 
  Missing are all (-9999) ;  
  Cluster is countryx; 
Analysis:  
  Type = COMPLEX; 
  !MLR is default estimator 
   
Model: 
  govsAT (e1); 
   govsAT ON socprotS corpc femlabor; 
   socprotS ON govsAT corpc married; 
  Model Constraint: 
  e1=.3469; 
Output: 
STDYX; 
RES; 
TECH4; 
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